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Public Scoping Meeting
PEIS Reconfiguration of the
Nuclear Weapons Complex

Transcript of Comments
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Public Reading Room
U. S. Department of
Operations

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX RECONFIGURATION
PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
PUBLIC SCOPING MEETING

SEPTEMBER 22, 1993

NATIONAL GUARD ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES
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M O R N I N G S E S S I O N

1
2 MR. LAWSON: Good morning. My name is
3 Barry Lawson, and I'm pleased to welcome you to the
4 Washington scoping meeting on the Programmatic
5 Environmental Impact Statement on the Reconfiguration of
6 the DOE's Nuclear Weapons Complex. The goal of this
7 reconfiguration effort is to design a complex for the
8 future which DOE calls Complex-21. I am President of
9 Barry Lawson and Associates of Concord, Massachusetts,
10 and I am not an employee of the Department of Energy nor
11 do I act as its advocate. I have been retained to serve
12 as the moderator at this meeting which I plan to conduct
13 in a fair and impartial manner.

14 Scoping is part of the public
15 participation process required in preparation of an
16 Environmental Impact Statement. It provides an
17 opportunity for you to be involved in the decision-making
18 process for major federal actions that could have an
19 impact on the environment.

20 The purpose of this meeting is to give
21 you an opportunity to identify for the record the
22 significant issues and concerns that you believe DOE
23 should consider in the preparation of the Environmental
24 Impact Statement, or the PEIS as it will be referred to
25 from time to time, for reconfiguration of the Nuclear

1 Weapons Complex. A little later I will tell you some of
2 the procedures we will follow in this meeting.

3 The purpose of today's meeting.
4 therefore, is to provide a forum for you to give the
5 Department your comments on the proposed scope of the
6 PEIS as described in the Federal Register notice dated
7 July 23, 1993. Copies of this notice are available at
8 the registration desk in the lobby.

9 In addition to oral comments presented
10 today, written comments are welcomed and will receive
11 equal consideration. You can either give us written
12 comments today or mail them to the Department of Energy.
13 You may get the address from the registration desk, as
14 well. The Department will then prepare a draft
15 Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement after it has
16 reviewed and incorporated the oral and the written
17 comments that they will receive during this scoping
18 period.

19 Now, this is a formal meeting of the
20 Department of Energy to receive input for the record, and
21 although we may ask you clarification -- questions of
22 clarification to make sure we understand your comments
23 and suggestions, our primary job is to listen. Written
24 comments must be postmarked by October 29th, 1993, to
25 ensure proper consideration in preparing the draft

1 Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement. Late
2 comments will be considered to the extent practicable.
3 Those interested in asking questions about the
4 reconfiguration program in a more informal session can do
5 so in the outer lobby outside where you came in.
6 Representatives of the Department are available to listen
7 to and to respond to the questions and concerns. Please
8 remember that these conversations will not be part of the
9 formal record. In order for your comments to be included
10 in the formal record, you need to present them orally or
11 submit them in writing either today or by mail to the
12 Department by October 29th.

13 Right now, I would like to introduce
14 to you Stephen Sohinki who will present a brief
15 background on the reconfiguration program. Mr. Sohinki
16 is the Director of Environment, Safety, Health and
17 Quality Assurance in the Weapons Complex Reconfiguration
18 Office here in Washington.

19 MR. SOHINKI: Thank you, Mr. Lawson.
20 I also want to welcome you here today to this public
21 scoping meeting regarding the Programmatic Environmental
22 Impact Statement on reconfiguring the nation's nuclear
23 weapons complex.

24 For the past several decades the
25 Department of Energy and its predecessor agencies have

1 been responsible for designing, producing and maintaining
2 the weapons that have supported the nuclear deterrence
3 policies and requirements that have been set by the --
4 established by the Presidents of the United States and
5 supported by the Congress. The present administration
6 has reiterated this commitment to a strong nuclear
7 deterrent. The facilities at which nuclear weapons have
8 been produced in this country were designed and sized at
9 a time when very large stockpiles of weapons were being
10 built and maintained by both the United States and the
11 former Soviet Union.

12 Further, these facilities were
13 designed and constructed long before the stringent
14 environment, safety and health requirements that are now
15 in forced were established. As a result, it's becoming
16 increasingly more difficult to comply with those
17 requirements at our facilities, if we can do so at all.

18 Two and a half years ago, the
19 Department initiated the preparation of this Programmatic
20 Environmental Impact Statement with the expressed aim of
21 achieving a smaller, less diverse weapons complex that
22 was less expensive to operate than the current complex.
23 Even at that time, it was recognized that because of
24 agreements, such as Start I and other signs that tensions
25 were easing between the east and west, the complex of the

1 future would be very different than the complex that we
2 envisioned in the 1940's and '50's.

3 In the past several years, we have
4 seen momentous changes in the world which no one really
5 could have envisioned just shortly before they occurred.
6 With the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the
7 Communist governments of Eastern Europe, the tearing down
8 of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, the
9 unilateral arms reduction initiatives which have occurred
10 and the Start II Treaty which has been signed have been
11 made possible. These initiatives will result in a
12 stockpile that's just twenty-five percent of the levels
13 that were planned just five years ago. As a result,
14 there are no current or near term requirements for the
15 production of new nuclear weapons.

16 With these changes, the Department
17 faces new and different challenges in carrying out its
18 responsibilities regarding the Nuclear Weapons Complex
19 and stockpile. Regardless of whether we make any new
20 weapons, the Department must continue to support the
21 enduring stockpile, including surveillance activities,
22 maintenance of existing weapons, and ensuring the safety
23 and security of the stockpiled weapons with limited or no
24 underground testing. We must also dismantle and provide
25 safe and secure storage for nuclear materials that have

1 been moved from the retired weapons until such time as a
2 decision is made regarding the use or disposition of
3 those materials.

4 Finally, we must be prepared to resume
5 weapons design, development and fabrication should
6 changing world conditions ever warrant that decision.

7 The Department has re-evaluated its
8 planning effort for the future nuclear weapons complex in
9 light of these challenges. We now envision and are able
10 to plan for an even smaller complex and one that is even
11 less costly to operate than the one we envisioned at the
12 inception of the PEIS process two and a half years ago.

13 The focus of our planning has changed
14 from stand-alone production capability to maintenance of
15 the existing weapons and stewardship of the special
16 nuclear materials involved. In addition, exciting new
17 technological developments are occurring which will
18 enable the Department to carry out its necessary weapons
19 complex activities in a manner which will emphasize
20 pollution prevention, waste minimization and which will
21 minimize risk to the public, workers and the environment.

22 All of these results taken together
23 have resulted in several important changes in the
24 reconfiguration proposal. These changes were detailed in
25 the revised Notice of Intent which was published on July

1 23rd. We have added a proposal for a consolidated,
2 long-term storage facility for plutonium and one for
3 highly enriched uranium. With the emphasis on an even
4 smaller and more consolidated complex, we are now
5 proposing that if new facilities are built, all storage,
6 processing, and component fabrication activities
7 involving like materials would be located at the same
8 site. For example, it simply makes no sense for a
9 plutonium storage facility to be built at one location
10 and a fabrication facility at another location. To do so
11 would require duplicative facilities, needless
12 transportation of nuclear materials and additional costs
13 which cannot be justified.

14 In addition, we are evaluating the
15 option of consolidating plutonium and uranium research
16 and development activities, which are now carried on at
17 the National Laboratory, at whatever sites are selected
18 for other plutonium and uranium functions. We are also
19 proposing to add the Nevada Test Site and to delete the
20 Hanford site as candidate sites for new weapons complex
21 functions.

22 The international events and arms
23 reduction initiatives about which I have spoken have also
24 resulted in decisions by the Department to eliminate
25 weapons complex missions at the Rocky Flats Plant and

1 transition of that site to an environmental restoration
2 mission, as well as to place the K-Reactor at Savannah
3 River in a cold stand-by condition with no provisions or
4 plans for restart to make tritium in the future. The
5 alternatives which we propose to discuss in the PEIS
6 have, in turn, been affected by those decisions.

7 In view of the fundamental
8 re-evaluation of the reconfiguration program that's taken
9 place since the original Notice of Intent was published
10 in February of 1991, The Department decided that it
11 should conduct these additional -- this additional round
12 of scoping hearings or meetings to present our proposed
13 changes and receive your input. The Department will
14 consider all oral and written comments made during these
15 scoping meetings and written comments made or sent to us
16 on or before October 29th in determining the scope of the
17 Programmatic Impact Statement.

18 We intend to publish a revised
19 implementation plan near the end of this year, and to
20 publish a draft Programmatic Impact Statement for public
21 comment in the spring of next year with a final PEIS at
22 the end of next year and a record of decision in early
23 1995.

24 Well, on behalf of the Department,
25 then, I'd like to thank you for being here to assist us

1 in planning the scope of the PEIS. Your comments and the
2 informal discussions that we'll have outside this room
3 are important to us in making decisions regarding the
4 scope of the document, and I will now turn the
5 proceedings back to Mr. Lawson. Thank you.

6 MR. LAWSON: Thank you. I would like
7 to take a few minutes to discuss the simple procedures
8 that I will follow at this meeting.

9 Anyone who wishes to speak must first
10 register, and if you want to speak and have not
11 registered, there is a table outside that says,
12 Registration, and just go out there and sign in, if you
13 would, please.

14 I will call each speaker in the order
15 that they have registered from a list that has been
16 prepared at the registration table. If you have
17 preregistered, I will call you as close as possible to
18 the time you have scheduled, or if I have spoken to you
19 this morning about changing your time, I will call you at
20 that revised time. There is a time limit of five minutes
21 per speaker. Please try to conclude your comments within
22 that time frame. The Department has set this limit to
23 ensure that everyone who wants to speak has that
24 opportunity, but I do say that I have the flexibility and
25 discretion to allow additional time to speak if there is

1 time available, and during the day today we will have
2 time available. So, after you have made your five
3 minutes -- given your five minutes of testimony, if there
4 is time either then or later in the day, if you would
5 like additional time, I would certainly consider that.

6 I will not limit the content of the
7 statements that are made here today, but I will remind
8 you that the most valuable initial comments to DOE are
9 those that are addressed to the scope of the Programmatic
10 Environmental Impact Statement. Please remember that
11 only the comments that are made from the speaker's stand
12 or submitted in writing can be formally considered by the
13 DOE in determining the scope of the Impact Statement.

14 A court reporter is recording the
15 comments presented at this meeting. Our reporter today
16 is Ann Wingo, who is seated over here to my right. She
17 is not a DOE employee. She will be making a verbatim
18 transcript of all the comments received today, and these
19 transcripts will become part of the DOE record for these
20 meetings. The Department will place the transcripts in
21 reading rooms which are located across the country as
22 soon as possible after these meetings. A list of the
23 locations of all DOE reading rooms has been provided in
24 your registration packets. Additional copies are
25 available at the registration table. I will just remind

1 you that the reading room for this particular area is in
2 the Freedom of Information Reading Room, that is Room
3 1E-190 in the Forestall Building at 1000 Independence
4 Avenue.

5 I'll begin taking your comments in a
6 few minutes. When I call your name, please come forward
7 to the microphone at the speaker's podium to -- across
8 from me here and give your name and address for the court
9 reporter. And if you're speaking for an organization,
10 please identify clearly that organization. I encourage
11 speakers to provide written copies of their comments for
12 the record. If your comments cite material prepared by
13 others, and if you want to include those citations in the
14 record, please let me have a copy of them so that I can
15 read them into the record. Remember that DOE will
16 evaluate all comments, oral and written, equally.

17 As we have mentioned a couple of times
18 already, if, after this meeting, you want to submit
19 further comments, you may do so until the end of October,
20 October the 29th, more specifically.

21 Please give any written materials and
22 exhibits you wish to submit today as part of the record
23 to me so that they can be properly recorded.

24 Organizations are asked not to bring
25 posters or signs into this meeting room. If you wish to

1 display information or make handout material available to
2 the public, you may do so, and please check at the
3 registration desk for the area which has been designated
4 for this purpose.

5 In conclusion, I ask that you not
6 carry on conversations in this room that might interfere
7 with the proceedings. I also remind you that this is a
8 non-smoking room, as is the question and answer area
9 outside. We ask you to obey the rules established by the
10 owners of this building.

11 Today's schedule calls for the morning
12 session to last until 1:00. Then we will recess for one
13 hour for lunch. This afternoon's session will run from
14 2:00 to 5:00 p.m. This evening's meeting will begin at
15 6:30 and is scheduled to adjourn at 9:30.

16 Now, I will call our first speaker,
17 and as I will do throughout the day, will call the names
18 of the following two speakers so they can be prepared to
19 come forward. Now, we have shuffled the roster a little
20 bit this morning. The first person I will be calling on
21 is Brian Costner, and he would be followed by Stephen
22 Schwartz -- is Mr. Schwartz here? Is D.J. Campbell here?
23 You'll be the second speaker, ma'am, and is Tom Collins
24 here? You will be the third speaker. Mr. Costner.

25 9:34

BRIAN COSTNER

1 Well, what a way to start a morning.
2 My name is Brian Costner. I'm Director of Energy
3 Research Foundation in Columbia, South Carolina, and I'm
4 going to be attending a few more of these hearings, and
5 will submit written comments sometime before October
6 29th.

7 But for today, I just wanted to give a
8 bit of an overview of a few of the issues that I think
9 are important. I think from the outside, it's important
10 to congratulate everyone that's involved in this effort
11 on making some, I think, very important decisions that
12 are moving things in the right direction.

13 I've watched this whole effort to
14 rebuild the weapons complex develop over the last several
15 years, and I think it's very encouraging to see that what
16 was once a plan to essentially rebuild the infrastructure
17 in place with multiple new reactors and new plutonium
18 processing facilities and all the capabilities,
19 essentially, of the current complex, that now we are
20 looking at really something significantly reduced in
21 scale, capacity and capability from what's been
22 considered in the past, and I know that took a lot of
23 people within the Department of Energy really some strong
24 will and effort on their part to see that things change,
25 to, at least, begin reflecting the realities of the

1 post-Cold War world.

2 I think the question before us now,
3 though, is how far is that going to go and has it really
4 gone far enough, and it seems to me that there some real
5 reason to question whether, in fact, we can't go further
6 in delaying some decisions about the future of the
7 complex and continuing to evaluate the appropriate size
8 and capabilities that are needed for a future complex in
9 order to truly match the end of the Cold War. And part
10 of that depends on how you view our options at this
11 point. I know the Department of Energy's current
12 position is that they have a mission from Congress to
13 maintain the arsenal and nuclear deterrence is still a
14 critical part of our national security policy, and that's
15 what is driving the current thought.

16 But I'm rather disappointed that the
17 most recent Notice of Intent leaves out, for instance, I
18 thought, one of the better elements of the
19 reconfiguration study in the efforts from a couple of
20 years ago, and that was the intention of looking at a
21 range of stockpile sizes and coming up with what is the
22 requirement for different degrees of reduction in the
23 arsenal.

24 And as I understand the current
25 thinking, it is that there somehow has been achieved a

1 low enough stockpile size that additional reductions
2 would not be reflected in any kind of changes and
3 capabilities, or that somehow through a modular approach
4 to the weapons complex, that decisions can be made now
5 about the future.

6 I think, though, that with the Cold
7 War over, we really have a challenge in front of us to
8 see how much we can now do toward bringing the world
9 community, not just the United States and the former
10 Soviet Union, but the world community into line with
11 controlling this spread of nuclear weapons and actually
12 reducing the arsenal sizes. And as many people have
13 speculated, the United States is taking its arsenal down
14 to about five thousand warheads over the next ten years.
15 That still puts us significantly ahead of most other
16 countries in the world. So, I think that it's very
17 critical that we look at further reduction if we're going
18 to make this a truly international effort. And as you
19 well know, a number of people, including the National
20 Academy of Sciences, a number of people and organizations
21 have talked about minimal deterrence capabilities of a
22 thousand warheads or fewer.

23 A number of people, of course, also
24 talk frequently and have been talking for years about
25 moving the world toward eliminating all nuclear weapons,

1 and I think that would not only be appropriate for the
2 Department of Energy, but I really think, and in many
3 regard, that it's critical for the success of this
4 progress that DOE consider those options when evaluating
5 the alternatives in the PEIS.

6 Now, there may be many in DOE that say
7 that you can't consider this option because Congress
8 hasn't agreed to some of them, and you can guess whether
9 or not Congress would ever agree to them, but it's
10 important, then, to recall that within an Environmental
11 Impact Statement, it's very appropriate for DOE to look
12 at alternatives which DOE doesn't currently have a
13 mandate to pursue, and that in looking at those
14 alternatives, not only will I think you put DOE in a
15 better position to make a good decision, but you will
16 also, I think, enhance the public credibility of this
17 process.

18 I think another generic category that
19 is very important for the PEIS's is related to the
20 information quality. A lot of the documentation that's
21 come out of the Energy Department in the past has
22 suffered and it is often very heavily criticized because,
23 perhaps, first of all, scientifically, it just doesn't
24 all fit together quite right, and it's not at all
25 uncommon to see DOE documents embroiled in controversy

1 about whether or not they are scientifically accurate,
2 whether or not they are credible. So, I think that it's
3 worth issuing a challenge to the people that are going to
4 be preparing this document to really make it a top
5 priority that the information is of good quality and to
6 pursue ways of doing that. Maybe part of it is bringing
7 in some better elements of peer review instead of
8 developing this all behind closed doors or with
9 contractors and then releasing it at the end for public
10 comment. Maybe it would be very appropriate,
11 particularly on some of the scientific calculations and
12 those sorts of things to have some peer review.

13 And another thing that I think is also
14 important is the way this is written, I think it needs to
15 be very straightforward. You have got to have the
16 credible science there. You have got to have it so that
17 technical people can look at the information and can
18 check your calculations and those sorts of things, but it
19 also has to be laid out in a way that people can just
20 understand it, that it's not sort of always skipping the
21 real point. In a lot of cases the real point is, you
22 know, how many truckloads are going to be coming through
23 my neighborhood if a plutonium storage facility is built
24 in my back yard. Don't confuse people with talks about
25 either classified information or -- and then not giving

1 them anything, or putting them in such obscure terms that
2 you don't get to the bottom line which is how many times
3 a day am I going to see this truck wheeling around the
4 corner. Look at that in all the categories of
5 information, and just try to really write this in a
6 different way than many EIS's have been written in the
7 past.

8 Finally, coming from South Carolina
9 which is I think probably most everybody in this room
10 knows, has been for a good decade or longer, been
11 fighting for new, multi-billion-dollar construction
12 projects for the Savannah River Site are very sensitive
13 to the need not to turn this into a pork race, not to
14 hold out promises of golden carrots, and this steps a
15 little bit outside of the formal PEIS process because
16 what I'm going to ask for is not entirely just what's in
17 the document, but really how you deal with the public
18 when you're going through this process. People have
19 this, in South Carolina, which is a very conservative
20 state, this odd tendency to, on the one hand, vote for
21 very conservative candidates and insist on fiscal
22 responsibility on reducing the tax burden on Americans,
23 on controlling the size of the Federal Government, in
24 particular, and on the other hand, of lobbying very, very
25 hard for Federal big dollar projects. You know, you have

1 got to allow people to be irrational, but I think you
2 also have to be responsible in dealing with them. And
3 many of the job estimates that you've floated around
4 about these projects are highly suspect. The potential
5 impacts on the local community are often very distorted.
6 It's seen, very often, as an all or nothing; either we
7 are going to get these new, Multi-billion-dollar bomb
8 plants and everybody's going to live in bliss, or
9 Savannah River Site or some other plant is going to be
10 shut down, and I think it's up to the Department of
11 Energy to help in an effort to really make this more
12 realistic. That there isn't any plant that is going to
13 be shut down overnight regardless of the decisions, and
14 even the decisions that involve the most construction
15 that the PEIS would consider, you know, the impacts for
16 employment are rather short-termed. In many cases, they
17 involve boom and bust scenarios where you have a
18 construction activity that really accelerates for a
19 couple of years and then it fades away. And I think you
20 just need to make sure that that point gets communicated
21 as well.

22 And finally, in that regard, let me
23 say I just came back from Amarillo, Texas where I hold
24 some -- I heard some rather interesting stories about
25 some of the things that people think DOE is going to

1 provide in the future, everything from apparently there
2 are some local business folks that think that somehow
3 there is going to be work done at Pantex, perhaps, or
4 local universities to figure out how to convert plutonium
5 from warheads into batteries that last a lifetime. So,
6 there's obviously a bit of confusion about the type of
7 plutonium being discussed.

8 I think that the restructuring
9 activities that are going on in the complex, the efforts
10 of technology transfer, while they're not entirely a part
11 of the Programmatic E.I.S, DOE needs to look at things in
12 a more -- what I'm hearing very often called, a systems
13 view to sort of break down the barriers between the
14 different silos within the Department and realize that
15 the discussions that are taking place in this are
16 influencing in many ways what people are planning for the
17 future of these communities, and I think that it really
18 takes a departmental effort, I mean, including the people
19 developing this programmatic E.I.S. to help folks in
20 these local communities understand what are realistic
21 options for the future of a site like Pantex, Savannah
22 River or Oak Ridge, with or without any of these
23 Complex-21 facilities. And I think that, you know, there
24 are a lot of good people in DOE that can help folks in
25 the local communities better understand what the

1 realistic options are, and it seems to me that if people
2 are focusing on those, there's a greater chance of
3 success and a greater chance of stability in the local
4 economies than if you have folks that are chasing off
5 stuff blowing in the wind that just isn't very likely to
6 come to be.

7 So, you'll be hearing from me more
8 later, and thanks very much.

9 THE MODERATOR: Thank you, Mr.
10 Costner.

11 MR. SOHINKI: Thank you.

12 THE MODERATOR: The next speaker this
13 morning will be D. J. Campbell to be followed by
14 Tom Collina. Did I get that better this time?
15 And Stephen Schwartz. Ms. Campbell.

16 9:45 D. J. CAMPBELL

17 My name is D. J. Campbell, and I thank
18 the U.S. Government for giving me an opportunity to
19 speak. This morning I am bringing you a report from 2809
20 Fulsom Lane in Bowie, Maryland.

21 I would like, as a matter of fact, if
22 you would probably give me a little extra time, and if
23 you have questions you can ask me as I go along. I
24 didn't get enough sleep last night, and I've had too much
25 coffee. So, ignore my voice.

1 I'm here to tell you that we have a
2 limited Constitution. Powers are reserved to the people.
3 And I'm here to share with you my exhibits. This is
4 Federalist Papers, and Federalist Papers number 78, on
5 page 467 says, "There is no position which depends on
6 clearer principles than that every act of the delegated
7 authority contrary to the tenor of the commission under
8 which it is exercised is void. No legislative act
9 therefore contrary to the Constitution can be valid".
10 It's really important. There are very few Americans
11 sitting in front of their televisions that know the
12 constitution, and there are even less people here in
13 Washington, although they all are sworn to uphold it.

14 This is the National Security Act. It
15 was enacted in 1947, and it set up a covert government
16 and that is what all this is part of. We have a civil
17 republic. We're not supposed to be a military state. It
18 set up the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense
19 Department, the National Security Council. One of the
20 things it was supposed to do was share its intelligence.
21 Most of that intelligence has been used by the Executive
22 Branch which has become overpowered. Our balance of
23 power has been totally destroyed. We have a neutralized
24 Congress, we have a packed Supreme Court.

25 I'm going to run through this a little

1 bit because most Americans don't know what this is all
2 about. It set up the National Security Agency, the Armed
3 Services Intelligence, the Bureau of Intelligence and
4 Research, the National Reconnaissance Office, the Bureau
5 of Investigation, and the Departments of Treasury,
6 Energy, Drug Enforcement, and the Atomic Energy
7 Commission. Now, what they did was they put an automatic
8 tap on our U.S. Treasury to develop the ideas of the
9 Third Reich. They brought in criminals and Nazi
10 scientists to develop these weapons, and it's all been
11 done in secret.

12 I'm here as a citizen, I paid my own
13 way in. Nobody is paying for me today. As I said, the
14 activities and expenditures of this covert subgovernment
15 since 1947 has not been reported to the people. So, I go
16 back to our constitution, and this is Article One,
17 Section 9 that says, "No money shall be drawn from the
18 Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by
19 law. And a regular statement and account of receipts and
20 expenditures of all public money shall be published from
21 time to time". We have had no accounting on any of the
22 expenditures or activities of the National Security
23 Council for what now, forty-six years. That's nearly
24 half a century, Gentlemen -- Ladies and Gentlemen.

25 Now, I have been to a nuclear test

1 site twice. It's a beautiful desert ecology and when you
2 drive down the road, you see the sun doing wonderful
3 things on the mountains. It says U.S. Government
4 Property, but it's not U.S. Government Property, it
5 belongs to the Shoshoni Indians, and it's a violation of
6 a treaty that we made with the Indians. We are
7 desecrating their lands. We didn't lease it, we didn't
8 rent it, and we didn't buy it.

9 Now, I'm going to go through some of
10 the things here in the U.S. Government Manual, and I
11 found that it doesn't say anything about what's happening
12 to the hazardous waste, and, of course, we all kind of
13 know that the hazardous waste is being handled by the
14 Mafia. We have U.S. government contracts now given to
15 these people and they have become very legitimate, and as
16 somebody already mentioned, they are driving the stuff up
17 and down our roads in the dark of night. I was on an
18 environmental caucus in California which is, what, seven
19 hundred miles. People came in from the various counties
20 and reported to us this stuff in the dark of night is
21 being injected into our soil. They're calling it deep
22 injection. Another thing they are doing is trying to
23 turn it into fertilizer. They are literally making us
24 eat our nuclear waste.

25 Now, I, a few weeks ago, had a

1 neighbor turn on another flood light. I have got flood
2 lights all over so I can't see the moon and I can't see
3 the stars, and I said, well, what is it that's happening
4 with this electricity, and what do our householders need
5 to know in order to deal with this. They're not getting
6 any information. So, I thought, well, how many trees are
7 they burning down to run a flood light all night.

8 So, I started calling around and found
9 it very difficult, but it turned out that every rock I
10 picked up had slimy things under it. So, I finally got
11 hold of somebody at Baltimore Gas and Electric and they
12 verbally gave me some more shocking statistics. They
13 said that nine percent of my electricity in Bowie,
14 Maryland comes from natural gas, forty percent from coal
15 and oil and twenty-five percent from nuclear. That adds
16 up to about seventy-five percent. I don't know what the
17 rest is, but other sources have told me that our nuclear
18 use in Bowie, Maryland is now probably as high as forty
19 percent.

20 And also I found out on these
21 obscuring utility bills that there's something here
22 called taxes and surcharges. They are charging me every
23 month for possible future nuclear development. Our
24 householders don't know this and they have no way of
25 getting this information. I talked to the Maryland

1 Utility Commissioner and he was too important to talk to
2 people.

3 Now, I know how our people feel in
4 Bowie about these roads, and we've already had accidents
5 right near my intersection. The police cordon them off
6 and they don't tell us what it is, and we know it's
7 hazardous waste. Now, our public officials and civil
8 servants are supposed to be planning for our future in
9 terms of the principles and ideals of this country. And
10 we are not, as ancient Rome, Hitler and George Bush said,
11 working for a new "Vorld" order.

12 THE MODERATOR: Ms. Campbell, I would
13 like to give you another two minutes now. If
14 you have other comments after we have the other
15 speakers, if you would like to continue beyond
16 that time.

17 MS. CAMPBELL: Well, I'm just about
18 through if you can indulge me a few more.

19 THE MODERATOR: Two minutes.

20 MS. CAMPBELL: I'm just about through.

21 Now, what we have done here is we have
22 kept alive the spirit of Fascism, and our purpose in the
23 United States of America is written on our dollar bill.
24 E pluribus unum; out of many, one. They are supposed to
25 be working on the new order of the ages, it says it right

1 here where that comment is. These are looped profiting
2 systems, and what's happening in Bowie, Maryland is they
3 are beefing up the use of nuclear all the time, so we
4 won't know, so we'll be trapped as we are with our cars.

5 Now, the other thing I wanted to just
6 go over with you is the United States Government Manual.
7 I want to just touch on some points in here, so it will
8 take me a few more minutes if you will let me.

9 THE MODERATOR: As long as you are not
10 going to read the entire document.

11 MS. CAMPBELL: I certainly am not. I
12 have looked up the things that have to do with nuclear.
13 This is an old government manual, it's dated 1990, pages
14 244 and 269 all have to do with covert military
15 activities. These are the people that are planning our
16 future. It has nothing to do with the constitution, and
17 it's all right in here. Then, the next part that
18 mentions this is the Department of Energy, and another
19 thing about this, it's done by the Department of Defense,
20 and they are military people. They are not civilians.
21 This is supposed to be a civilian-run government. The
22 large budgets evidently here in the Department of Energy
23 have to do with radioactive waste, and as I look through
24 this manual, they don't talk about what they are doing
25 with the military waste. They seem to be passing their

1 waste onto us civilians. They talk about nuclear energy
2 and you can all look through this because you can get
3 hold of these. And then there's the Nuclear Regulatory
4 Commission, and those people are not even civil servants,
5 and then there's the Freedom of Information. Freedom of
6 Information is like the War Powers Act. This is
7 obscuring our constitutional law.

8 And then the last mention in here is
9 the International Atomic Energy. Now, all these people
10 are talking about peace and health and prosperity, but
11 our power plants were set up in order to create the
12 plutonium they needed for weapons conversion.

13 So, in closing, I would like to remind
14 you that what we want are alternatives, we need money to
15 be going into things that don't hurt people, and it says
16 also on that dollar bill, the Divine have smiled upon our
17 undertaking, but that's only, Gentlemen, if we fulfill
18 our constitutional duties. Thank you.

19 THE MODERATOR: Thank you, Ms.
20 Campbell.

21 MR. SOHINKI: Thank you, Ms. Campbell.

22 THE MODERATOR: Our next speaker this
23 morning will be Tom Collina to be followed by
24 Stephen Schwartz. Is Mr. Schwartz here?

25 MR. SCHWARTZ: Yes.

1 THE MODERATOR: Is Drew Caputo here?

2 You will be next after that.

3 9:56 TOM ZAMORA COLLINA

4 I am Tom Zamora Collina, Director of
5 Policy and Research at the Institute for Science and
6 International Security, located at 236 Massachusetts
7 Avenue, Northeast, Suite 500, Washington, D.C. 20002.

8 I appreciate the opportunity to
9 address this hearing on the scope of the draft PEIS. As
10 part of my testimony, I'm submitting, for the record, a
11 just released copy of an ISIS report which includes
12 comments on the PEIS's scope and elaborates on the issues
13 I will discuss here today.

14 I'd like to make three main
15 recommendations which the draft PEIS should examine. The
16 first goes to something that Brian Costner was talking
17 about in the problematic situation of trying to plan a
18 future weapons complex before you know where the arsenal
19 is going. To help with that situation, to help DOE out
20 with that situation, the first recommendation is that DOE
21 can delay decisions about the size and location of new
22 production plants until the end of the century. The U.S.
23 nuclear arsenal that will remain after planned reductions
24 are implemented is not expected to need new nuclear
25 components or additional tritium production for around

1 twenty years. As a result, DOE does not need to make
2 decisions about when and where to build new production
3 facilities until at least 2000. In the meantime,
4 continued arsenal reductions could delay the need for new
5 plants even further, and at that time, DOE will have a
6 better idea of the future stockpile.

7 Second, DOE should focus its near-term
8 efforts on warhead dismantlement, storage and disposal.
9 With no need to build new nuclear production plants any
10 time soon, DOE can focus its efforts in the near-term on
11 more pressing issues. Warhead dismantlement must keep
12 pace with International agreements and the warheads'
13 nuclear components must be safely stored and ultimately
14 disposed of, possibly under international inspection.
15 The current scope of the PEIS ignores the crucial issues
16 of plutonium disposal and how to make these processes
17 more transparent to international inspection.

18 Third, DOE should create an
19 independent panel to oversee the reconfiguration process.
20 Responsible oversight by independent, non-governmental
21 experts can help ensure that the future complex is no
22 larger than necessary, and is built to inflict the least
23 possible environmental damage.

24 In the brief time left, I will focus
25 my comments on how DOE can delay construction decisions

1 and why this is a prudent thing to do. Today, DOE has no
2 plan to build new nuclear weapons for the foreseeable
3 future as was mentioned earlier. In fact, the arsenal is
4 in the process of being reduced from some twenty thousand
5 to five thousand warheads. Nevertheless, as DOE looks
6 toward the next century, it has emphasized the need to
7 build new production plants. After an extensive survey
8 of the complex, we conclude that there is simply no
9 reason to make construction decisions any time soon. Any
10 near-term decisions to construct new production plants
11 runs the risk of wasting billions of dollars on
12 unnecessary oversized facilities.

13 As the U.S. Arsenal gets smaller,
14 fewer weapons must be maintained by the complex and a
15 smaller capacity is needed. In fact, arsenal reductions
16 are solving many of DOE's problems including the need to
17 rebuild the complex any time soon. For example, the
18 arsenal that will remain after plant reductions are
19 carried out is modern, safe and reliable. With an
20 effective maintenance program, this arsenal can provide
21 more than adequate security for many years with little of
22 the production complex operating. These warheads are not
23 expected to need replacement until well after the end of
24 the century. As a result, DOE does not need to make
25 decisions about when and where to build new plants for

1 many years. In the meantime, continued reductions could
2 delay the need for new plants even further and reduce
3 their required production capacity.

4 Fortunately, there's time to wait and
5 see where the arsenal is going before building new
6 production plants. DOE, as was said, has no plans to
7 produce new weapons for quite a while. At some point,
8 however, even if no new types of weapons are built,
9 existing warheads may need to be remanufactured as they
10 reach the end of their useful lifetimes. This involves a
11 small capability to replace warhead components and
12 produce tritium.

13 There is little public information
14 about how long warheads can last. U.S. weapons have
15 typically been replaced long before they have worn out in
16 the manner analogous to new clothing fashions replacing
17 old ones. Nevertheless, the public information that does
18 exist implies that warheads can last twenty to thirty
19 years without degradation suggesting an even longer life.

20 To determine the earliest time when
21 warheads might need to be remanufactured, we have
22 estimated the maximum, and that is the oldest, age of
23 each warhead type that is expected to be retained in the
24 active stockpile at the end of the decade. The average
25 maximum age of all of these warhead types would be about

1 eight years at the end of 1993, with an age range of
2 about five to thirteen years. Therefore, even if
3 warheads last only twenty years, the oldest warheads in
4 the enduring stockpile, which are some B61 tactical
5 bombs, would not need to be remanufactured until about
6 2000.

7 Some warhead components can last
8 significantly longer than twenty to thirty years.
9 Plutonium pits have been reused from one weapon to the
10 next indicating that they can last at least two warhead
11 lifetimes, and it is also possible to reuse other warhead
12 components, such as a warhead's thermonuclear secondary.

13 As a result, decisions about the size
14 and location of any new location of any new nuclear
15 component manufacturing facilities can be deferred until
16 at least 2000, the outlook for additional arms reduction
17 will be clearer, and if some weapons fail earlier than
18 anticipated, and the nuclear components need to be
19 remanufactured, existing capabilities in the complex
20 could handle the small workload.

21 When warheads are eventually replaced,
22 arms reductions will have greatly reduced the required
23 remanufacturing rate. For example, an arsenal of five
24 thousand warheads, each of which last twenty-five years
25 would have an average remanufacturing rate of two hundred

1 warheads per year. This is about ten times lower than
2 peak weapons production rates during the 1980's. And a
3 thousand warhead arsenal will only require only about
4 forty rebuilds per year.

5 As for tritium, no new production may
6 be needed for twenty to forty years. Tritium from
7 retired weapons can be recycled into the remaining
8 stockpile. For an arsenal of five thousand weapons,
9 tritium production would not be necessary for twenty
10 years, and then only an estimated one kilogram would be
11 required. An arsenal of a thousand weapons would not
12 require additional tritium for forty years and only
13 require two hundred grams per year at that time.

14 Any decision about building a new
15 tritium production source can be postponed until at least
16 2000. And DOE almost agrees with this statement.

17 According to a June 8th, 1993 letter
18 from Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary to Sam Nunn, Chairman
19 of the Senate Armed Services Committee, quote, "Based on
20 the current stockpile projections outlined in the
21 approved FY '93 to FY '98 nuclear weapons stockpile plan,
22 the Department estimates that a new production source
23 should begin operations in the fiscal year 2008. To meet
24 this date, construction should begin by approximately
25 fiscal years 1999 to 2000 for the reactor technologies

1 and the fiscal year 2002 for a proton linear
2 accelerator."

3 If further arms reductions are
4 achieved, the decision could be deferred. as the arsenal
5 declines, the date new tritium will be needed will
6 continue to move further into the future. By waiting as
7 long as possible, and I don't mean waiting beyond the
8 point when you really need these activities, but by
9 waiting as long as DOE feels is possible, before moving
10 ahead with new production plants, DOE will be in a much
11 better position to predict the size of the future
12 arsenal, and thus, to plan the complex. In this way DOE
13 could save billions of dollars by avoiding the
14 construction of unnecessary or oversized plants.

15 DOE has an opportunity here to
16 initiate a more reason/decision-making process and to
17 recast itself by emphasizing warhead dismantlement, arms
18 control and non-proliferation, and environmental
19 restoration, and as a first step in this direction, DOE
20 should announce that it is delaying all decisions about
21 new production plants until the end of the century.

22 Thank you.

23 THE MODERATOR: Thank you, sir.

24 MR. SOHINKI: Thank you, Tom.

25 THE MODERATOR: Our next speaker will

1 be Stephen Schwartz to be followed by Drew
2 Caputo and Chris Brown, if he is here. Mr.
3 Brown.

4 10:04 STEPHEN SCHWARTZ

5 Good morning. I hope the Department
6 isn't requiring you to stand during all of this. I
7 appreciate it, but feel free to sit down.

8 THE MODERATOR: Thank you.

9 MR. SCHWARTZ: I'm Steve Schwartz.
10 I'm the Washington representative of the Military
11 Production Network which is a national alliance of more
12 than forty local, regional and national organizations
13 addressing the Department of Energy nuclear weapons
14 production and waste cleanup issues. We were one of the
15 driving forces behind the large turnout at these hearings
16 two years ago, and because a number of folks that I
17 represent are in the room today, and have testified
18 around the country at other hearings, I will be brief.

19 Another reason I will be brief is
20 because I have been requested to say that one of the
21 things we would like you to do is to review the comments
22 that we gave at the last round of hearings, and I'll just
23 point out that by our count, just for the reconfiguration
24 PEIS, not for the "Cleanup" PEIS back in '91, out of the
25 more than eighteen hundred and fifty or so people that

1 testified seventy-six percent come in with comments that
2 said basically that DOE ought not to be producing more
3 nuclear weapons, and it ought to allow the public more
4 access to information about why it was envisioning
5 rebuilding the complex when obviously the world has
6 changed, as Brian and Tom have both said, but the
7 underlying assumptions about this plan, unfortunately,
8 have not.

9 I guess the principle point that I
10 would like to address is one of secrecy, because this
11 really underlies the entire issue of this program. I
12 will say that at a meeting that we had, that Tom and
13 Brian and I had at DOE with Howard Canter, who I see
14 right here, at his request last month where we discussed
15 the scope of this PEIS and the process for how it would
16 be carried forward, Mr. Canter did make it clear that
17 everything except classified information would be
18 supportable and traceable and that we could go to reading
19 rooms. If that didn't work, we could contact the
20 specific DOE officials and get hold of that information.

21 But unfortunately, the caveat about
22 classified information is a real sticking point for us
23 because it is fundamentally the classified information on
24 which all of these decisions are being based, and without
25 access to that, we and everyone else in this room that

1 doesn't have a Q-clearance is unable to really make a
2 reasoned judgment about whether or not DOE is
3 fundamentally being honest with the public.

4 That is not to suggest that Mr. Canter
5 or anyone else at DOE today is lying to us. It's just
6 that DOE, I think everyone can acknowledge, has a
7 fundamental problem with the public, still, with the
8 issue of distrust, and the one way to get rid of that
9 issue is to let us know what is going on. That doesn't
10 mean that we want to know how the bombs are disassembled,
11 or exactly how much material is in each one, or what
12 sequence of steps, you know, so on and so forth, but
13 there's basic fundamental information, like how much
14 fissile material there is, how many weapons are in the
15 arsenal? How many do you plan on rebuilding under this
16 new complex, if that's necessary? What does this all
17 really cost? If there aren't answers to those questions,
18 tell us, and if there are, we would like to know.

19 There have been efforts in Congress to
20 try to move the Department in the direction of being more
21 open, and the Department has, first under Secretary
22 Watkins, and more recently under Secretary O'Leary, moved
23 to release more information. But it's still not, in our
24 view, enough.

25 I guess by way of trying to explain it

1 to lay people, it would be sort of like if I am the
2 government and you all collectively are the citizens, and
3 I come to you and say, I'm going to build you a new
4 house. Give me all your money and I'll build you a
5 house. But I don't really give you enough information
6 and you don't give me enough information to find out,
7 okay, do you really need the house? You know, what size
8 should it be, where should it be located, how many
9 bathrooms should it have? Should it have a one or
10 two-car garage, what kind of gas or electric stove would
11 you like. So, I build all of that, and I come back to
12 you, and you say, well, I didn't really need that. You
13 know, this is what I really wanted or I wanted something
14 more like this, and by then it's too late, and the issue
15 is really one of, well, I didn't tell you what I was
16 going to do, fundamentally. I told you that I was going
17 to do "X", but I didn't give you all the details. And in
18 the end, you will either be dissatisfied or I will have
19 wasted a lot of money, or probably both. So, that's the
20 real sticking point for us.

21 And, you know, this process isn't over
22 yet. And we're hoping to see that our comments this
23 time, are, in fact, listened to. We don't expect
24 everything to be agreed to. That's not realistic, but I
25 think there are a number of issues that were hammered

1 home last time and that will be hammered home through the
2 course of hearings this time that are real fundamental
3 important issues. And we hope to get back a response
4 from DOE, something other than, well, we reviewed these
5 comments but we're going to do this anyway. We'd really
6 like to see a more substantive response.

7 So, I'll just close by saying that the
8 world has changed since these hearings first took place
9 two years ago, and, if anything, the need for
10 reconfiguring the complex along the lines that were
11 originally considered is fundamentally diminished.
12 Certainly, I don't think anyone can argue that nuclear
13 weapons are going to be around for a long time, and that
14 there will need to be facilities to take care of them
15 until the time that the government hopefully decides that
16 they are no longer needed. But whether or not we need
17 facilities to actually produce weapons or prepared to
18 produce weapons is another issue entirely. So, thank
19 you, and good luck for the rest of the day.

20 THE MODERATOR: Thank you.

21 MR. SOHINKI: Thank you, Mr. Schwartz.

22 THE MODERATOR: Our next speaker is
23 Drew Caputo, to be followed by Chris Brown, and
24 then Ms. Beverly Gattis if she is in the room.
25 Is Bertha Bosik here or perhaps Eilene La Land?

1 You will be the fourth speaker.

2 10:10 DREW CAPUTO

3 My name Drew Caputo. I'm a staff
4 attorney for the Natural Resources Defense Council here
5 in Washington, D.C. Our offices are located at 1350 New
6 York Avenue, Suite 300, here in the District.

7 NRDC is a national environmental
8 advocacy organization with about one hundred and seventy
9 thousand members located all over the country, and we
10 have been involved for quite a long time in -- through
11 our nuclear program, involving ourselves in taking an
12 active role in the nuclear issues facing the country.

13 Briefly, today, I would like to -- I
14 would like to offer my commendation and thanks to the DOE
15 for the public process that's going on right now, and
16 then issue two challenges to the Agency.

17 First, the commendation. I think that
18 public, open, exacting, extensive processes like this
19 matter. They matter at a practical level because they
20 give the public citizens who need this sort of
21 information that is conveyed through these things in
22 order to participate in democratic activities like that,
23 they give people the information they need. They also
24 send a signal that an agency which has had a sorry
25 history of closeness is committed to being open. I want

1 to commend everyone who has, I think, gone out of their
2 way and sort of changed some ways of doing things for
3 putting a real premium on public participation and
4 openness as part of this process.

5 Now, the first challenge that I would
6 like to offer is sort of related to the openness issue
7 which I just referred to, and that is that openness in
8 procedures like what is going on right now is really only
9 half a step and only half a loaf. Just as important and
10 even more important is openness in the substantive
11 information that is at the heart of the process that is
12 going on right now, and that the public needs to know if
13 they are to have a meaningful role in the process. And
14 in making this point, I'm essentially echoing and
15 underlining the points that Steve Schwartz just made.
16 But there are a variety of crucial facts and information
17 that simply aren't part of the public domain right now.
18 and they need to be if the public is going to have an
19 meaningful opportunity to participate.

20 Just as an example of that, the DOE
21 is, I think, correctly including the issue of a plutonium
22 storage facility in the Programmatic EIS. And that is
23 obviously a critical issue that faces just not the United
24 States but the rest of the world in figuring out what
25 we're going to do with all this material which is among

1 the most toxic in the world, and is also inherently
2 suitable for use in nuclear weapons. But for anybody but
3 the DOE to participate in this debate, and there needs to
4 be that sort of broad participation, we need to know such
5 basic, critical information like how much plutonium we
6 are talking about here, in what form, and how does the
7 amount of plutonium that is available for disposal or
8 storage relate to the size of the nuclear arsenal.

9 I don't think there's anybody in the
10 public interest community which is demanding complete
11 openness on these issues. I think we all recognize that
12 there are some issues which need to be kept secret for
13 legitimate reasons of national security. But there is no
14 reason for the blanket secrecy that continues to this
15 day. It's the vestige of the Cold War, and more than
16 being sort of a philosophical problem, it's a real
17 impediment to making progress cooperatively on these
18 issues.

19 The DOE has the legal authority under
20 the Atomic Energy Act to take steps to declassify some of
21 this really critical information, and I want to challenge
22 the Energy Department to act aggressively on that issue,
23 and to make some of that information a part of the PEIS
24 process.

25 The second issue relevant to the scope

1 of the PEIS that I want to address has to do with what I
2 understand is a fairly longstanding debate about how many
3 documents there should be. The last time around on this
4 scoping process I understand that there was a debate
5 about whether or not there should be two PEIS's; one on
6 the reconfiguration process and one on the waste process
7 as DOE wanted to do, or one combining all those issues in
8 one global PEIS. As I understand that debate, there, I
9 think, are two legitimate principles that are driving
10 each side. The people on the public interest community
11 who wanted one unitary document, I think, correctly
12 pointed out that one can't make decisions about building
13 or reconfiguring or doing anything to the weapons
14 production complex without paying close attention to the
15 environmental costs associated with taking those steps.

16 One of the biggest problems that DOE
17 faces, obviously, is having ignored those consequences in
18 making production decisions over the last fifty years.
19 In response to that, I think DOE had a pretty good
20 response which is that if you do the one document, the
21 document, itself, is pretty unwieldy. I think NRDC will
22 take a formal position on whether or not we support one
23 or two documents in the written comments that we'll
24 submit at the end of October. But I would like to
25 suggest that there may be a common ground that takes care

1 of both concerns. And that is that, to me, the central
2 issue isn't how many documents there are. The central
3 issue is what issues get addressed that need to be
4 addressed.

5 And a possible resolution would be for
6 the DOE to make clear in a public, direct statement
7 before the end of the public comment period that the
8 Agency understands its obligation, and clear obligation
9 under NEPA, to, as part of the reconfiguration EIS,
10 consider fully the environmental costs of the decision it
11 intends to make as part of the reconfiguration process.
12 That means, if you want to build something new, if you
13 want to change something, what sort of costs for the
14 environment is that going to have?

15 And as part of that environmental
16 impact analysis, there has to be a full and complete
17 analysis of how the incremental environmental impacts of
18 new decisions relate with the cumulative environmental
19 impacts of fifty years worth of waste that now needs to
20 be cleaned up. I think that's a step that DOE could take
21 and I think it might resolve what's been a dispute. And
22 I think it would go an additional step towards making the
23 non-governmental community understand that DOE is
24 changing, and it understands fully that making important
25 decisions related to production, that considering the

1 environmental consequences of that decision needs to be
2 needs to be at the top of the list. Thank you.

3 THE MODERATOR: Thank you. I want to
4 ask if Beverly Gattis is here? Okay. The next
5 speaker will be Chris Brown. He'll be followed
6 Eilene La Land.

7 10:17 CHRIS BROWN

8 Good morning. My name is Chris Brown,
9 Southern Nevada Director of Citizen Alert, a statewide
10 environmental watchdog organization in the state of
11 Nevada, located at 4633 Paradise Road, Las Vegas, Nevada,
12 89109. I would like to focus my comments today on two
13 aspects of the issues before us. One is the issue of
14 research, development and testing, and its relationship
15 to this document, and the other one is, what is called in
16 this document, plutonium storage, but clearly involves
17 the questions of the waste produced through the
18 reconfiguration process.

19 Safeguards, stockpile maintenance or
20 stewardship, as it is called by the Department of Energy,
21 are really pseudonyms for new weapons design. It is
22 clear that the surrogate testing programs that are
23 scheduled by the DOE under those programs need to be
24 included in this document, and they need to be fully
25 reviewed for their impacts on both the environment and on

1 our foreign policy. Their exclusion is counter to the
2 National Environmental Policy Act requirements that all
3 impacts of a project be considered.

4 It's clear that the vision enclosed in
5 this document by the Department of Energy requires a
6 research, design and testing function in order to provide
7 momentum to the production cycle that is envisioned in
8 all three of these alternatives. Specifically, the PEIS
9 should include analysis of the impacts of various options
10 the Department is currently considering, including
11 hydrodynamic and hydronuclear testing, inertial
12 confinement fusion and diamond anvil tests or phase
13 change tests.

14 The need for any nuclear complex or the
15 question of whether or not any of this is necessary is
16 not being looked at as previous speakers have said. The
17 no-action alternative as outlined in this document
18 requires major reconstruction and new construction in
19 order to maintain a stockpile of the size envisioned. In
20 other words, a quite sizable stockpile. As such, this
21 document and the approach it outlines will undermine non-
22 proliferation and comprehensive test ban efforts
23 currently being made by the administration.

24 Under innocuous pseudonyms the
25 Department is sabotaging the preconditions for

1 successfully convincing non-nuclear nations and other
2 nuclear nations to join us in a comprehensive test ban
3 treaty or to extend the Non-proliferation Treaty. At
4 what cost; billions of dollars of taxpayers' money over
5 the next decade. At what cost; millions of curies of
6 potential contamination. At what cost; the likelihood
7 that one day these weapons of mass destruction will be
8 used and thousands of casualties incurred.

9 It is clear that the implications of
10 the three options on foreign policy and specifically
11 disarmament and arms control policy are potentially
12 devastated. The Department, by looking only at
13 alternatives which assume an ongoing arms race, is
14 presuming on the role of the President and the State
15 Department. This document and the plans of the
16 Department should be reviewed, and that review should be
17 public and published as part of the document by the
18 various agencies responsible for negotiating the
19 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the extension of the
20 Non-proliferation Treaty.

21 As a Nevadan, the section on plutonium
22 storage sets off alarms. The last minute inclusion of
23 Nevada as a potential site sends a clear message as we
24 have been receiving since the 1970's from the Department
25 that we are a target for the refuse from its nuclear

1 weapons and nuclear power programs.

2 I would like to say that the issue of
3 plutonium storage is a serious one and that it needs to
4 be dealt with by the Department and not simply put off by
5 one community after another that we don't want it here.

6 However, what we see in this document
7 is what we have seen all along from the Department,
8 forced siting of the waste process. And as long as
9 forced siting is the principle method that the Department
10 uses, the host community is one that is going to resist.
11 You should already be well aware of this from your
12 experience in Nevada with the Yucca Mountain project.
13 The Department's initiatives on public participation in
14 the environmental restoration and waste management
15 program are very welcomed. They're a nice change from
16 past policy, but the lessons learned in that program have
17 obviously not been learned by the defense side.

18 In order for a plutonium storage or
19 disposal option to ever become publicly acceptable, a
20 number of issues must be addressed. First of all, is
21 plutonium a waste or an asset. It is very clear in this
22 Notice of Intent that you make the assumption that it is
23 an asset. It is not clear, though, that the general
24 public shares this perception. In fact, if anything,
25 it's fairly clear the general public across this country

1 sees things nuclear, and especially the waste generated
2 by them, as something of a very large problem; not an
3 asset at all.

4 Then, we need to look from there to
5 the problem of disposal then as well as storage. In this
6 light, longer term, engineered barriers need to be
7 examined similar to the the programs in Sweden and the
8 possibility of technology development to treat the
9 plutonium are transmuted to some less lethal form.

10 As an aside I should say that the
11 Department, once again, is discrediting itself with the
12 Section 801 Report by trying to promote the advance
13 liquid metal reactor, a breeder reactor program, as a
14 technology to burn plutonium, even though it only
15 theoretically could accomplish that task, and there's no
16 actual physical examples of how it would accomplish such
17 a task. And here again is an example of how the
18 Department discredits itself publicly around the issue of
19 nuclear waste where you try to promote a new program as a
20 solution when the only evidence out there is that it's
21 going to create a bigger problem.

22 In order for the Department to get on
23 the right track with regard to the question of the waste
24 generated from this program as well as the other programs
25 that it runs, is that you are going to have to go out for

1 a national referendum to the public as a first step. An
2 "A" priority requirement for solving the problem of
3 plutonium storage is to go out and begin the process of
4 collecting the information about what the public wants
5 done with this, not the kind of assumptions we see in
6 this Notice of Intent that already assume that you have
7 concluded that the public is in favor of you treating
8 this as an asset.

9 What you're experiencing at Yucca
10 Mountain now, a technologically deficient program that is
11 publicly unacceptable to the host committee -- community
12 rather -- is the only logical conclusion from this Notice
13 of Intent. You will have the same problem that you are
14 experiencing at Yucca Mountain today if you pursue the
15 approach outlined in this document.

16 The final conclusion, then, is from
17 this issue to the Environmental Restoration and Waste
18 Management Program, the only way the Department is ever
19 going to be able to credibly put together a solution to
20 the way these two programs interlock is to have a
21 combined PEIS about the environmental restoration and
22 reconfiguration programs.

23 THE MODERATOR: Thank you, Mr. Brown.

24 I would like to do a check to see if some of the
25 people who are scheduled to speak are here. Has

1 Beverly Gattis arrived? Is Bertha Bosik here?

2 THE AUDIENCE: She is not coming.

3 THE MODERATOR: I appreciate that. Is

4 Tracy McCaffery here? Our next speaker will be

5 Eilene La Land, and she would be followed by

6 Beverly Gattis.

7 10:27 EILENE LA LAND

8 Good morning. My name is Eilene La

9 Land. I'm here representing Tri Valley Cares, Citizens

10 Against a Radioactive Environment, a Livermore,

11 California based citizens group which monitors the

12 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

13 A main focus of Tri Valley Cares is

14 the conversion of the lab to peaceful, socially useful

15 research like developing new cleanup technologies for

16 existing pollution at our national bombs plants.

17 I became involved in Tri Valley Cares

18 in 1989 after my husband accepted a job at the Livermore

19 Lab, and we moved from the east cost to Livermore. I was

20 concerned because I knew they did nuclear work there,

21 though I do not know what the lab's role was in

22 developing nuclear weapons. My husband assured me that

23 he would not be working on nuclear projects. So, I

24 assumed he would be out of harm's way. Since joining Tri

25 Valley Cares, I have learned a great deal about the

1 environmental hazards posed by nuclear weapons work, and
2 what I have learned is much worse than what I ever could
3 have imagined.

4 This PEIS or modernization, or as you
5 call it, reconfiguring the Nuclear Weapons Complex must
6 come to grips with the past contamination. Livermore
7 Lab, like the rest of the complex, has a history of
8 accidents, leaks and spills.

9 In 1963 Livermore suffered a uranium
10 criticality accident which is an unplanned nuclear chain
11 reaction. The workers heard an explosion and evacuated
12 the building, but four were still exposed. In 1967 an
13 accident released one half gram of plutonium to the
14 Livermore City sewer system. That plutonium is still
15 there today in a sludge spread out behind the plant.

16 Livermore Lab also has a history of
17 accidents with radioactive hydrogen called tritium. Our
18 group has documented airborne tritium releases totaling
19 three quarters of a million curies. To give you some
20 recent data, the tritium contamination is so pervasive
21 that the local wine, grapes, honey and our milk are all
22 tainted.

23 As if that isn't enough to scare the
24 average person, in December, 1990, the lab began testing
25 rain water, and they found it to be so contaminated with

1 tritium that if they had to store it, they would have to
2 label it radioactive waste. That's our rain water in
3 Livermore.

4 Over all, the lab has put about one
5 million curies of radiation into our air including
6 tritium, plutonium and uranium, one million curies is the
7 amount of radiation some analysts estimate was dumped on
8 Hiroshima.

9 This PEIS contemplates building new
10 bomb plants which will produce new wastes and
11 contamination. That is simply not acceptable. The Cold
12 War was not a victimless war. We the American public
13 were its chief victims.

14 Further, this PEIS projects projects
15 that the research, development, production and testing of
16 nuclear weapons will continue into the middle of the
17 twenty-first century. This is an insane way to think.

18 At Livermore, the most horrific
19 accidents have been related to the fabrication of the
20 components of the test bombs and then taken to the lab --
21 I mean to -- the lab taking them to Nevada to detonate.

22 My first encounter with such a test
23 was when I was -- went to Nevada to demonstrate against
24 nuclear testing in 1991. When we arrived in the evening
25 of the first day, we were greeted by a man who told us

1 there was a test planned for the next day, but it was
2 cancelled because of technical problems. We were hoping
3 it was our presence there that delayed it. The next
4 morning, however, while attending a workshop led by the
5 Western Shoshoni upon whose lands the test site was
6 located, a man came in and announced, ten minutes to
7 detonation. I can't tell you what an experience that
8 was. It was like ice water running through my veins. I
9 became completely numb.

10 Later, I learned that the Livermore
11 Lab had an accident released on the same day. That
12 nuclear test deliberately contaminated the Earth. The
13 lab had accidentally released one hundred and twenty-five
14 curies of tritium through a stack in Building 331. the
15 lab never told its employees. In fact, I was the one to
16 let my husband know about the accident when I returned
17 home to Livermore.

18 Recently in the news a woman spoke out
19 after forty years about a secret LSD experiment our
20 government performed on military and private citizens.
21 The experiments had been conducted in secret, and no one
22 took responsibility until forty years later when someone
23 spoke out. This story drew my attention because that's
24 how long the Department of Energy, you guys, and the lab
25 have been experimenting on its workers and the people of

1 Livermore with toxic and radioactive waste and pollution,
2 also in secret, and also without taking responsibility.

3 It's time to take responsibility. I
4 think we can try a new experiment. Peace. We don't need
5 to detonate nuclear tests anymore ever. We don't need to
6 design nuclear weapons anymore. This PEIS must finalize
7 a no-testing, no-production option. This is a reasonable
8 alternative. That is what I and hundreds of others told
9 you at the hearings in 1991. It was true then and it is
10 even more true today. So, why is there so -- there is no
11 such alternative plan for the PEIS? Weren't you
12 listening to the public hearings then? And I wonder if
13 you are listening now.

14 THE MODERATOR: Thank you for your
15 comments. Our next speaker this morning will be
16 Beverly Gattis to be followed by Tracy
17 McCaffery.

18 10:39 BEVERLY GATTIS

19 Good morning. My name is Beverly
20 Gattis. I'm President of Serious Texans Against Nuclear
21 Dumping in Amarillo, Texas. We are a citizens group who
22 formed in 1983 around the issue of the high level waste
23 repository which might have been situated in the
24 panhandle of Texas. From what we learned then, we
25 continued to follow nuclear issues. And in 1991, when

1 the reconfiguration study was released, we found
2 ourselves with the interesting situation, since my group
3 has about half Republicans and half Democrats, having to
4 arrive at some way to talk about nuclear weapons issues,
5 because the Pantex facility was about to change
6 dramatically.

7 We have taken those issues up
8 reluctantly in some ways, but also as citizens who know
9 that conscientiously you cannot do any less. We also
10 have this interesting situation of being one of the few
11 sites in the country that everyone wants to have stay
12 open. We are doing the dismantlement. Peace groups,
13 everyone wants Pantex to continue operating. That is
14 work that we agree to do. It is work that we accept.
15 But it is work that we will not walk into blindly. It is
16 a future for the next forty years that cannot be handled
17 as the last forty years were handled. We have seen that
18 there is too much secrecy, we have seen that we must have
19 good information with which to make good decisions. We
20 have followed the discussions and the international
21 agreements, and we know there's work to do. What we
22 refuse is to be a blind partner.

23 Locally, we find these discussions
24 have a powerful effect on the community. Even now, the
25 Amarillo area is rather fractured by the people who are

1 pro Pantex expansion -- and that is the definition as it
2 stands in their minds -- and those of us who have a great
3 many questions about what does expansion mean. And we
4 didn't feel that we had much enlightenment from the
5 Notice of Intent. If we are going to be a plutonium
6 storage area, generally, in our area it is talked about
7 as plutonium pits. We know -- we assume that if we are a
8 long-term storage site, it will be other forms of
9 plutonium as well, that there will be processing, but how
10 much, what does that entail, what does that mean, who is
11 designing the facilities, who's reviewing those designs,
12 when can we have access to that information to make
13 independent evaluation? These things are still missing
14 for us and they must be provided.

15 I frankly feel that many of these
16 items could have been provided already. We asked for
17 them in 1991. We still haven't seen them. It is not
18 fair to ask a community to be a partner. It is not fair
19 to rely on public acceptability from an area when those
20 decisions are being made without sufficient information.
21 It is easy to have public acceptance based on flawed or
22 the lack of information.

23 And that is not the role the
24 Department of Energy -- the new Department of Energy, of
25 which we heard so much in 1991 -- it's not a role that

1 should be played. We expect the Department of Energy to
2 be an honest broker of information. It is the Department
3 of Energy that has the information. We understand that
4 you are only one entity that has decisions to -- or
5 influence on decisions and implements decisions when it
6 comes to international and national policy issues.

7 We would like to hear also the
8 Department of Energy saying, interagency discussion,
9 interagency work needs to take place so that we deal with
10 the work that we really have to do which is not building
11 weapons -- it is dismantling weapons. It is resolving
12 what to do with the materials in the future. It is a
13 hovering but unspoken presence the decisions lacking
14 about disposition for these primary nuclear materials.
15 It affects international choices as well, what we do.

16 The United States can either be a
17 leader that helps guide the world to resolving these
18 issues, it can provide access and plans for mutual
19 verification, or the United States can conduct its
20 current dismantlement in such a way that it leaves so
21 much doubt and uncertainty, so much unaccounted for, and
22 perhaps so much inequity in place that it has the
23 potential to set back, if not destroy, the future
24 possibilities that the entire world is thrilled to see.
25 It is, as you said in your opening presentation, we never

1 expected this decade to contain this opportunity, but it
2 does.

3 I think that, finally, the decisions
4 and the work that we all are willing to undertake, but
5 not blindly, will not be judged by whether or not we have
6 averted the immediate threat of nuclear war. Success
7 will be judged by whether or not the threat of nuclear
8 war continues to diminish and possibly finally
9 disappears, and that the world never faces it again as it
10 has faced it for the past forty years. I think success
11 will be judged not by the fact that we did the work.
12 Success, this time, will be judged by whether or not we
13 destroyed the people who did the work for us, we
14 destroyed sections of our country who did the work;
15 whether or not we built new relationships between highly
16 secret processes and the communities which host them.
17 Whether or not government found a new way to operate in
18 partnership, rather than as an independent island in the
19 midst of people's homes. That is what will judge success
20 this time. Thank you.

21 THE MODERATOR: Thank you very much.

22 Our next speaker will be Tracy McCaffery to be
23 followed by Daryl Kimball. Is Mr. Kimball here?

24 You will be our next speaker, sir.

25 10:41 TRACY ANN MCCAFFERY

1 Good morning. My name is Tracy Ann
2 McCaffery, and I'm a research analyst and organizer for
3 Physicians for Social Responsibility's program on health
4 and environmental impacts of nuclear weapons production.

5 PSR is the largest arms control and
6 environmental advocacy organization made up of health
7 care practitioners in the nation, with over twenty
8 thousand members and supporters nationwide representing
9 all major fields of medicine.

10 PRS requests that these comments and
11 the attached letters be included in the record of scoping
12 comments.

13 This morning I want to bring to your
14 attention several facts. During the last round of PEIS
15 hearings two years ago over twelve hundred people
16 nationwide took the time to relay to the Department of
17 Energy their views about the future of the Nuclear
18 Weapons Complex. If you review your records you will
19 find that less than two percent spoke in praise of the
20 Department of Energy's proposed actions.

21 It is important to keep in mind that
22 the world is a different place two years ago. The Soviet
23 Union still existed, the Cold War was still on, and yet,
24 Americans, when asked for their opinion of the Department
25 of Energy sent the undeniable message that the DOE was

1 not performing to their expectations. Over and over
2 again the message was the same. Cleanup must be Doe's
3 top funding priority. The DOE must stop making the mess
4 and start cleaning it up, and that the best way to
5 minimize waste generation and begin the cleanup is to end
6 nuclear weapons production.

7 Now, there is a new round of public
8 hearings because the DOE has rethought its plans for the
9 future due to changes that have taken place around the
10 world. I'm here to say that not much has changed in the
11 view of thousands of Americans. I'm here to urge you to
12 look over your records of public comments two years ago.
13 Their comments will ring as true today as they did then.
14 The end of the Cold War and the present budget prices
15 make it even more urgent to clean up -- for cleanup to be
16 the Department of Energy's top funding priority, For the
17 DOE to stop generating more waste and contamination and
18 start cleaning it up, and for the DOE to acknowledge that
19 the best way to minimize waste generation is to end
20 nuclear weapons production.

21 We can no longer afford to produce
22 unnecessary and unneeded nuclear weapons. The public has
23 spoken before on this issue and continues with patience
24 to speak again.

25 I have with me nearly seventeen

1 hundred petitions signed by PSR members and supporters
2 over the last few months, and more continue to arrive
3 every day. These letters are addressed to Secretary
4 Hazel O'Leary. They call on Secretary O'Leary to make
5 the expeditious and thorough clean up of DOE sites a
6 matter of highest priority. In addition, they urge the
7 Secretary to call for the deep cuts in DOE's weapons
8 production, research and development and testing budget.
9 So much has changed, and yet, the issues to the American
10 people are the same. The need to build new facilities
11 and to continue to produce new nuclear weapons and
12 produce more nuclear waste is not at all clear.

13 Review your record. Look over the
14 words of over twelve hundred Americans who told you the
15 same thing two years ago that they are repeating today.
16 Enough is enough. Thank you.

17 THE MODERATOR: Thank you. Our next
18 speaker will be Daryl Kimball, after which we
19 will take a short break. Before you leave and
20 while Mr. Kimball is coming to the podium, I
21 would like to remind you that there are DOE
22 officials who are out in the outer lobby, and
23 when we do take the break, if you would like to
24 ask them any questions or express any concerns,
25 they will be there and will be glad to talk to

1 you about that. Mr. Kimball.

2 10:45 DARYL KIMBALL

3 Thanks. good morning. My name is
4 Daryl Kimball. I'm Associate Director of Policy at
5 Physicians for Social Responsibility also. We have, in
6 addition, twenty thousand members. We are organized in
7 one hundred chapters nationwide. And we have long been
8 concerned about the environmental and safety problems
9 associated with nuclear weapons production. In 1961, we
10 were formed to end nuclear weapons testing and the
11 adverse health effects it created. And this morning I
12 would like to speak about one issue related to nuclear
13 weapons testing that is relevant to the reconfiguration
14 PEIS.

15 The Department of Energy has a revised
16 program for nuclear weapons testing which is not
17 currently considered in the revised PEIS Notice of
18 Intent. As we all know, on July 3rd, President Clinton
19 announced that he would extend the U.S. moratorium on
20 nuclear testing at least through September of 1994,
21 unless another nation conducts a nuclear weapons test.
22 President Clinton stated that the U.S. arsenal of nuclear
23 weapons is safe and reliable, and that there is no
24 immediate need for new tests. He also directed the
25 Department of Energy to maintain the capability to resume

1 testing. He said that if another nation tests, he will,
2 "Direct the Department of Energy to prepare to conduct
3 additional tests while seeking approval to do so from
4 Congress to assure that the U.S. nuclear deterrent
5 remains unquestioned under a CTB." Mr. Clinton also said
6 that the DOE should explore other means of maintaining
7 confidence in the safety, reliability and performance of
8 our nuclear weapons.

9 Well, since then, just in July, later
10 in July, the Department of energy submitted a revised
11 program and budget for nuclear weapons testing which is
12 known by the Department, or according to the Department,
13 as stockpile stewardship. According to Congressional
14 legislation that is still under consideration, the
15 proposed program would seek to maintain the basic
16 operating infrastructure of the Nevada Test Site. This
17 would cost approximately one hundred twenty-five to one
18 hundred fifty million dollars; maintain the readiness and
19 technical capability to resume nuclear testing at -- in
20 Nevada, another one hundred to one hundred twenty-five
21 million dollars, and third, a new and revised program to
22 conduct research and development on alternatives to
23 underground nuclear test explosions, including the
24 construction of some new facilities. This would be meant
25 to maintain the safety and reliability of the U.S.

1 stockpile. These activities are estimated the cost in
2 the neighborhood of one hundred twenty-five to one
3 hundred fifty million dollars.

4 Despite the nuclear test moratorium,
5 Secretary O'Leary, in a letter to the Senate, has claimed
6 that it is necessary that 402.7 -- 402.7 million dollars
7 is necessary to maintain the capability to conduct tests
8 and to initiate these new programs to, "...substitute for
9 the loss of data which has been available from
10 underground nuclear weapons tests."

11 Last year -- this fiscal year, I
12 should say -- the Department spent approximately 419.1
13 million for nuclear weapons testing activities. So, the
14 number is roughly unchanged despite the nuclear test
15 moratorium.

16 What Physicians for Social
17 Responsibility would like to suggest in reference to the
18 stockpile stewardship program is that it should be
19 integrated and considered within the context of the
20 reconfiguration PEIS. The Department should, in
21 consultation with other relevant agencies, in particular,
22 the Arms Control Disarmament Agency and the State
23 Department, evaluate the impact that the stockpile
24 stewardship program will have on U.S. nuclear
25 non-proliferation goals and on the goal of the Nuclear

1 Test Ban. Because the program may allow the United
2 States not only to maintain the safety and reliability of
3 our arsenal, but also to develop new nuclear weapons
4 designs, other nations can be expected to try to follow
5 suit. That could negatively impact U.S. Policy
6 objectives.

7 The Department of Energy should also
8 evaluate whether current nuclear weapons laboratory
9 capabilities are sufficient to meet the objections set
10 forth in the President's July 3rd statement. If
11 additional resources are necessary to pursue new nuclear
12 weapons research and construction activities, I might
13 point out that there is quite an ample amount of money
14 available in the current nuclear weapons research and
15 development budget. The Department has requested 1.32
16 billion for defense-related activities on nuclear weapons
17 research and design for FY-1994 which is a full 10.1
18 percent increase over fiscal year 1993.

19 Finally, I would also like to note
20 that the Nevada Test Site has been added to the list of
21 facilities proposed as candidate sites for new nuclear
22 weapons production and/or plutonium storage facilities.
23 The reason for this change is, in my mind, not clearly
24 explained by the revised Notice of Intent. The test site
25 was not under the original Complex-21 planned candidate

1 site for major new facilities, and I would like to
2 request that the DOE Reconfiguration Office staff -- I
3 see many of you here -- might provide a written
4 explanation for the addition of the test site to the list
5 of candidate sites. That's all. Thank you.

6 THE MODERATOR: Thank you, Mr.
7 Kimball. At this point. We will take a break
8 for roughly fifteen minutes. Our first two
9 speakers -- I have now about ten minutes to
10 eleven. At five past eleven we will start with
11 Mr. Makhijani, and Mr. Michelson.

12 THE AUDIENCE: He's not here.

13 THE MODERATOR: Take a break and come
14 back at 11:05.

15 (WHEREUPON, a recess is had.)

16 THE MODERATOR: I would like to call
17 this session of the scoping meeting on the
18 Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement back
19 into session. My name is Barry Lawson. I am
20 serving as a neutral moderator for today's
21 scoping meeting. I am not a member or belong to
22 the Department of Energy nor am I an advocate.
23 With me at the front table is Steve Sohinki and
24 Steve is the Director of Environment, Safety,
25 Health, and Quality Assurance with the Weapons

1 Reconfiguration Office here in Washington. Ann
2 Wingo is our court reporter. For the
3 reconvening session this morning I have three
4 people who are scheduled to speak, two of whom I
5 believe are here. Mr. Makhijani, you are here
6 and you will be the first speaker, and is
7 Michelson here? You will be the second speaker,
8 and is there any possibility that Kerry Cook is
9 here? All right. We will go as far as we can.

10 Mr. Makhijani, nice to see you again.

11 11:09 ARJUN MAKHIJANI

12 Thank you. I appreciate the fact that
13 the Department of Energy has opened up again the scope of
14 the Reconfiguration Environmental Impact Statement,
15 recognizing the world situation has changed.

16 However, having recognized the world
17 situation has changed so much, the DOE and the Pentagon
18 have frozen the world situation by FE-AT (phonetically)
19 by saying that they are only going to consider a five
20 thousand weapon arsenal, approximately. The number is
21 classified, but a number of ways of calculating how many
22 weapons are planned looking at the scope of the announced
23 programmatic review, and a briefing that was given to
24 members of the Military Production Network by Mr. Canter
25 indicate that a five thousand weapon arsenal is the size

1 of arsenal for all -- underlying all alternatives that
2 will be considered. This is like it's planned
3 obsolescence for the R-PEIS.

4 We've gone a lot of time scoping and
5 rescoping this thing finding that we cannot keep up with
6 the world, and now we are going to go backwards from a
7 readiness to consider a lot of different arsenal sizes
8 before to a situation where we're going to freeze the
9 arsenal at five thousand, assuming that there is going to
10 be no further discussion or no further changes in the
11 world. And five thousand weapons happens to be at the
12 upper limit of the arsenal size that is currently the
13 subject of mainstream debate. Everything from zero to
14 five thousand is being considered. It's dramatically
15 different from two years ago, but I think that if the DOE
16 does not consider the alternatives, it's really going in
17 for a planned obsolescence of the style that is infamous
18 in some private industries, though that is a different
19 subject. So, I won't get into it in detail.

20 The chaos is Russia pointed out by the
21 dismissal of Parliament yesterday points to these
22 continuing changes in the world. The National Security
23 goals are being continuously reviewed, and the role of
24 nuclear weapons in the post Cold War world has not yet
25 been settled. It's not clear who these weapons are being

1 targeted at.

2 We're, in a way, -- I have been in the
3 energy field for a very long time, and in 1973 to '79,
4 energy prices changed a lot, and the electric utilities
5 did not change their planning, but went on ordering
6 electric power plants as if growth was going to continue
7 at twice the rate of GNP growth forever. I was there at
8 the time, and I actually did some work at Lawrence
9 Berkley Lab which had been funded by the Energy Research
10 and Development Administration, DOE's predecessor, in
11 which we warned the DOE that unless it alerted the
12 industry, and they changed to more like a one to one
13 ratio for electricity, the GNP growth, we'd be facing
14 some pretty serious financial crises in the utilities,
15 but nobody was listening.

16 I think that it would -- it really --
17 my one strong recommendation which -- and I detailed that
18 in the written testimony that I have handed in, is that a
19 number of scenarios which I specify in some detail, be
20 considered from zero to five thousand, and I say five
21 thousand even though it has no rationale, other than it's
22 the number that the Pentagon chose because that's what
23 current commitments obligate us to go down to. There is
24 no security rationale for five thousand weapons, and I
25 have discussed how one might arrive at an upper limit for

1 this arsenal if one were committed to having a very
2 powerful nuclear arsenal for the United States, which has
3 some very severe non-proliferation penalties at a time we
4 are going into discussion of renewal of the
5 Non-proliferation Treaty. A lot of countries feel that
6 the U.S. wants a big deterrent, why shouldn't other
7 countries have a similar deterrent. But if one accepts
8 that the U.S. should have a huge nuclear arsenal, how
9 should you define a huge nuclear arsenal?

10 I did a little historical research. I
11 don't know how many people would admit to want to being
12 to the right of General Curtis LeMay. I don't think
13 there are too many. But General Curtis LeMay was at the
14 head of the Strategic Air Command in the 1950's, and they
15 had an optimum war plan, and they assessed that this
16 optimum war plan would reduce the Soviet Union to a, "...
17 Smoking, radiating ruin at the end of two hours." And
18 the number of warheads in this optimum war plan was seven
19 hundred and fifty. Now, I think that that might be a
20 guide for any -- I won't say sensible -- but any upper
21 limit that anybody might conceivably want, given the
22 spectrum of political opinion that exists.

23 But I think that the DOE is obligated
24 to consider a five thousand weapon arsenal because that's
25 the -- approximately the current weapons guidance given

1 to it by the Pentagon, but it should consider several
2 other scenarios; a one thousand warhead arsenal as
3 recommended by the Center for Strategic and International
4 Studies in its recent study. A one hundred weapon
5 arsenal, warhead arsenal, which has been discussed by
6 many including a former director, the first director of
7 the Lawrence Livermore National Lab, Herbert York, Former
8 Secretary of Defense, Robert MacNamara, and the concept
9 of non-weaponized deterrence which bases deterrence on a
10 capability to build some nuclear weapons rapidly, but
11 does not require any active warheads in the arsenal.

12 Now, the question is how much -- one
13 of the questions in the Environmental Impact Statement is
14 how much bang for the buck do nuclear weapons provide. I
15 think it's very important for the Environmental Impact
16 Statement to revisit this question because we have been
17 assuming that nuclear weapons provide a very big bang for
18 the buck, while in the current year's appropriation,
19 anyway, and expenditures, that's not the case. We are
20 spending five billion dollars for production, design and
21 testing of nuclear weapons, we aren't doing any.
22 Therefore, if you divide five billion by zero, you get
23 infinity, or if you divide the bang, zero, by five
24 billion, you get zero. You are getting no bang for the
25 buck right now.

1 The other points that I would like to
2 touch on are the problem of excess plutonium. I think
3 the PEIS rescoping presumes that plutonium will be an
4 asset. It's true that at the time that plutonium was
5 produced, it was produced because it was regarded as an
6 asset and Congress was willing to appropriate money to
7 produce this thing, which was an asset. However, in view
8 of the current world situation, plutonium is not an
9 asset, and it's not a security asset beyond whatever
10 number of weapons are decided for the arsenal, and that
11 is a continually changing figure. So, I think the
12 position in the PEIS, which has to consider alternatives
13 is that whatever alternative is being considered, one of
14 the options under each alternative for arsenal size
15 should be to view all plutonium not in weapons, not in
16 warheads, as a surplus liability from a non-proliferation
17 point of view, and to consider treatment methods like
18 vitrification so that it would effectively be treated as
19 the liability that it is. I do not believe that
20 plutonium is an energy asset either, because to be a
21 civilian energy asset it has to have some economic value,
22 and there's no credible study that indicates that
23 plutonium has a net economic value.

24 Finally, I think that we have to look
25 to closing down the Weapons Complex and not building new

1 weapons because operating production facilities, really,
2 is interfering with the cleanup and waste management
3 goals. Secretary Watkins set out to change the culture
4 of the DOE in 1989, and I think that by the time he left,
5 he had not succeeded. I hope that many changes that have
6 happened in the DOE will produce more positive results
7 for the next four years. But one of the most important
8 things in the change of culture, in my view, is that if
9 there is a production mission, the weight of historical
10 momentum is such that the best talents, people and weight
11 of scientific and creative ability is put on the
12 production side. People that are in the Nuclear Weapons
13 Complex has not historically been on the environmental
14 side. I think that the R-PEIS should examine very
15 carefully the effect of keeping any site in production,
16 what effect that will have on the culture of DOE and on
17 the cleanup at that site, and on the waste management
18 problems that we have.

19 Finally, I think the PEIS needs to
20 address the long-term disposal issues that will arise out
21 of the various production alternatives, including the
22 problems of transuranic wastes and high-level wastes and
23 their implication for W.I.P.P., Yucca Mountain or any
24 other repository that the DOE might consider. Thank you.

25 THE MODERATOR: Thank you, sir. Our

1 next speaker will be Irving Michelson.

2 11:20 IRVING MICHELSON

3 Mr. Chairman, my name is Irving
4 Michelson. I live in Leisure World of Maryland at 15101
5 Interlochen Drive, Silver Spring, Maryland.

6 I'm a retired chemist. I was Director
7 of the program which monitored radioactive fallout in the
8 U.S. food supply from nuclear weapons tests from 1958 to
9 1963. This program is operated for a consumers' union
10 with contracts and grants from the Atomic Energy
11 Commission, the Public Health Service and the National
12 Institutes of Health. At this meeting I'm representing
13 Seniors Against Nuclear Arms, an organization of
14 residents of the Leisure World of Maryland in Montgomery
15 County. This organization was founded as a protest
16 movement against this threat of nuclear war. We are
17 concerned about the nuclear arsenals around the world and
18 the environmental hazards created by the frenzied pace of
19 nuclear weapons production. I am also representing the
20 Montgomery County Peace Action, and my comments are
21 endorsed by the Maryland Peace Action Council in the
22 National Office of Peace Action which is the successor
23 organization of SANE FREEZE.

24 We are delighted that the DOE is
25 undertaking reconfiguration of its Nuclear Weapons

1 Complex with the goal of down-sizing it to reflect the
2 realities of the present day international situation.
3 Our views are based on the following facts.

4 Since 1946 when two small atom bombs
5 ended our war with Japan, not a single nuclear weapon has
6 been used even though there have been many wars around
7 the globe during the past half century. Nevertheless, we
8 continue a frantic program of producing evermore
9 destructive weapons, stockpiling over twelve thousand
10 warheads, a grotesquely large arsenal, enough to wipe out
11 all possible enemies many times over. The fact that the
12 USSR engaged in the same idiotic behavior was not a good
13 excuse for us.

14 The concentrations of our national
15 resources on the arms race eventually undermined our
16 national economic base as well as that of the USSR. We
17 are now the world's largest debtor and our national debt
18 is the largest in history. We cannot afford the minimum
19 services our citizens have a right to expect as the most
20 powerful government in the world.

21 The frenzied pace of production of
22 nuclear weapons produced many highly polluted areas at
23 the sites of production because in our fear of impeding
24 the pace of weapons production, we did not enforce normal
25 environmental controls on these sites. As a result, we

1 are now faced with the need to spend hundreds of billions
2 of dollars to clean up these sites. Estimates range from
3 one hundred to three hundred billion.

4 During the next few years, you will
5 disassembling thousands of nuclear weapons to get our
6 arsenal down to about three thousand which is still
7 preposterous. After all the assembling, there will still
8 be, in your plans, at least three thousand. So, there
9 appears to be no reason to support facilities to make
10 more nuclear weapons. Such facilities would be a
11 complete waste of time and money and would only create
12 more waste and contamination. From these facts, we
13 conclude that much of DOE's efforts and resources would
14 be better devoted to cleaning up the contaminated weapons
15 production sites than to prepare for further weapons
16 production or maintenance during the next decade.

17 Now that we have no enemy with a
18 significant nuclear arsenal we can embrace the concept of
19 down-sizing to a goal of three thousand. That should be
20 considered as only an interim goal in our view. Beyond
21 that, we must consider further reductions. But in the
22 meantime we should not set up facilities to maintain an
23 arsenal of three thousand during the next decade. If we
24 regain our sober perspective, we will not need them at
25 all. Such a stockpile would be a relative to the Cold

1 War mentality of the period of the frenzied arms race
2 when we allowed paranoia to overrule our rationality.
3 Thank you.

4 THE MODERATOR: Thank you, Mr.
5 Michelson. Is there anyone else who is ready to
6 make comments and would like to do so at this
7 time? If not, we have a scheduled speaker at
8 12:05 and unless that person or a number of
9 other people arrive in the meantime, I then
10 suggest that we recess for now and reconvene at
11 12:05.

12 I do remind you that there are DOE
13 personnel here who would be glad to talk to you
14 about concerns or any questions that you may
15 have. Thank you. 11:25.

16 (WHEREUPON, a recess is had.)

17 THE MODERATOR: It's 12:07, and I
18 would like to call back into session this
19 scoping meeting on the scope of the Programmatic
20 Environmental Impact Statement for DOE's Nuclear
21 Reconfiguration Program.

22 My name is Barry Lawson, and I'm
23 President of Lawson and Associates in Concord,
24 Massachusetts. I am not a DOE employee, nor am
25 I an advocate for the Agency. To my right is

1 Steve Sohinki, and Steve is the Director of
2 Quality, Safety, Health and Quality Assurance or
3 Environment, Safety, Health and Quality
4 Assurance in the Department's Nuclear Weapons
5 Reconfiguration Office. Ann Wingo is our court
6 reporter.

7 At this point we have one additional
8 speaker, and this is Kerry Cook. Ms. Cook is
9 here and I will call on her now. So, if there
10 is anybody else who would like to speak, I will
11 take them after Ms. Cook. If not, we will
12 probably stay around informally here until about
13 12:30 to take any last minute speakers before we
14 break for lunch. Ms. Cook.

15 12:10 KERRY COOK

16 Thank you. I am Kerry Cook. I'm the
17 Executive Director of Twenty Twenty Vision, a grassroots
18 organization housed in Washington, D.C. with eleven
19 thousand subscribers all over the United States. You
20 should be seeing some Twenty Twenty Vision members at
21 various hearings around the country, because they're
22 quite concerned about this issue.

23 We are dedicated to the revitalization
24 of Democracy by creating persistent, strategic citizen
25 action to persuade decision-makers to protect the Earth

1 by reducing militarism and preserving the environment.
2 I'd like to say that I've been to quite a few of these
3 hearings and over the years I've seen what I'm glad to
4 say is I think maybe some attention being given to
5 citizens' requests that these hearing be a little more
6 user friendly, that we not have to face judges sitting up
7 on high looking down at us sternly, and that we are
8 allowed to face our friends and support people, and
9 anyone else we want to. And I will compliment the
10 Department of Energy and the officers and moderators for
11 making these a little more accessible to the public.

12 Now that I have done that, of course,
13 I'm going to say that it would be a real refreshing treat
14 for me to be able to come to one of these and see that
15 the Department of energy had bothered to listen to any of
16 us who have been coming to these hearings over the last
17 fifteen years, and had actually decided that maybe
18 continuing to try to make bomb plants was not exactly
19 what the people of the United States wanted the
20 Department of Energy to do.

21 The fact remains that the Department
22 of Energy's latest stab at reconfiguring the U.S. Nuclear
23 Weapons Complex holds desperately onto its option to make
24 new bomb plants -- excuse me -- to make new nuclear bombs
25 and gives the public three options on how to do that. We

1 can pick the old, dirty, broken down bomb plants and just
2 keep them going, we can take the old, dirty broken down
3 bomb plants and give them a new coat of paint, or we can
4 build brand new bomb plants guaranteed to run safely
5 until they start up. It's an insult to the intelligence
6 of the citizens of the United States that the Department
7 of Energy is conducting this debate when it's clear that
8 the major decisions, the ones the people of the United
9 States should be making, have already been made.

10 The fate of the Department of Energy's
11 Weapons Complex needs to be discussed and decisions do
12 need to be made, but this is not the forum, this is not
13 the choice of options that will lead us to a decision
14 that will deserve public respect. So, you're not going
15 to get it.

16 DOE, the Cold War is over. The
17 Russians aren't coming. They're busy right now. Open up
18 this process and invite the public in, into all of your
19 discussions, including the one that we're never in on
20 which is the "need" for the nuclear weapons for your bomb
21 complex. What have you got to lose. A bomb complex?

22 For all of the public hearings and the
23 comment periods, it's clear that the Department of Energy
24 is basing this entire process on a decision that's been
25 made, on an assumption you are carrying that you're going

1 to have five thousand, give or take a thousand, or give
2 or take a few more, nuclear bombs forever, and that is
3 just insane. That's insane that you think that this is
4 all the progress we're ever going to get in the world,
5 that Start I and Start II are the end of something. They
6 are not the end, they are the beginning, and the people
7 are not going to let it stop there. Why is the
8 Department of energy thinking that the thinking of ten
9 years ago, or even today, that the thinking of today is
10 as good as it's ever going to get. Again, this is just a
11 beginning.

12 I've lived up in Idaho up until
13 recently, and there's a lot of places that can claim a
14 particularly horrific experience with the Department of
15 Energy, but we think we're certainly at least equal in
16 horror stories. We, the people of Idaho, have put a
17 tremendous amount of work in the last ten years into
18 fighting off Department of Energy bomb plant proposals,
19 and I can say with absolute certainty that the Department
20 of Energy always desperately needed every one of them.
21 You had to have the new production reactor or if the Free
22 World, as we know it, would fall. You had to have the
23 Special Isotope Separation Plant or the rest of the
24 Nuclear Weapons Complex would turn to dust. Well, the
25 people of Idaho and finally the people of the United

1 States didn't let you build the Special Isotope
2 Separation Plant. Long after even Congress was telling
3 you, quit embarrassing us. It's embarrassing to even
4 have you ask for this. You don't need this thing. It's
5 just -- it's bells and whistles. Let's talk about real
6 need. You fought it to the end. The Department of
7 Energy was deeply disappointed when Congress said, and
8 the President said, get out of here. You're not going to
9 get any more money for this. But I'll tell you who
10 wasn't disappointed, the people of the United States.
11 They were very happy. They were right and you were
12 wrong.

13 The fact of the matter is is you're
14 still wrong. You didn't get it. Why aren't you
15 learning, why aren't you learning from people all over
16 the country telling you, we don't want you putting more
17 money into this. You have terrible -- you have a huge
18 crisis out in this country. You have got your left-over
19 bomb plant material that you have no idea what to do
20 with, and do not tell the lie to the people of the United
21 States that you can build bomb plants and build bombs and
22 take care of the environment and clean that mess up you
23 have already created. You can't. There aren't the
24 resources in the world for you to do that, and you won't
25 because the fun and games of building a new bomb will

1 always take precedent with you over cleaning up the mess
2 you have already made.

3 I have just picked up your mission
4 statement. I wanted to make sure someone read it into
5 the record. The mission statement of the Department of
6 Energy is, "The Department of Energy is entrusted to
7 contribute to the welfare of the nation by providing the
8 scientific foundation, technology, policy and
9 institutional leadership necessary to achieve efficiency
10 in energy use, diversity in energy sources, a more
11 productive and competitive economy, improved
12 environmental quality and a secure national defense."
13 You explain to me and the rest of the people of the
14 United States why the only real job that's in the budget
15 of the Department of Energy has to do with bomb plants
16 and wanting more bomb plants, and how to keep bomb plants
17 going. Live up to this. This doesn't sound so bad. I
18 kind of like this. I'd like to see this Department of
19 Energy fund it.

20 I would like to come back to a hearing
21 and say, you know, you're really on the right track,
22 you're going to lead us out of this mess. You're going
23 to be the leaders who are going to lead the world in
24 guaranteeing non-proliferation. How's that for a mission
25 for the Department of Energy. That's one that Twenty

1 Twenty Vision and the people of the United States could
2 get behind and they would fight for funding for you, but
3 this, this reconfiguration thing, it's a disaster. Thank
4 you.

5 THE MODERATOR: Thank you for your
6 comments. Is there anyone else who would like
7 to speak? If not, I will call another recess.
8 We will stay around here informally for about
9 fifteen more minutes. If there are no speakers,
10 we will break at 12:30. I will so note into the
11 record, and if we do break at that time, we will
12 reconvene at two o'clock this afternoon.

13 For those of you who gave your
14 testimony this morning, we want to thank you
15 very much for your thoughtful comments and
16 remind you that written comments can be sent to
17 the Department to be postmarked by October 29th.
18 Thank you very much.

19 (WHEREUPON, a recess is had.).

20 THE MODERATOR: As we have no
21 additional speakers this morning, I will now
22 call a recess between this hour and two o'clock
23 this afternoon when we'll again have the
24 reiteration of the opening comments and then
25 speakers at that time. This meeting will now

1 adjourn until 2:00.

2 (WHEREUPON, a recess is had.)

3 THE MODERATOR: Good afternoon. My
4 name is Barry Lawson. I am serving as the
5 moderator for today's scoping session on the
6 Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for
7 the Department of Energy's Nuclear Weapons
8 Reconfiguration project. To my right is Steve
9 Sohinki who is with the Department of Energy.
10 He's the Director of Environmental, Safety,
11 Health and Quality Assurance in the Nuclear
12 Weapons Reconfiguration Office. Our reporter,
13 also to my right, is Ms. Ann Wingo, and we are
14 not going to go through the entire introduction
15 that we made this morning. We will do that
16 again this evening if we have participation by
17 the public.

18 This afternoon we have two people who
19 have signed up to speak, and we will hear from
20 them in a second. I would just like to remind
21 them that scoping is part of the public
22 participation process as required for the
23 preparation of the Environmental Impact
24 Statement and it also provides an opportunity
25 for the public to provide input to the

1 Department on any actions of a Federal nature
2 that could have an impact on the environment.
3 The purpose of this meeting is to give the
4 public an opportunity to identify for the record
5 the significant issues concerning that you
6 believe the Department should consider in the
7 preparation of its Programmatic Environmental
8 Impact Statement on the Nuclear Weapons
9 Reconfiguration. I think that probably will do.

10 As I mentioned, we do have two speakers. We
11 have allowed them five minutes. Since we have
12 very few speakers this afternoon, if you would
13 like to go beyond that, you are certainly
14 welcomed to do so.

15 We appreciate very much your coming
16 this afternoon, and I would like, at this point,
17 to invite Ms. -- Dr. Judith Johnsrud to be our
18 first speaker. If you would take your place at
19 the podium, Dr. Johnsrud, that would be great.

20 Dr. Johnsrud, when you are prepared you
21 may begin. Also, if you would, identify who you
22 are, and if you have an organizational
23 affiliation, to please give that to us as well.

24 2:24 DR. JUDITH JOHNSRUD

25 Surely. I'm trying to find one

1 statement that seems to be trying to allude me here.

2 Okay. We don't have it.

3 Gentlemen, my name is Judith Johnsrud.

4 I live in State College, Pennsylvania. I hold a doctoral
5 degree in the field of geography and specializing for
6 twenty-five years in the geography of nuclear energy. I
7 have participated in prior DOE proceedings concerning
8 both the Weapons Complex and the Environmental
9 Restoration and Waste Management Programs, including
10 workshops in these areas. For identification purposes, I
11 chair the National Energy Committee of the Sierra Club,
12 although I do not necessarily in my comments today
13 represent the views of the Club as a whole. I also chair
14 the Radiation In The Environment Committee of the
15 Pennsylvania Chapter of Sierra Club, and also direct an
16 Environmental Coalition in the state of Pennsylvania
17 representing it on Pennsylvania's Advisory Committee on
18 Radioactive Waste. I often feel up beyond the eyeballs
19 in radioactive waste.

20 I have prepared for you -- I should
21 add, I do not represent the Advisory Committee in
22 Pennsylvania in my comments. They are, essentially, my
23 own comments from a geographer's perspective. And I have
24 prepared for you a four and a half page response to the
25 Notice of Intent. I hope that we will be subsequently

1 able to add additional more specific comments before the
2 end of your comment period. Since this is so significant
3 an issue for our nation's future, I would strongly urge
4 DOE to plan now to extend the public comment period in
5 order that far more members of the public whose lives
6 will be affected by your decisions will have an
7 opportunity to participate in the scoping process, as
8 well as subsequently in the PEIS process.

9 Do please sit down.

10 THE MODERATOR: I prefer to stand, if
11 you don't mind.

12 DR. JOHNSRUD: Rather than directly
13 reading my comments, I'll try to summarize them. I hope
14 that they are not found to be too offensive by employees
15 of the Agency, but I do want, from the outset, to urge
16 that those who are in the employ of the Department of
17 Energy begin personally to take a much greater
18 non-bureaucratic responsibility for the consequences of
19 the decisions that are made by the Agency, as a whole,
20 and of course, initially by its underlings. I say this
21 in recognition of the courageous actions of some members
22 of our State Department in recent weeks who have found
23 that their conscience disallows them from continuing in a
24 governmental agency that they believe does not serve well
25 -- the better interest of our nation.

1 Since its inception, the Department of
2 Energy, has, without any question, directed a
3 disproportionate amount of its attention and resources to
4 the development of evermore and evermore destructive
5 nuclear weapons. It's a culture that has developed in
6 the Cold War era, post World War II, and it is a
7 manifestation of, if you will, an ever increasing
8 militarization of our society, wherein, we have come to
9 believe that national security does indeed rest upon
10 armaments, armaments of unparalleled destructive
11 capability. I was astonished, nonetheless, to find in
12 the Notice of Intent the indication that the agency had
13 issued a finding of no significant impact with respect to
14 the non-nuclear consolidation environmental assessment
15 issued in June for any nuclear facility of any sort.
16 Such a finding is wholly inconsonant with the realities
17 of the impacts of ionizing radiation in the environment
18 and upon human beings and other forms of life.

19 I would say that such an action was,
20 indeed, contrary to laws that require the protection of
21 human health and safety, as well as protection of the
22 environment, and therefore, such action is arbitrary and
23 capricious, both. And I certainly would urge that DOE
24 have no intention of a comparable finding with respect to
25 this PEIS. It would be challengeable, intolerable.

1 The fundamental issue that needs to be
2 addressed by the Agency, and in my opinion, has not been
3 properly recognized is the effect of exposures to
4 ionizing radiation through environmental mechanisms.
5 Recent information within the past decade now makes it
6 clear that with respect to cancers and inheritable
7 genetic defects, there is no evidence to contradict the
8 hypothesis of a linear dose response relationship. This
9 is not the statement of any wild-eyed environmentalists.
10 This is, in fact, the statement of the National Academy
11 of Sciences Committee on the biological effects of
12 ionizing radiation in their 1990 BEIR-V report. Indeed,
13 many researchers find that there is -- appears to be a
14 supra-linear relationship between dose and response and
15 this association of low dose and particularly chronic low
16 dose exposures has been verified by both field
17 observations of attending physicians and research in the
18 laboratory within former Soviet Union concerning the
19 impacts of chronic low doses via ingestion and inhalation
20 pathways, both in the aftermath of Chernobyl and in the
21 populations located in the vicinity of the weapons
22 facilities of the former Soviet Union, Acastan, Eastern
23 Urles, the Artic Rim and other nuclear installations.

24 As the head of the equivalent
25 commission on radiation biology of the former Soviet

1 Academy of Science has put it, they now find it necessary
2 to rewrite classical radiation biology to take into
3 account the health injury resultant from low dose
4 exposures, and this injury is not in the form that we are
5 accustomed to. Cancers, latent genetic defects. Indeed,
6 it is the damage to the very mechanism of our well-being,
7 the functioning of the immunological system which, when
8 damaged, allows the occurrence of infection, greater
9 susceptibility to a whole range of diseases, longer
10 illnesses, repeated illnesses, general overall ill
11 health.

12 The Department of Energy has not
13 historically, and I think probably now, in doing this
14 PEIS, will claim that it does not need to, consider low
15 dose radiation impacts because they are not recognized in
16 EPA, NRC or DOE 's radiation production standards for
17 either workers or members of the public. It is our
18 strong recommendation that the PEIS must be developed
19 within the context of anticipated damage from chronic low
20 dose exposures. This, in turn, relates, obviously, to
21 the necessities for the cleanup of facilities and the
22 control of all radioactive materials and wastes that are
23 generated by DOE's weapons related activities.

24 Taken in concert with these adverse
25 impacts of the ionizing radiation on human health, are

1 the far-reaching changes with respect to national
2 security and the military roles of our government in the
3 aftermath of the Cold War. I think none of us
4 anticipated living through the politically, socially,
5 economically cataclysmic changes that have occurred
6 already in this decade. I am very much troubled that I
7 do not see in the Department of Energy a fundamental
8 alteration of what many of us call the Cold War
9 mentality. That is to say, the dedication to the
10 continued need for the development of nuclear weapons and
11 their production as some ostensible means of securing our
12 nation's economic and political existence.

13 I was, again, astonished to find that
14 this PEIS Notice of Intent for Reconfiguration of the
15 Weapons Complex does not, in fact, really change DOE's
16 stance with respect to the necessity of continuing
17 research, development, testing and production of nuclear
18 weapons. I suggest to you that it is time for DOE to
19 change. We have an entirely different administration in
20 Washington. We have international agreements that bind
21 us to the reduction of nuclear weapons, not the
22 generation of evermore of them.

23 Moreover, most fundamentally,
24 radioactive waste is a production problem; whether in the
25 commercial reactor realm or from the DOE weapons

1 programs. We do not have solutions to radioactive waste
2 disposal. In fact, I would suggest to you that within
3 the laws of physics we cannot, will not dispose of
4 anything, our garbage, our sewage or anything else. It's
5 with us in one form or another. This is most certainly
6 true of radioactive waste which over time will decay at
7 its own rate, not what we chose or what we do with it.

8 So, there is a fundamental
9 contradiction between the protestations of Admiral
10 Watkins and the present Secretary, Ms. O'Leary, that DOE
11 is indeed attempting to "clean up its act," to do a far
12 better job than it has historically done, and the
13 expressed intent in this Notice of Intent to continue to
14 consolidate, to down-size but to continue the development
15 of nuclear weapons and to reestablish a nuclear weapons
16 complex, if not at Hanford, if not at Oak Ridge, if not
17 at Savannah River, well, then, after all, Nevada is badly
18 contaminated, so, of course, we might as well just
19 pollute the test site and make it worse. This is, again,
20 an arbitrary and truly capricious action on the part of
21 this agency at this time in history.

22 THE MODERATOR: Dr. Johnsrud, could I
23 interrupt you for a second. I apologize for
24 doing so. You are now at almost fifteen
25 minutes. I want to hear -- I do want to hear

1 the rest of your comments. I would ask if you
2 are going to be more than a couple more minutes
3 that I would ask Mr. Robinowitz if he would like
4 to have her finish so that --

5 MR. ROBINOWITZ: That's fine.

6 THE MODERATOR: Okay.

7 DR. JOHNSRUD: Thank you, and I
8 apologize for running over. It is, however, a subject
9 that is deserving of far more than five minute, as I'm
10 sure you recognize.

11 One of the difficulties that -- let me
12 say first, I'm glad the Department asks about the
13 integrating of the two PEIS exercises for the
14 Reconfiguration as well as the Environmental Restoration
15 Waste Management programs. I have been disturbed to
16 realize how little contact there appears to be between
17 DOE staff people. I get the sense that the one hand
18 really is in much of a fog about what the other hand is
19 doing. It's as if the Environmental Restoration Program
20 is going to send its folks out in their protective suits
21 to shovel up the waste DOE has created -- DOE and its
22 predecessor -- over the decades, while behind them, along
23 come the bomb developers happily producing evermore of
24 the problem. The Agency must come to comprehend and act
25 upon the oneness between production and the consequent

1 hazardous waste that is generated by that production. I
2 don't see that it is there. Certainly not in this PEIS
3 Notice of Intent.

4 So, I would strongly recommend that
5 these two programmatic environmental impact statements be
6 conjoined perhaps proceeding separately but also
7 proceeding in concert. It's very important that this be
8 done.

9 One other aspect I want to call -- two
10 others aspects I want to call your attention to. One is
11 the existing use by the Department of Energy at its
12 weapons facilities of recycling of contaminated
13 materials. The second is DOE's utilization of what NRC
14 calls below regulatory concern, the deregulation, and,
15 hence, recycling into consumer products or landfills or
16 water supplies, of low activity wastes. Perhaps not such
17 low activity wastes. This latter approach has been
18 rejected by the NRC under the Energy Policy Act of 1992.
19 The Department of Energy again fails in its s. Perhaps
20 not such low activity wastes. This latter approach has
21 been rejected by the NRC under the Energy Policy Act of
22 1992. The Department of Energy again fails in its
23 responsibility, so long as it continues to utilize
24 recycling or deregulation and recycle in ways that allow
25 radioactive materials into the environment or to become

1 part of the dose to workers within the ill.

2 The other point is perhaps a little
3 more arcane and I speak to it as a geographer, with a
4 long experience with these issues, with concerns dealing
5 with the entire nuclear field cycle and the pathways of
6 ionizing radiation in the environment. What we have seen
7 in the past half century is what I term environmental
8 loading. The NCRP suggests that background radiation
9 levels have risen from the naturally occurring one
10 hundred to two hundred millirem to somewhere between
11 three hundred to four hundred millirem, of which, they
12 contend that a substantial portion comes from indoor
13 radon. Now, the longer we continue in the use, the
14 development, the expansion of nuclear weapons, nuclear
15 weapons complexes, as well as domestic uses with routine
16 permitted releases to the environment in addition to the
17 accidents that occur, the greater will be that
18 environmental loading. And since we now have the
19 understanding at molecular biological levels of the kind
20 of rather random injury resulting in all sorts of ill
21 health, disease, genetic impacts, it is now, in fact,
22 time to move in the opposite direction.

23 With respect to radioactive waste -- I
24 want to conclude with this point. And, again, it's
25 underlining that radioactive waste is a production

1 problem. We have assumed in our technological culture,
2 in fact, I would almost go so far as to say within our
3 technological religious belief that all technical
4 problems have solutions, that if we search just a little
5 longer, spend a little more money, give you folks at the
6 Department of Energy a little more help, a little more
7 time, that you will develop the means of safe isolation
8 for the full hazardous life of these wastes.

9 Now, as a geographer, when I consider
10 the time period of toxicity, these wastes including,
11 obviously, plutonium is a major component, we are,
12 indeed, talking five hundred thousand years, and that
13 translates into two million human generations at risk,
14 unit by unit, just as much five hundred years in the
15 future as now. We delude ourselves to continue to assume
16 that this government, your agency or any other anywhere
17 on Earth will find the means of safe sequestration of
18 radioactive waste that will succeed for the reclusive
19 time period, the period of hazard, the hazardous life of
20 these wastes.

21 All of these factors then speak to the
22 need to alter this acceptance of the dogma that we can
23 and will solve the problem, a shift in our national and,
24 indeed, international approach to the uses of nuclear
25 energy. There is an absolutely urgent need for DOE in

1 this Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement to
2 address these fundamental underlying issues. I urge you
3 to delete from consideration a continuation and/or
4 expansion of the weapons complex. We have no further
5 need, we have no further desire, and we cannot longer
6 afford to invest further in this technology of protection
7 for our society that has so demonstrably failed leaving
8 us with an insoluble problem.

9 I strongly urge, therefore, a complete
10 rewrite from pages seven through fifteen of the Notice of
11 Intent, within the context of there being no safe levels
12 of exposure; the Cold War being over; the need, urgent
13 need, for the denuclearizing of our society in the
14 twenty-first century, and the responsibility of DOE to
15 lead the way. Thank you for your indulgence of time.

16 THE MODERATOR: Thank you very much,
17 Dr. Johnsrud.

18 MR. SOHINKI: Thank you.

19 THE MODERATOR: Our next speaker will
20 be Mark Robinowitz.

21 2:46 MARK ROBINOWITZ

22 The one encouraging item in your
23 Notice is the statement that the arsenal is going to be
24 reduced to approximately twenty-five percent of what had
25 been previously envisioned. The rest of it, though, on

1 the other hand, is still stuck back in the 1950's with
2 statements like, "Without assured supply of tritium we
3 cannot continue to maintain an nuclear arsenal". This is
4 flatly wrong. You do not need tritium to make a nuclear
5 weapon explode as I'm sure you all realize. I have heard
6 DOE people state this. I have a document in my comments
7 from two years ago. If it was true, that would be a good
8 thing, and I don't seriously expect that any of you would
9 actually like to detonate a nuclear weapon on top of live
10 human beings. At least I hope not.

11 One item that needs to be included in
12 your document is a full accounting of the contamination
13 of each of your sites. All of them. Not just the
14 radioactive contamination in terms of how many curies of
15 which isotopes have been produced over the last five
16 decades, but the chemical contamination. Which solvents
17 were used in the reprocessing? How many CFC's were
18 released into the environment? All the other toxins that
19 DOE has had a proclivity to use when there were safer
20 effects, safer chemicals available. How many pounds of
21 these chemicals were used. What are the synergistic
22 effects of being exposed to these toxins and radioactive
23 materials? What is their bio-accumulation up the food
24 chain? What are the other health effects besides cancer,
25 the immunological effects, hormonal effects, the genetic

1 effects, since there was no extra supply of genetic
2 material that we can rely upon when we cause birth
3 defects and other problems in future generations?
4 Perhaps the single worst problem that our industrial
5 society has created is that we are destroying the gene
6 pool.

7 You need to include the more recent
8 information on toxics and radiation and health that has
9 been coming up in the last few years. How much dioxin,
10 for example, has been synthesized at DOE facilities?
11 What is the long term impact of all of this radioactive
12 material getting out into the biosphere? What would be
13 the impact of a tank leak at Savannah River going into
14 the aquifer if an earthquake were to happen there?

15 So, you need a full accounting of
16 everything that has happened at all of these facilities.
17 What has been the impact of all of the seven hundred or
18 so detonations at Nevada? What's the impact at Oak Ridge
19 where DOE has placed signs that state, do not touch the
20 water in the streams that lead out of the town? How much
21 Mercury has been put in the environment there, and all
22 the other facilities of which each of them have their own
23 horror stories? How many people have been murdered
24 because of these decisions? How many American citizens
25 are dead because of the arsenal, building these bombs?

1 How many people elsewhere in the world are dead because
2 of it? Sakarof gave calculations of what the radioactive
3 impact of this would be on the human race over thirty
4 years ago. You could rely on some of that information.

5 You also need to look at
6 detoxification. There is no way to dispose of these
7 materials. You will just be putting them somewhere,
8 here, there. Whose grandchildren are you aiming them at?
9 Because there is, as I'm sure you realize, no way to
10 guard five hundred million years in the future. That's
11 ludicrous. Five hundred thousand years I mean. Or even
12 five hundred years. There are serious questions that the
13 human race will be here in five hundred years. Pollution
14 is making the human race's continued existence quite
15 threatened. Pollution is causing sterility in the
16 population. It's causing epidemics of industrial
17 disease. How can you all plan for keeping these wastes
18 in perpetuity for thousands of years? That is insane, to
19 put it politely.

20 A couple of other points. I presume
21 you are going to use some form of risk assessment for
22 when you calculate various "risks" that we, the public,
23 are being asked to face with your expenditure of our tax
24 dollars. I would just like to read one sentence from a
25 report that I will submit of the questions asked about

1 risk assessment. "Quantitative risk assessment adds a
2 gloss of scientific respectability to the highly dubious
3 proposition that one human being ought to be free to
4 douse another human being with industrial poisons." We
5 do not consent to having hundreds of fissions products
6 put in our food chain. We do not consent to having toxic
7 solvents in our water supply. We do not consent to this.
8 It is a violation of human rights laws, the Genocide
9 Convention of the United Nations, of the Nuremberg
10 principles and basic humanity. We do not consent to
11 this. But unfortunately we have to pay for it. There is
12 no vote on this. Your decisions are generally not voted
13 on by members of Congress. And even they are often aloof
14 and far from the public.

15 If you are going to operate any of
16 these facilities, have a vote on the effected
17 communities. Ask the people around a particular facility
18 would they like continued production or not in a binding
19 referendum.

20 A couple of final points. On your
21 card here on the mission of the DOE, so-called, you state
22 that you recognize the importance of environmental
23 impacts of your operations. Yet the technologies that
24 you're employing are fundamentally incompatible with the
25 biological life. Fission products are fundamentally

1 incompatible with biological processes. There's no way
2 for human beings to safely absorb fission products,
3 transuranics and all of the other delights that have been
4 synthesized in nuclear reactors. They are fundamentally
5 incompatible with life. That cannot be stressed enough.
6 Some of the toxic chemicals that are used in the
7 production processes, particularly in the reprocessing
8 are also fundamentally incompatible with life. This has
9 to be acknowledged. If you cannot acknowledge that these
10 technologies are fundamentally dangerous, and that there
11 is no way to detoxify nuclear waste at this point, then
12 don't bother writing a report. It would be
13 intellectually dishonest.

14 I'm going to submit for the record the
15 comments I wrote for the earlier hearings on this which
16 go into more detail. But one or two things, is that if
17 you cannot acknowledge this, then it's basically like if
18 you did an EIS on the bombing of Hiroshima and forgot to
19 mention that people were killed. Or if the Auschwitz
20 camp did an EIS on the impacts of releasing Zicon-B and
21 forgot to mention what the purpose is. We don't need
22 more nuclear bombs. Nobody wants them except a very
23 small group of people, mostly here in Washington. Most
24 people don't want them. You have enough even when you
25 reduce by twenty-five percent. If you do need to do an

1 EIS, do an EIS on the impact of dismantling them at
2 Pantex and storing the little spheres of plutonium
3 forever and ever. Do an EIS on that. That is something
4 we need to do, we need to dismantle them. We need to
5 dismantle them all. What's the environmental impacts of
6 that going to be. What other ways to mitigate if not
7 eliminate the risk at this dismantling and storage of the
8 materials. Do an EIS on the possibilities of
9 transmutating long-lived wastes into short-lived wastes.
10 I'm skeptical of that, but that's the only thing I have
11 heard that seems to make any sense. Do an EIS on that.

12 Final two points, I look forward to
13 the name Department of Energy being accurate one of these
14 days when you'll actually research energy that comes from
15 the sun or the wind. Every two days we get more sunlight
16 than all of oil, coal and uranium combined, that ever
17 was. Turn your attentions to that. That's where the
18 future work is going to be. The Japanese are going to do
19 this. The Germans are going to do this. Why can't we?

20 Finally, I urge you to take a cue from
21 our new Vice-President who said in his book a year and a
22 half ago, that we have to make the restoration of the
23 environment the central organizing principle for
24 civilization. There will be plenty of jobs cleaning up
25 all the mess that you and your predecessors have made for

1 fifty years. There will be jobs for a long, long time,
2 thousands of years. If you're worried about jobs, there
3 will be plenty of jobs, but not another curie of waste
4 should be synthesized. Not another drop of toxic
5 chemicals put in our water. Thank you.

6 THE MODERATOR: Thank you. Thank you
7 very much for your comments this afternoon. Is
8 there anybody else here who is prepared to
9 provide comments to DOE? Okay. It is now a
10 little before three. Excuse me, Mr. Robinowitz.

11 MR. SOHINKI: Did you give a copy to
12 the court reporter?

13 MR. ROBINOWITZ: This is the only copy
14 I have.

15 THE MODERATOR: We will recess now,
16 and I will reconvene when I have one or two
17 people who would like to speak this afternoon.
18 As of now we have nobody else scheduled either
19 for this afternoon or for this evening's
20 session. For those who are interested, there
21 are DOE officials in the outer lobby who are
22 willing and able to listen and answer your
23 questions that you may have about the
24 Reconfiguration program or the Programmatic EIS.
25 We will reconvene if and when we have people

1 who would want to speak.

2 Thank you very much for attending and
3 this meeting is now recessed.

4 (Whereupon, a recess is had.)

5 THE MODERATOR: It is now 5:00, and as
6 there are no other speakers who have appeared
7 for making comments, we will now recess this
8 afternoon's session until 6:30 this evening. We
9 will not begin with any repeating of any of the
10 comments that were made this morning until and
11 unless we have some people who have shown up to
12 speak. The meeting is now adjourned until 6:30.

13 (WHEREUPON, a recess is had.)

14 THE MODERATOR: It is now 8:30 p.m.,
15 and we have had not speakers, either scheduled
16 or walk-in this evening. So, with this, we will
17 formally close today's scoping meeting with the
18 Department of Energy. I would to thank Steve
19 Sohinki and Ann Wingo for their good work, and
20 also thank all of the people who gave their
21 thoughtful comments and just remind people that
22 if they have any final comments, written
23 comments, to get them in by October 29th, 1993.
24 Thank you and good night.

25 (WHEREUPON THE HEARING IS ADJOURNED.)

R E P O R T E R ' S C E R T I F I C A T E


STATE OF TENNESSEE:

COUNTY OF KNOX:

I, ANN P. WINGO, Court Reporter and
Notary Public at Large, do hereby certify that I reported
in machine shorthand the foregoing proceedings in the
above entitled cause, and that the foregoing pages,
numbered from 1 to 112, inclusive, were typed by me and
constitute a true record of the foregoing proceedings.

I further certify that I am not an
attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor a relative
or employee of any attorney or counsel connected with the
action, and not financially interested in the action.

Witness my hand and seal this 28th day
of September, 1993.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Ann P. Wingo", is written over a horizontal line.

ANN P. WINGO, Court Reporter

and Notary Public at Large

My Commission Expires: 8/29/95