



Engineering in Cyber Resilience with Cyber- Informed Engineering

May 2024

Changing the World's Energy Future

Virginia L Wright



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May 2024

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MAY 14-16, 2024
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Engineering in Cyber Resilience with Cyber-Informed Engineering

Moderator: Lucian Niemeyer, Building Cyber Security

Speakers:

- Virginia Wright, Program Manager, INL
- Cheri Caddy, Senior Advisor, DOE

May 14, 2024, 1:30 p.m.



SPEAKER



Virginia Wright
Idaho National Laboratory
CIE Program Manager

Fun Facts

- INL has a research range which is the size of Rhode Island.
- INL has hosted 52 reactors since 1949
- INL has demonstrated that nuclear power could fly an airplane

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SPEAKER



Cheri Caddy
U.S. Department of Energy
Senior Technical Advisor for Cyber

Fun Facts

- Cyber attacks on ICS keep increasing
 - Ransomware attacks on ICS are up 50% between 2022-2023 (according to Dragos)
- Connected Vehicles – a ubiquitous part of converged IT/OT – are an area of increasing focus



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Cyber-Informed
Engineering


Engineering in Cyber Resilience with Cyber-Informed Engineering

Polling Question: (CHOOSE ALL THAT APPLY)

What role do you serve in ensuring cybersecurity for your infrastructure?

- a) I set the requirements
- b) I design systems, aligned to the requirements
- c) I use systems, aligned to the requirements
- d) I create or sell systems
- e) I advise on cybersecurity
- f) None

Cyber Attacks on Control Systems are Real – and Growing



Cybersecurity Threats are no longer Just Theoretical

Attackers May Be Coming for Your Plant. Time to Tighten Cyber Defenses.

The water and wastewater sectors are targets for a variety of cyber attacks. Some simple measures can go a

Every “Thing” Everywhere All at Once

Every asset in an organization's inventory that is not accounted for and protected is a potential attack vector that an attacker can use to gain access or move undetected.

Cybersecurity

US warns hackers are carrying out attacks on water systems

SECURITY ADVISORY

People's Republic of China State-Sponsored Cyber Actor Living off the Land to Evade Detection

Russia-linked hackers claim cyberattacks on U.S., French and Polish water utilities

Issue Date: May 24, 2023

Alert Code: AA23-144a

Russian hackers breached, sabotaged Texas water treatment plant, cyber firm says

BY ANDY GREENBERG SECURITY APR 17, 2024 6:08 AM

Hackers Linked to Russia's Military Claim Credit for Sabotaging US Water Utilities

Cyber Army of Russia Reborn, a group with ties to the Kremlin's Sandworm unit, is crossing lines even that notorious cyberwarfare unit wouldn't dare to.



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
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National CIE Strategy

- Directed by the U.S. Congress in the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act
- Outlines core CIE concepts
 - Defined by a set of design, operational, and organizational principles
 - Placed cybersecurity considerations at the foundation of control systems design and engineering
- Five integrated pillars offer recommendations to incorporate CIE as a common practice for control systems engineers
 - Intended to drive action across the industrial base stakeholders—government, owners and operators, manufacturers, researchers, academia, and training and standards organizations
- DOE issued the National CIE Strategy June 15, 2022
- CIE has been named in the National Cyber Strategy and the National Cyber Strategy Implementation Plan and in the report on cyber-physical systems by the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology



https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-06/FINAL%20DOE%20National%20CIE%20Strategy%20-%20June%202022_0.pdf

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE)

- CIE uses **design decisions and engineering controls** to eliminate or mitigate avenues for cyber-enabled attack.
- CIE offers the **opportunity to use engineering to eliminate specific harmful consequences** throughout the design and operation lifecycle, rather than add cybersecurity controls after the fact.
- Focused on **engineers and technicians**, CIE provides a framework for cyber education, awareness, and accountability.
- CIE aims to create a **culture of security** aligned with the existing industry safety culture.



Pillars of the National CIE Strategy



Awareness

Promulgate a universal and shared understanding of CIE



Education

Embed CIE into formal education, training, and credentialing




Development

Build the body of knowledge by which CIE is applied to specific implementations



Current Infrastructure

Apply CIE principles to existing systemically important critical infrastructure



Future Infrastructure

Conduct R&D and develop an industrial base to build CIE into new infrastructure systems and emerging technology



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







["SOCIETY OF AMERICAN MILITARY ENGINEERS"](#)

CIE Principles

PRINCIPLE	KEY QUESTION
Consequence-Focused Design	How do I understand what critical functions my system must <u>ensure</u> and the undesired consequences it must <u>prevent</u> ?
Engineered Controls	How do I implement controls to reduce avenues for attack or the damage which could result?
Secure Information Architecture	How do I prevent undesired manipulation of important data?
Design Simplification	How do I determine what features of my system are not absolutely necessary?
Layered Defenses	How do I create the best compilation of system defenses?
Active Defense	How do I proactively prepare to defend my system from any threat?
Interdependency Evaluation	How do I understand where my system can impact others or be impacted by others?
Digital Asset Awareness	How do I understand where digital assets are used, what functions they are capable of, and our assumptions about how they work?
Cyber-Secure Supply Chain Controls	How do I ensure my providers deliver the security we need?
Planned Resilience	How do I turn “what ifs” into “even ifs”?
Engineering Information Control	How do I manage knowledge about my system? How do I keep it out of the wrong hands?
Cybersecurity Culture	How do I ensure that everyone performs their role aligned with our security goals?


OK, But How Do You CIE?



How does this work in practice?

Water Booster Pump Station

Water Booster Pump Station



Water Booster Pump Station Archives App4Water

<https://www.app4water.com/product-category/applications/booster-pump-station/>



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


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Water Booster Pump Station



Water Booster Pump Station Archives App4Water

<https://www.app4water.com/product-category/applications/booster-pump-station/>

Cyber Solution Review


- Control System Software has a qualifying secure development lifecycle.
 - Very mature demonstrated processes
 - Provided SBOM
 - Component infrastructure is up to date
 - Mature vulnerability release process – with regular patches
 - 24/7 Support availability
- Cloud provider is reputable and qualified
 - SOC Type 2 and FedRamp (if needed), great physical security
 - Very mature, experienced in hosting critical infrastructure services
 - Demonstrated response and restoration capabilities

IT Installation Review

- Network entry point has standard security package
- Monitoring and logging traffic on this interface according to standard practice
 - Logging interfaces with organizational logging system
- Traffic in and out is encrypted between the cloud provider and the site network boundary

Organizational Review Board Votes

- Finance / Accounting – 
- Information Technology – 
- Cybersecurity – 
- Engineering Operations – 




CIE Application for

Water Booster Pump Station

Consequence-Focused Design

KEY QUESTION

How do I understand what critical functions my system must ensure and the undesired consequences it must prevent?



Assuming attacker defeats security controls:

- What is the worst that can happen?
 1. Attacker turns pumps on / off
 2. Attacker turns multiple pumps on / off
 3. Attacker turns pumps on / off quickly to damage equipment
- How would we respond?
 - For 1 and 2, return to manual mode operations until resolved
- Would any of these issues be catastrophic?
 - 3 would cause loss of pressure, water hammer effect, significant outage, replacement of equipment and significant expense

Engineered Controls

KEY QUESTION

How do I implement controls to reduce avenues for attack or the damage which could result?



Attacker defeats security and turns pumps on / off quickly to damage equipment – 18-month outage, large repair / replacement project

- Ideal control:
 - Deterministic (governed by physics)
 - Not networked / digital
 - It is visible and can be seen in infrastructure
 - Complimentary with existing protections
- Engineer suggests analog time-delay relay – slows command speed and eliminates potential for water hammer conditions resulting in equipment damage

Secure Information Architecture

KEY QUESTION

How do I prevent undesired manipulation of important data?


What are the data elements in this system where manipulation could have the most impact?

- *IT says: Denial / Loss of View or Denial / Loss of Control*

Where could manipulation of data lead to Engineering or Operational Impacts?

- Loss of Protection
- Loss of Safety
- Loss of Productivity and Revenue
- Damage to Property

How should the potential for these specific operational impacts inform the cybersecurity strategy?



Mechanical Time Delay Relay

Design Simplification

KEY QUESTION


How do I determine what features of my system are not absolutely necessary?

Where could we eliminate a system feature that would reduce potential for attack impacts? If we can't eliminate the features, how can we ensure they are not misused?

VFD-driven Pump



Relay-driven Pump



- When this pump station was built, the team considered a network-connected, Variable Frequency Drive-controlled pump.
- The team chose instead to have a relay control the pump.


Layered Defenses

KEY QUESTION

How do I create the best compilation of system defenses?

If we identify that an adversary turning on and off pumps leads to our worst engineering consequences -

- How can cybersecurity prioritize the defenses from our side and from the vendors to detect or prevent that from happening?
- How many layers of protection can we assemble?
- How can we inform cybersecurity requirements?




Active Defense

KEY QUESTION

How do I proactively prepare to defend my system from any threat?

If we identify that an adversary turning on and off pumps leads to our worst engineering consequences -

- How would we defend against that action?
- What do we expect of our vendor? Do we need additional contracts?
- How will engineering and cyber work together during the defense?
- Have we documented and practiced our defense?




Mechanical Time Delay Relay

Interdependency Evaluation

KEY QUESTION

How do I understand where my system can impact others or be impacted by others?

We have added a new interdependency – the cloud service and software. Beyond specific cyber attack, how might instability in this service affect our operations?




- What happens if the service goes down?

Digital Asset Awareness

KEY QUESTION

How do I understand where digital assets are used, what functions they are capable of, and our assumptions about how they work?

We have talked to the vendor about extending the product to allow remote control of the chlorinator. We are used to operating it manually. How will the use of digital technology change engineering risk?




- Is the dispensed amount hardwired or adjustable?
- How do we know that the product was actually dispensed?

Cyber-Secure Supply Chain Controls

KEY QUESTION

How do I ensure my providers deliver the security we need?

We examined the components used by the vendor and the security culture of the cloud company and both were very mature. However, there are still some questions we need to ask.




- How is the system patched? How are patches delivered? Can the asset owner accept or reject a patch?
- Does the software vendor or cloud provider ever allow access to our system to their vendors or maintainers?
- How are 3rd-party support providers, including the call-in support qualified and vetted?

Planned Resilience

KEY QUESTION

How do I turn “what ifs” into “even ifs”?




- *What if an attacker turned all of the pumps on or off?*
 - We use manual operations and contact the vendor. We predict very little loss from this scenario.
- *What if the application vendor reported an adversary attack?*
 - We return to manual operations and have a contract vehicle to ensure we can staff that for up to 2 weeks.
- *What if the application stopped working?*
 - See above. After two weeks, we would need to arrange for emergency staffing.
- *What if the cloud vendor had ransomware?*
 - See above.

Engineering Information Control

KEY QUESTION

How do I manage knowledge about my system? How do I keep it out of the wrong hands?

- *How much information about this upgrade must be shared?*
 - Municipal water activities are public record.
 - High level information about this upgrade must be shared.
 - Engineering team recommends to leadership that the specific vendor, product name, and cloud vendor name be kept out of the record.




Cybersecurity Culture

KEY QUESTION

How do I ensure that everyone performs their role aligned with our security goals?

Organizational Review Board Votes

- Finance / Accounting – ☒
- Information Technology – ☒
- Cybersecurity – ☒
- Engineering Operations – ☐ →



- *How do we build an inclusive cybersecurity culture?*
 - The fact that engineering could drive the implementation based on potential impacts of a cyber attack was a major change.
 - Engineering will need to talk to procurement to ensure resiliency resources are obtained.

So Where from here with CIE?

CIE Implementation Guide

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY

Office of
Cybersecurity and
Energy Security

Cyber-Informed
Implementation

Version 1.0

DRAFT

AUGUST 7, 2023

PRINCIPLE 1

Consequences

KEY QUESTION

How do I understand and ensure the understanding of consequences and the understanding of consequences?

Principle Description

Apply CIE strategies first and foremost to the system performs. Typically these are functions subverted, could result in unacceptable or catastrophic impacts to the organization, including undesired impacts to environment, availability or effectiveness of product integrity, and public image. Use a structured approach in areas where digital technology is used within the system. Consider where an unprotected action or failure of digital technology might lead to a high-consequence event, including unauthorized system actions, invalid data, automated action, or interdiction of a digitally enabled control that exist to minimize impacts of misuse. Controls are implemented via digital technology or a combination of both.

This list of high-impact consequences underpin system performance throughout the system design lifecycle and their priority within each CIE principle. For the work above, engineers will consider engineering controls (e.g., 2: Engineered Controls), that could either remove an unprotected action or mitigate its consequences.

4 This idea aligns with ISA/IEC 62443 "Assess, Design, Implement, Operate, Maintain, and Improve" while the system may not have changed, the patches address the consequences. The reassessment should be performed.

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PRINCIPLE PHASE
1 A



PRINCIPLE 1: CONSEQUENCE-CONCEPT PHASE (continued)

5

What business and

- a Which parts of the system could be impacted by the consequence?
- b Which result in "acceptable" risk management?
- c Which consequences are "unacceptable" and distinct consequences?

6

What regional or system failure or

- a What entities are involved in the infrastructure?
- b What changes are occurring from region to region?

7

What crucial assets

- a What violations are occurring?

8

Where might root causes

- a At each instance of the event?

9

Are there adverse

- a What circumstances are occurring?
- b In adverse consequences?

10

What staffing roles and

- a What training or support is needed?
- b What are the consequences?

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First point in the Engineering Lifecycle that the example is considered
Continuation of the example through the Engineering Lifecycle

CIE Engineering Lifecycle

Concept	Requirements	Design	Development	Testing, Verification, and Deployment	Operations and Maintenance
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Water Sector Engineering Lifecycle

Planning Concept	Preliminary Design Report	Detailed Design	Construction and Commissioning	Operations and Maintenance
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PRINCIPLE	CIE CONTROL/MITIGATION EXAMPLE	Planning Concept	Preliminary Design Report	Detailed Design	Construction and Commissioning	Operations and Maintenance
Principle 6: Active Defense	6-1 Implement an OT network monitoring solution. Design network to support data collection by sensors. Employ Zero Trust Architecture where possible.					
	6-2 Generate documentation on how to detect early warning signs and how to block, disconnect, and isolate network connection/device(s).					
Principle 7: Interdependency Evaluation	7-1 Implement continuous inter-departmental training to build relationships between different disciplines which will facilitate communication during emergency situations.					
	7-2 Ensure multiple sources are available for any dependency on outside inputs.					
Principle 8: Digital Asset Awareness	8-1 Adopt a commercial off the shelf OT network monitoring solution that uses passive data collection to build an asset inventory.					
	8-2 Regularly update the software and firmware on all devices found in the inventory					
Principle 9: Cyber-Secure Supply Chain Controls	9-1 Include security requirements in RFPs and contracts, develop a Secure Software Lifecycle Development program and implement tight vendor controls.					
	10-1 Install hardwired controls for all critical systems.					
Principle 10: Planned Resilience	10-2 Generate documentation and train staff to expect that any digital component can become compromised and lose functionality and know how to operate in manual.					

<https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1995796>

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


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Takeaways and Actions

- **Key Takeaway:** Cybersecurity *is* for Engineers
- **Action:** Review the CIE Implementation Guide to see how cybersecurity can apply to your engineering tasks
- **Action:** Join a CIE COP Working Group!

CIE COP and Working Group Purpose



Current Activities

Working with Standards Bodies

- IEEE PES, and others
- ISA99 – 62443

Working with Universities

- Developing curriculum guidance
- Incorporating CIE into engineering education

Working with Asset Owners

- Incorporate CIE into ongoing efforts
- Refine products
- Templates for cyber-informed designs

Recent CIE Publications

Websites

- DOE CESER CIE Website – <https://www.energy.gov/ceser/cyber-informed-engineering>
- INL CIE Website - <https://inl.gov/cie/>
- NREL CIE Website - <https://www.nrel.gov/security-resilience/cyber-informed-engineering.html>

Publications

- CIE Implementation Guide: [Cyber-Informed Engineering Implementation Guide \(Program Document\) | OSTI.GOV](#)
- CIE Workbook (Distribution, ADMS): <https://www.osti.gov/biblio/1986517>
- CIE Workbook (Microgrids): <https://www.osti.gov/biblio/2315001>

Articles and Briefings

- SANS ICS Concepts Video: https://youtu.be/o_vlxW6UTeg
- Industrial Cyber: [CIE and CCE Methodologies Can Deliver Engineered Industrial Systems for Holistic System Cybersecurity](#) (June 11, 2023) with interviews from INL, 1898, and West Yost
- Harvard Business Review: [Engineering Cybersecurity into U.S. Critical Infrastructure](#) (April 17, 2023) by Ginger Wright, Andrew Ohrt, and Andy Bochman
- Shift Left video podcast on GrammaTech blog: [Shifting Left for Energy Security](#) (April 4, 2023) with Ginger Wright, Idaho National Lab and Marc Sachs, Auburn University
- For more CIE articles and publications, visit: inl.gov/cie

Please provide feedback!

Thank You!



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<https://www.energy.gov/ceser/cyber-informed-engineering>

