



System Study: Emergency Power System 1998–2022

December 2023

Zhegang Ma, Kellie Kvarfordt
Idaho National Laboratory

Thomas Wierman
Schroeder Incorporated



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**Zhegang Ma, Kellie Kvarfordt
Idaho National Laboratory**

**Thomas Wierman
Schroeder Incorporated**

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**Idaho National Laboratory
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83415**

<http://www.inl.gov>

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ABSTRACT

This report presents an unreliability evaluation of the emergency power system (EPS) at 93 U.S. commercial operating nuclear reactors. New Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) models with the most recent SPAR parameter update results were used in this report. Demand, run hour, and failure data from 1998–2022 for selected components were obtained from the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Industry Reporting and Information System. The unreliability results are trended for the most recent 10-year period while yearly estimates for system unreliability are provided for the entire active period. No statistically significant increasing or decreasing trends were identified in the industry-wide estimates of EPS system start-only unreliability, but a highly statistically significant decreasing trend was identified in the industry-wide estimates of EPS system 8-hour mission unreliability.

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ACRONYMS

CCF	common-cause failure
EDG	emergency diesel generator
EPIX	Equipment Performance and Information Exchange
EPS	emergency power system
FTLR	fail to load/run
FTR	fail to run
FTS	fail to start
GTG	gas turbine generator
HTG	hydro turbine generator
ICES	INPO Consolidated Events Database
INPO	Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
IRIS	Industry Reporting and Information System
LOOP	loss-of-offsite power
MSPI	Mitigating Systems Performance Index
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PRA	probabilistic risk assessment
ROP	Reactor Oversight Process
SBO	station blackout
SPAR	standardized plant analysis risk
SSU	safety system unavailability
UA	unavailability (maintenance or state of another component)

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1. INTRODUCTION

This report presents an unreliability evaluation of the emergency power system (EPS) at 93 U.S. commercial operating nuclear reactors listed in Table 1. For each reactor (or plant), the corresponding Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) model was used in the yearly calculations. Demand, run hour, and failure data from calendar year 1998–2022 for selected components in the EPS were obtained from the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Industry Reporting and Information System (IRIS), formerly the INPO Consolidated Events Database (ICES) and the Equipment Performance and Information Exchange Database (EPIX). Train unavailability data (outages from test or maintenance) were obtained from the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) Safety System Unavailability (SSU) database (1998–2001) and the Mitigating Systems Performance Index (MSPI) database (2002–2022). The system unreliability results are trended for the most recent 10-year period while yearly estimates for system unreliability are provided for the entire active period.

This report does not attempt to estimate basic event values for use in a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). Suggested values for such use are presented in the 2020 SPAR parameter update including INL/EXT-21-65055, *Industry Average Performance for Components and Initiating Events at U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants: 2020 Update* [1], which is the most recent update to NUREG/CR-6928 [2], and INL/EXT-21-62940, *CCF Parameter Estimations, 2020 Update* [3], for common-cause failure (CCF) parameters.

New SPAR models (versions of 8.80 or above, as indicated in Table 1) that utilize the 2020 SPAR parameter update results [1, 3] were used in this report. In previous system studies, which can be found at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Reactor Operational Experience Results and Databases web page (<https://nrcoe.inl.gov/>), older SPAR models (versions of 8.1 to 8.2) with the *2010 Component Reliability Update* [4] for basic event data were used for the 2011 through 2020 system study updates. For comparison purposes, it is necessary to use the same set of SPAR models and basic event data in the analysis while the only variables subject to change are yearly demand, run hour, failure, and unavailability data for selected components in the system. However, more recent SPAR models must be used to replace outdated models periodically so that the system study reflects the current plant and system configurations as well as the more representative baseline data for the industry performance. With the 2020 SPAR parameter and model updates concluded in 2022, it was a good time to revamp the system study with the more current models for the 2022 update.

The EPS classes were categorized by the design considerations and configurations. Class 2 EPS includes configurations that effectively result in a success criterion of one of two emergency diesel generators (EDGs) (or other emergency power sources). Class 3 EPS includes configurations that effectively result in a success criterion of one of three EDGs (or other emergency power sources). EPS designs effectively resulting in a success criterion of one of four or more are included in Class 4. Table 1 summarizes the plants, their EPS classes, and the SPAR model versions used in this study.

The EPS model is evaluated using the loss-of-off-site power (LOOP) flag set in the SPAR model. The LOOP flag set assumes all ac power is unavailable and that the EPS is required to perform to mitigate the effects of the LOOP initiating event. All models include failures due to unavailability while in test or maintenance. Human error and recovery events in the models are set to “False” in the study for the results to represent the mechanical part of the system. An overview of the trending methods, glossary of terms, and abbreviations can be found in the *Overview and Reference* document [5] on the NRC web page (<https://nrcoe.inl.gov/>).

Two variations of the EPS system model are implemented and calculated. The EPS start-only model is the EPS SPAR model modified by setting all fail-to-run basic events to zero (“False”), unit crosstie events to “False,” all human error and recovery events to “Ignore,” and all cooling basic events to “False.” The 8-hour mission model sets all human error and recovery events to “Ignore.”

Section 2 of this report summarizes the main findings from the study. Section 3 presents the baseline EPS unreliability results using basic event values from the 2020 SPAR parameter update. Section 4 shows the trend results for EPS unreliability using system-specific data as listed in Section 6. Section 5 provides the basic event group importance information using the baseline results from Section 3. Section 7 presents a high-level generic description of the EPS system.

Table 1. Plant EPS class listing.

Class	Plant	SPAR ID	SPAR Version
Class 2	Beaver Valley 1	BVS1	8.80
Class 2	Beaver Valley 2	BVS2	8.80
Class 2	Brunswick 1	BRU1	8.80
Class 2	Brunswick 2	BRU2	8.80
Class 2	Callaway	CALL	8.80
Class 2	Clinton 1	CLNT	8.80
Class 2	Columbia 2	COLM	8.80
Class 2	Comanche Peak 1 & 2	COPK	8.81
Class 2	Cook 1 & 2	COOK	8.81
Class 2	Cooper	COOP	8.80
Class 2	Davis-Besse	DAVB	8.81
Class 2	Ginna	GINA	8.80
Class 2	Grand Gulf	GGUL	8.80
Class 2	Harris	HARR	8.81
Class 2	McGuire 1 & 2	MCGU	8.80
Class 2	Monticello	MONT	8.81
Class 2	Nine Mile Pt. 1	NMP1	8.80
Class 2	Nine Mile Pt. 2	NMP2	8.80
Class 2	Oconee 1, 2 & 3	OCON	8.80
Class 2	Palisades	PALI	8.80
Class 2	Perry	PERY	8.80
Class 2	Robinson 2	ROBN	8.80
Class 2	Seabrook	SBRK	8.80
Class 2	Summer	SUMM	8.80
Class 2	Waterford 3	WTRF	8.80
Class 2	Wolf Creek	WOLF	8.80
Class 3	Arkansas 1	ANO1	8.80

Class	Plant	SPAR ID	SPAR Version
Class 3	Arkansas 2	ANO2	8.81
Class 3	Braidwood 1 & 2	BRWD	8.81
Class 3	Byron 1 & 2	BYRN	8.81
Class 3	Calvert Cliffs 1	CCF1	8.80
Class 3	Calvert Cliffs 2	CCF2	8.80
Class 3	Catawba 1 & 2	CATA	8.81
Class 3	Diablo Canyon 1 & 2	DCAN	8.81
Class 3	Farley 1 & 2	FARL	8.81
Class 3	Hatch 1 & 2	HATC	8.82
Class 3	Hope Creek	HOPE	8.80
Class 3	LaSalle 1 & 2	LSAL	8.81
Class 3	Millstone 2	MIL2	8.80
Class 3	Millstone 3	MIL3	8.80
Class 3	Palo Verde 1, 2, & 3	PVNG	8.80
Class 3	Peach Bottom 2	PBT2	8.80
Class 3	Peach Bottom 3	PBT3	8.80
Class 3	River Bend	RIVB	8.80
Class 3	Salem 1 & 2	SALM	8.80
Class 3	Sequoyah 1 & 2	SEQH	8.80
Class 3	South Texas 1 & 2	STEX	8.80
Class 3	St. Lucie 1	STL1	8.80
Class 3	St. Lucie 2	STL2	8.80
Class 3	Surry 1&2	SURY	8.80
Class 3	Susquehanna 1	SUS1	8.82
Class 3	Susquehanna 2	SUS2	8.80
Class 3	Turkey Point 3 & 4	TKPT	8.80
Class 3	Vogtle 1 & 2	VOGT	8.80
Class 3	Watts Bar 1&2	WB12	8.80
Class 4	Browns Ferry 1	BRF1	8.80
Class 4	Browns Ferry 2	BRF2	8.80
Class 4	Browns Ferry 3	BRF3	8.80
Class 4	Dresden 2 & 3	DRES	8.81
Class 4	Fermi 2	FERM	8.80
Class 4	FitzPatrick	FITZ	8.80

Class	Plant	SPAR ID	SPAR Version
Class 4	Limerick 1	LIM1	8.80
Class 4	Limerick 2	LIM2	8.82
Class 4	North Anna 1 & 2	NANN	8.80
Class 4	Point Beach 1 & 2	PBCH	8.80
Class 4	Prairie Island 1 & 2	PRAI	8.80
Class 4	Quad Cities 1 & 2	QCTY	8.80

2. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The results of this EPS system unreliability study are summarized in this section. Of particular interest is any statistically significant^a increasing trends. In this update, **no statistically significant increasing or decreasing trends** were identified in the industry-wide estimates of **EPS system start-only unreliability**, but a **highly statistically significant decreasing trend** was identified in the industry-wide estimates of **EPS system 8-hour mission unreliability** for the most recent 10-year period.

The industry-wide EPS start-only and 8-hour basic event group importances were evaluated. For both **start-only and 8-hour mission, the leading contributor to EPS system unreliability** is the **1E Generator** group of basic events followed by the **Cooling** and **AC Power** groups.

a Statistically significant is defined in terms of the “p-value.” A p-value is a probability indicating whether to accept or reject the null hypothesis that there is no trend in the data. P-values less than or equal to 0.05 indicate that we are 95% confident that there is a trend in the data (reject the null hypothesis of no trend.) By convention, we use the “Michelin Guide” scale: p-value < 0.05 (statistically significant); p-value < 0.01 (highly statistically significant); p-value < 0.001 (extremely statistically significant).

3. INDUSTRY-WIDE UNRELIABILITY

The EPS fault trees from the SPAR models were evaluated for each of the 93 U.S. commercial operating nuclear reactors.

The industry-wide unreliability of the EPS has been estimated for two variations. A start-only model and an 8-hour mission model were evaluated (see Table 2). The uncertainty distributions for the EPS classes include both plant design variability (within a class) and parameter uncertainty while using industry-wide component failure data as in the 2020 SPAR parameter update.^b Table 2 shows the percentiles and mean of the aggregated sample data (Latin hypercube, 1,000 samples for each model) collected from the uncertainty calculations of the EPS fault trees in the SPAR models. In Figure 1 and Figure 2, the 5th and 95th percentiles and mean point estimates are shown each class and for the industry.

In Figure 1 and Figure 2, the width of the distribution for a class is affected by the differences in the plant modeling and the parameter uncertainty used in the models. Because the width is affected by the plant modeling, the width is also affected by the number of unique plant models in a class. For those classes with very few plants that share a design, the distribution width can be very small.

Table 2. Industry-wide unreliability values.

Model	EPS Grouping	Lower (5%)	Median	Mean	Upper (95%)
Start-only	Industry	6.12E-08	5.84E-05	6.17E-04	2.81E-03
	Class 2	8.79E-10	2.59E-04	9.55E-04	3.88E-03
	Class 3	2.48E-07	5.22E-05	4.16E-04	1.97E-03
	Class 4	9.38E-08	1.20E-05	3.73E-04	2.22E-03
8-hour Mission	Industry	1.34E-07	1.32E-04	9.91E-04	4.13E-03
	Class 2	1.70E-09	7.78E-04	1.58E-03	5.65E-03
	Class 3	3.63E-07	1.30E-04	7.09E-04	3.03E-03
	Class 4	3.67E-07	2.27E-05	3.88E-04	2.21E-03

^b By using industry-wide component failure data, individual plant performance is not included in the distribution of results.




Figure 1. EPS start-only unreliability for Class 2, 3, and 4 and industry-wide groupings.




Figure 2. EPS 8-hour mission unreliability for Class 2, 3, and 4 and industry-wide groupings.

4. INDUSTRY-WIDE TRENDS

The yearly failure and demand or run-time data from 1998–2022 were obtained from IRIS for the EPS system. EPS train maintenance unavailability data for trending are from the same period, as reported in the ROP program and IRIS. The component basic event uncertainty was calculated for the EPS system components using the trending methods described in Sections 1 and 2 of Reference [5]. Table 6 and Table 7 show the yearly data values for each EPS-specific component and failure mode combination that was varied in the model. These data were loaded into the EPS system fault tree in each SPAR model (see Table 1).

The trend charts show the results of varying component reliability data over time and updating generic, relatively flat prior distributions (or constrained noninformative distributions, refer to Section 2 of Reference [5]) using data for each year. In addition, the calculated industry-wide system reliability from this update (the “industry” values in Table 2) is shown as “SPAR/ICES” in the charts for comparison. Section 4 of Reference [5] provides a more detailed discussion of the trending methods. The regression method is indicated in the lower left-hand corner of the trend figures.

The component and failure mode that was varied in the EPS model is EPS diesel generator start, run, and test and maintenance.

Figure 3 shows the trend in the EPS start-only unreliability. Table 4 shows the data points for Figure 3. **No statistically significant increasing or decreasing trends** were identified in the industry-wide estimates of **EPS system start-only unreliability** for the most recent 10-year period.

Figure 4 shows the trend in the 8-hour mission unreliability. Table 4 shows the data points for Figure 4. **A highly statistically significant decreasing trend** was identified in the industry-wide estimates of **EPS system 8-hour mission unreliability** for the most recent 10-year period.




Figure 3. Trend of EPS system start-only unreliability.




Figure 4. Trend of EPS system 8-hour mission unreliability.

5. BASIC EVENT GROUP IMPORTANCES

The EPS basic event group Fussell-Vesely importances were calculated for the failure to start and 8-hour mission models for each plant using the industry-wide data from the 2020 SPAR parameter update. These basic event group importances were then averaged across all plants to represent an industry-wide basic event group importance.

The industry-wide EPS start-only and 8-hour mission basic event group importances are shown in Figure 5. For both **start-only** and **8-hour mission**, the **leading contributor to EPS system unreliability** is the **1E Generator** group of basic events followed by the **AC Power** and **Cooling** groups.

For more discussion on the EPS diesel generators, see the emergency diesel generator component reliability study at the NRC Reactor Operational Experience Results and Databases web page (<https://nrcOE.inl.gov/>). Table 3 shows the SPAR model EPS importance groups and their descriptions.




Figure 5. EPS industry-wide basic event group importances.

Table 3. EPS model basic event importance group descriptions.

Group	Description
1E Generator	All basic events associated with the primary emergency power supplies, including diesel, gas turbine, hydro-powered equipment, as well as the start, run, common-cause, and test and maintenance
AC Power	Buses and circuit breakers in the EPS model
Cooling	Cooling support components: service water or component cooling pumps, valves, and heat exchangers
DC Power	Buses, circuit breakers, battery chargers, and batteries in the EPS model
Generator Aux	This group includes the emergency power auxiliary components that are explicitly modeled in the EPS system, including the fuel oil, starting air, room cooling, and electrical dedicated to the generators
Heat Sink	The pumps, valves, strainers, and other equipment associated with the ultimate heat sink
Room Cooling	All basic events associated with the diesel generator room cooling
Sequencer	The sequencer including all basic events associated with the sequencer
TDP	All basic events associated with the high-pressure injection TDP that are needed in order to align alternate power source such as combustion turbine generator

The basic event group importances were also averaged across plants of the same EPS class to represent basic event group importances for different EPS classes. The EPS class-specific start-only and 8-hour mission basic event group importances are shown in Figure 6–Figure 8. For all classes, the leading contributor to EPS system unreliability is the 1E Generator group of basic events for both the start-only and 8-hour mission cases.




Figure 6. EPS Class 2 basic event group importances.




Figure 7. EPS Class 3 basic event group importances.




Figure 8. EPS Class 4 basic event group importances.

6. DATA TABLES

Table 4. Plot data for Figure 3, EPS start-only unreliability trend.

Year/Source	Regression Curve Data Points			Annual Estimate Data Points		
	Lower (5%)	Mean	Upper (95%)	Lower (5%)	Mean	Upper (95%)
SPAR/ICES	--	--	--	6.12E-08	6.17E-04	2.81E-03
1998	--	--	--	4.70E-08	4.05E-04	1.89E-03
1999	--	--	--	4.49E-08	4.00E-04	1.86E-03
2000	--	--	--	4.38E-08	3.75E-04	1.76E-03
2001	--	--	--	4.29E-08	3.85E-04	1.82E-03
2002	--	--	--	4.64E-08	4.28E-04	2.00E-03
2003	--	--	--	5.21E-08	4.96E-04	2.35E-03
2004	--	--	--	4.87E-08	4.96E-04	2.38E-03
2005	--	--	--	5.16E-08	4.57E-04	2.11E-03
2006	--	--	--	4.76E-08	4.68E-04	2.23E-03
2007	--	--	--	5.35E-08	5.47E-04	2.58E-03
2008	--	--	--	5.20E-08	5.05E-04	2.36E-03
2009	--	--	--	5.61E-08	5.43E-04	2.54E-03
2010	--	--	--	5.42E-08	4.90E-04	2.24E-03
2011	--	--	--	6.02E-08	5.95E-04	2.78E-03
2012	--	--	--	5.60E-08	5.35E-04	2.49E-03
2013	4.59E-04	5.15E-04	5.79E-04	4.85E-08	4.73E-04	2.23E-03
2014	4.59E-04	5.06E-04	5.58E-04	5.28E-08	4.85E-04	2.23E-03
2015	4.57E-04	4.97E-04	5.40E-04	5.58E-08	5.13E-04	2.35E-03
2016	4.55E-04	4.88E-04	5.23E-04	4.71E-08	5.93E-04	2.92E-03
2017	4.49E-04	4.79E-04	5.10E-04	5.07E-08	5.07E-04	2.41E-03
2018	4.41E-04	4.70E-04	5.01E-04	4.90E-08	4.47E-04	2.07E-03
2019	4.30E-04	4.62E-04	4.95E-04	4.50E-08	4.28E-04	2.02E-03
2020	4.17E-04	4.53E-04	4.92E-04	4.21E-08	4.17E-04	2.00E-03
2021	4.03E-04	4.45E-04	4.91E-04	4.96E-08	4.53E-04	2.11E-03
2022	3.89E-04	4.37E-04	4.91E-04	4.82E-08	4.52E-04	2.10E-03

Table 5. Plot data for Figure 4, EPS 8-hour mission unreliability trend.

Year/Source	Regression Curve Data Points			Annual Estimate Data Points		
	Lower (5%)	Mean	Upper (95%)	Lower (5%)	Mean	Upper (95%)
SPAR/ICES	--	--	--	1.34E-07	9.91E-04	4.13E-03
1998	--	--	--	8.02E-08	4.97E-04	2.19E-03
1999	--	--	--	7.03E-08	4.54E-04	2.05E-03
2000	--	--	--	8.23E-08	4.81E-04	2.10E-03
2001	--	--	--	6.83E-08	4.39E-04	2.00E-03
2002	--	--	--	8.78E-08	5.45E-04	2.39E-03
2003	--	--	--	1.02E-07	6.73E-04	2.93E-03
2004	--	--	--	1.07E-07	7.16E-04	3.13E-03
2005	--	--	--	1.08E-07	6.78E-04	2.84E-03
2006	--	--	--	8.25E-08	5.65E-04	2.55E-03
2007	--	--	--	1.26E-07	8.50E-04	3.61E-03
2008	--	--	--	1.29E-07	8.41E-04	3.49E-03
2009	--	--	--	1.03E-07	7.05E-04	3.07E-03
2010	--	--	--	1.12E-07	7.22E-04	3.01E-03
2011	--	--	--	1.39E-07	9.55E-04	3.99E-03
2012	--	--	--	1.25E-07	8.33E-04	3.49E-03
2013	8.09E-04	9.56E-04	1.13E-03	1.34E-07	8.61E-04	3.53E-03
2014	7.85E-04	9.04E-04	1.04E-03	1.42E-07	9.11E-04	3.66E-03
2015	7.59E-04	8.56E-04	9.64E-04	1.25E-07	8.15E-04	3.36E-03
2016	7.31E-04	8.09E-04	8.96E-04	1.14E-07	8.58E-04	3.87E-03
2017	6.99E-04	7.66E-04	8.39E-04	1.56E-07	1.05E-03	4.24E-03
2018	6.61E-04	7.24E-04	7.93E-04	1.09E-07	6.87E-04	2.86E-03
2019	6.19E-04	6.85E-04	7.58E-04	1.02E-07	6.34E-04	2.70E-03
2020	5.75E-04	6.48E-04	7.30E-04	9.23E-08	5.81E-04	2.55E-03
2021	5.32E-04	6.13E-04	7.06E-04	9.38E-08	5.92E-04	2.58E-03
2022	4.91E-04	5.80E-04	6.85E-04	9.59E-08	6.08E-04	2.63E-03

Table 6. Basic event reliability trending data.

Failure Mode	Component	Year	Number of Failures	Demands/ Run Hours	Bayesian Update			
					Mean	Post A	Post B	Distribution
FTLR	GEN	1998	14	4,098	3.39E-03	17.61	5.17E+03	Beta
FTLR	GEN	1999	5	4,039	1.68E-03	8.61	5.12E+03	Beta
FTLR	GEN	2000	8	4,140	2.22E-03	11.61	5.22E+03	Beta
FTLR	GEN	2001	13	4,168	3.16E-03	16.61	5.25E+03	Beta
FTLR	GEN	2002	14	3,930	3.51E-03	17.61	5.01E+03	Beta
FTLR	GEN	2003	15	3,876	3.74E-03	18.61	4.95E+03	Beta
FTLR	GEN	2004	10	3,821	2.77E-03	13.61	4.90E+03	Beta
FTLR	GEN	2005	15	3,784	3.82E-03	18.61	4.86E+03	Beta
FTLR	GEN	2006	15	3,756	3.84E-03	18.61	4.83E+03	Beta
FTLR	GEN	2007	21	3,642	5.20E-03	24.61	4.71E+03	Beta
FTLR	GEN	2008	16	3,718	4.08E-03	19.61	4.79E+03	Beta
FTLR	GEN	2009	18	3,673	4.53E-03	21.61	4.75E+03	Beta
FTLR	GEN	2010	11	3,625	3.10E-03	14.61	4.70E+03	Beta
FTLR	GEN	2011	16	3,659	4.13E-03	19.61	4.73E+03	Beta
FTLR	GEN	2012	17	3,509	4.48E-03	20.61	4.58E+03	Beta
FTLR	GEN	2013	12	3,525	3.38E-03	15.61	4.60E+03	Beta
FTLR	GEN	2014	12	3,543	3.37E-03	15.61	4.62E+03	Beta
FTLR	GEN	2015	13	3,501	3.62E-03	16.61	4.58E+03	Beta
FTLR	GEN	2016	11	3,494	3.18E-03	14.61	4.57E+03	Beta
FTLR	GEN	2017	9	3,451	2.77E-03	12.61	4.53E+03	Beta
FTLR	GEN	2018	14	3,483	3.85E-03	17.61	4.56E+03	Beta
FTLR	GEN	2019	7	3,419	2.35E-03	10.61	4.50E+03	Beta
FTLR	GEN	2020	4	3,407	1.69E-03	7.61	4.49E+03	Beta
FTLR	GEN	2021	5	3,352	1.94E-03	8.61	4.44E+03	Beta
FTLR	GEN	2022	8	3,369	2.60E-03	11.61	4.45E+03	Beta
FTR	GEN	1998	4	11,285	5.39E-04	7.83	1.45E+04	Gamma
FTR	GEN	1999	1	11,694	3.23E-04	4.83	1.49E+04	Gamma
FTR	GEN	2000	7	13,607	6.42E-04	10.83	1.69E+04	Gamma
FTR	GEN	2001	2	14,162	3.35E-04	5.83	1.74E+04	Gamma
FTR	GEN	2002	7	13,233	6.57E-04	10.83	1.65E+04	Gamma
FTR	GEN	2003	10	11,931	9.11E-04	13.83	1.52E+04	Gamma
FTR	GEN	2004	13	11,733	1.12E-03	16.83	1.50E+04	Gamma
FTR	GEN	2005	14	12,293	1.15E-03	17.83	1.55E+04	Gamma
FTR	GEN	2006	4	11,365	5.36E-04	7.83	1.46E+04	Gamma
FTR	GEN	2007	17	11,458	1.42E-03	20.83	1.47E+04	Gamma
FTR	GEN	2008	20	11,616	1.60E-03	23.83	1.49E+04	Gamma
FTR	GEN	2009	8	11,637	7.95E-04	11.83	1.49E+04	Gamma
FTR	GEN	2010	13	11,299	1.16E-03	16.83	1.45E+04	Gamma
FTR	GEN	2011	21	12,332	1.59E-03	24.83	1.56E+04	Gamma

Table 6. (continued).

Failure Mode	Component	Year	Number of Failures	Demands/Run Hours	Bayesian Update			
					Mean	Post A	Post B	Distribution
FTR	GEN	2012	11	7,352	1.40E-03	14.83	1.06E+04	Gamma
FTR	GEN	2013	17	7,913	1.87E-03	20.83	1.12E+04	Gamma
FTR	GEN	2014	17	7,228	1.99E-03	20.83	1.05E+04	Gamma
FTR	GEN	2015	12	7,788	1.43E-03	15.83	1.10E+04	Gamma
FTR	GEN	2016	10	7,584	1.28E-03	13.83	1.08E+04	Gamma
FTR	GEN	2017	22	7,390	2.43E-03	25.83	1.06E+04	Gamma
FTR	GEN	2018	10	7,875	1.24E-03	13.83	1.11E+04	Gamma
FTR	GEN	2019	8	7,389	1.11E-03	11.83	1.06E+04	Gamma
FTR	GEN	2020	6	7,405	9.23E-04	9.83	1.07E+04	Gamma
FTR	GEN	2021	4	7,186	7.50E-04	7.83	1.04E+04	Gamma
FTR	GEN	2022	5	7,321	8.35E-04	8.83	1.06E+04	Gamma
FTS	GEN	1998	18	4,773	2.70E-03	41.8	1.55E+04	Beta
FTS	GEN	1999	8	4,637	2.07E-03	31.8	1.53E+04	Beta
FTS	GEN	2000	12	4,563	2.34E-03	35.8	1.53E+04	Beta
FTS	GEN	2001	12	4,574	2.34E-03	35.8	1.53E+04	Beta
FTS	GEN	2002	10	4,653	2.20E-03	33.8	1.53E+04	Beta
FTS	GEN	2003	17	4,416	2.69E-03	40.8	1.51E+04	Beta
FTS	GEN	2004	14	4,328	2.51E-03	37.8	1.50E+04	Beta
FTS	GEN	2005	16	4,374	2.64E-03	39.8	1.51E+04	Beta
FTS	GEN	2006	9	4,361	2.17E-03	32.8	1.51E+04	Beta
FTS	GEN	2007	11	4,277	2.32E-03	34.8	1.50E+04	Beta
FTS	GEN	2008	8	4,318	2.11E-03	31.8	1.50E+04	Beta
FTS	GEN	2009	15	4,227	2.60E-03	38.8	1.49E+04	Beta
FTS	GEN	2010	15	4,142	2.61E-03	38.8	1.48E+04	Beta
FTS	GEN	2011	19	4,178	2.87E-03	42.8	1.49E+04	Beta
FTS	GEN	2012	14	3,972	2.57E-03	37.8	1.47E+04	Beta
FTS	GEN	2013	6	4,049	2.02E-03	29.8	1.47E+04	Beta
FTS	GEN	2014	12	4,019	2.43E-03	35.8	1.47E+04	Beta
FTS	GEN	2015	13	3,994	2.50E-03	36.8	1.47E+04	Beta
FTS	GEN	2016	13	4,011	2.50E-03	36.8	1.47E+04	Beta
FTS	GEN	2017	10	3,959	2.30E-03	33.8	1.46E+04	Beta
FTS	GEN	2018	7	3,964	2.10E-03	30.8	1.47E+04	Beta
FTS	GEN	2019	4	3,973	1.89E-03	27.8	1.47E+04	Beta
FTS	GEN	2020	4	3,941	1.90E-03	27.8	1.46E+04	Beta
FTS	GEN	2021	12	3,857	2.46E-03	35.8	1.45E+04	Beta
FTS	GEN	2022	3	3,868	1.84E-03	26.8	1.46E+04	Beta

Table 7. Basic event unavailability (UA) trending data.

Failure Mode	Component	Year	UA Hours	Critical Hours	Bayesian Update			
					Mean	Post A	Post B	Distribution
UA	EDG	1998	21234.84	1,874,166	1.04E-02	2.12	2.01E+02	Beta
UA	EDG	1999	22769.04	2,005,223	1.10E-02	2.51	2.26E+02	Beta
UA	EDG	2000	18408.57	2,042,467	9.53E-03	2.59	2.69E+02	Beta
UA	EDG	2001	19233.33	2,075,373	9.72E-03	1.83	1.86E+02	Beta
UA	EDG	2002	24631.27	2,093,196	1.20E-02	2.13	1.75E+02	Beta
UA	EDG	2003	28961.45	2,047,203	1.39E-02	1.65	1.17E+02	Beta
UA	EDG	2004	29616.96	2,099,392	1.36E-02	1.29	9.36E+01	Beta
UA	EDG	2005	26349.64	2,070,016	1.29E-02	2.36	1.80E+02	Beta
UA	EDG	2006	28713.17	2,083,212	1.33E-02	1.59	1.19E+02	Beta
UA	EDG	2007	34106.33	2,104,115	1.62E-02	1.74	1.06E+02	Beta
UA	EDG	2008	31754.78	2,089,978	1.52E-02	2.09	1.36E+02	Beta
UA	EDG	2009	33203.71	2,059,429	1.61E-02	1.98	1.22E+02	Beta
UA	EDG	2010	30037.07	2,081,690	1.44E-02	2.5	1.71E+02	Beta
UA	EDG	2011	36400.6	2,023,479	1.75E-02	1.9	1.07E+02	Beta
UA	EDG	2012	32469.83	1,977,596	1.59E-02	2.1	1.30E+02	Beta
UA	EDG	2013	30642.43	2,007,371	1.39E-02	1.88	1.33E+02	Beta
UA	EDG	2014	28291.92	2,027,147	1.43E-02	2.39	1.65E+02	Beta
UA	EDG	2015	30706.38	2,008,809	1.54E-02	2.56	1.64E+02	Beta
UA	EDG	2016	29859.1	2,025,233	1.51E-02	0.72	4.68E+01	Beta
UA	EDG	2017	30465.4	1,997,343	1.47E-02	1.64	1.10E+02	Beta
UA	EDG	2018	25798.44	1,990,438	1.30E-02	2.37	1.80E+02	Beta
UA	EDG	2019	24498.41	1,975,944	1.22E-02	2	1.62E+02	Beta
UA	EDG	2020	21822.02	1,887,082	1.14E-02	1.47	1.28E+02	Beta
UA	EDG	2021	24030.68	1,824,673	1.28E-02	2.04	1.58E+02	Beta
UA	EDG	2022	23835.6	1,807,766	1.35E-02	2.36	1.73E+02	Beta

Table 8. Failure mode acronyms.

Failure Mode	Failure Mode Description
FTLR	Fail to load/run
FTR	Fail to run
FTS	Fail to start
UA	Unavailability (maintenance or state of another component)

7. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

The EPS is designed to provide backup, on-site ac power to vital buses given a LOOP until off-site power can be restored to the plant. EPS designs vary widely among the 93 U.S. commercial operating nuclear reactors. A summary of those designs is presented in Table 9. Typical EPS designs include two, three, or four EDGs, with only one of the EDGs required for success. However, as indicated in Table 9, there are many variations of these typical designs, including shared EDGs and/or the ability to crosstie to other EDGs (at multi-unit sites), and availability of alternate ac sources such as gas turbine generators (GTGs) or hydro turbine generators (HTGs). In addition, several of the plants require two EDGs for long-term success, rather than one.

SPAR modeling of the EPS incorporates the plant-to-plant design and operational differences indicated in Table 9, which shows the generating equipment used in the EPS SPAR model. In some cases, two models (for sister units at the same site) use the same equipment. These are repeated for each entry to show how the SPAR models calculate. All ac emergency power sources that either are automatically started and aligned to essential buses given a LOOP or can be manually started and aligned within approximately 30 minutes are included in the EPS SPAR fault trees. Additional emergency power sources such as GTGs or HTGs that require more than 30 minutes to start and align to essential buses are included in other parts of the station blackout (SBO) event tree, typically as additional credit for recovery of ac power. Included in the EPS SPAR fault trees are dependencies such as room cooling, service water cooling, and dc power.

The typical EPS consists of two or more emergency power sources, usually diesel generators, connected to two or more vital or safety buses. These vital buses power equipment needed for safe shutdown during most transients that are postulated at nuclear power plants.

Figure 9 shows the simplest EPS configuration. Other EPS configuration variations are more buses, usually with their own emergency power sources; swing power sources that can power vital buses at either of two units; and/or alternate emergency power sources typically referred to as station blackout generators.

The SPAR models of the EPS include many more components than those shown in Figure 9. Most of the components are related to the support needed for the emergency power source success. Some are explicitly modeled in SPAR if there is a common-mode failure of multiple generators. Generally, these include:

- **Cooling:** Cooling is required to remove heat from the lubricating oil and the engine itself. Cooling is provided by service water either directly or through a closed loop cooling system such as component cooling water. Some emergency power sources have dedicated cooling systems that are independent of the service water systems.
- **Room Cooling:** Room cooling is usually required for extended performance of the EPS. The room cooling is provided by air conditioning heat exchangers that may be cooled by a chilled water source.
- **Fuel Oil:** Fuel oil is usually provided from a common fuel oil tank to separate “day tanks” for each emergency power source. Pumps, valves, and instrumentation are required to maintain day tank levels and supply fuel oil to the engine itself.
- **Sequencer:** The sequencer strips load from the dead bus prior to attempting to load the bus with the emergency power source. Then the sequencer sequences load back onto the bus once it has been re-energized.
- **DC Power:** DC power is provided by the vital batteries. DC power provides the energy to operate breakers and powers the control circuitry for the EPS.

Table 9. EPS configurations at U.S. commercial operating nuclear reactors.

Class	Plant	Total Generators	1E Generator	1E X-tie (To Sister Unit)	Non-1E Generator
Class 2	Beaver Valley 1	4	2	2	
Class 2	Beaver Valley 2	4	2	2	
Class 2	Brunswick 1	4	2	2	
Class 2	Brunswick 2	4	2	2	
Class 2	Callaway	2	2		
Class 2	Clinton 1	2	2		
Class 2	Columbia 2	2	2		
Class 2	Comanche Peak 1	2	2		
Class 2	Comanche Peak 2	2	2		
Class 2	Cook 1	2	2		
Class 2	Cook 2	2	2		
Class 2	Cooper	2	2		
Class 2	Davis-Besse	2	2		
Class 2	Ginna	2	2		
Class 2	Grand Gulf	2	2		
Class 2	Harris	2	2		
Class 2	McGuire 1	2	2		
Class 2	McGuire 2	2	2		
Class 2	Monticello	2	2		
Class 2	Nine Mile Pt. 1	2	2		
Class 2	Nine Mile Pt. 2	2	2		
Class 2	Oconee 1	2	1	1	
Class 2	Oconee 2	2	1	1	
Class 2	Oconee 3	2	1	1	
Class 2	Palisades	2	2		
Class 2	Perry	2	2		
Class 2	Robinson 2	3	2		1
Class 2	Seabrook	2	2		
Class 2	Summer	2	2		
Class 2	Waterford 3	2	2		
Class 2	Wolf Creek	2	2		
Class 3	Arkansas 1	3	2		1
Class 3	Arkansas 2	3	2		1
Class 3	Braidwood 1	4	4		
Class 3	Braidwood 2	4	4		

Table 9. (continued).

Class	Plant	Total Generators	1E Generator	1E X-tie (To Sister Unit)	Non-1E Generator
Class 3	Byron 1	4	2	2	
Class 3	Byron 2	4	2	2	
Class 3	Calvert Cliffs 1	5	2	2	1
Class 3	Calvert Cliffs 2	5	2	2	1
Class 3	Catawba 1	4	2	2	
Class 3	Catawba 2	4	2	2	
Class 3	Diablo Canyon 1	3	3		
Class 3	Diablo Canyon 2	3	3		
Class 3	Farley 1	5	3	2	
Class 3	Farley 2	5	3	2	
Class 3	Hatch 1	5	3	2	
Class 3	Hatch 2	5	3	2	
Class 3	Hope Creek	4	4		
Class 3	La Salle 1	4	2	2	
Class 3	La Salle 2	4	2	2	
Class 3	Millstone 2	3	2		1
Class 3	Millstone 3	3	2		1
Class 3	Palo Verde 1	8	2	4 (not included in SPAR model)	2 (need both)
Class 3	Palo Verde 2	8	2	4 (not included in SPAR model)	2 (need both)
Class 3	Palo Verde 3	8	2	4 (not included in SPAR model)	2 (need both)
Class 3	Peach Bottom 2	4	4 (2 of 4 required)		
Class 3	Peach Bottom 3	4	4 (2 of 4 required)		
Class 3	River Bend	4	3 ("C" EDG is different)		1
Class 3	Salem 1	4	3		1
Class 3	Salem 2	4	3		1
Class 3	Sequoyah 1	4	2	2	
Class 3	Sequoyah 2	4	2	2	
Class 3	South Texas 1	3	3		
Class 3	South Texas 2	3	3		
Class 3	St. Lucie 1	4	2	2	
Class 3	St. Lucie 2	4	2	2	
Class 3	Surry 1	4	3		1

Table 9. (continued).

Class	Plant	Total Generators	1E Generator	1E X-tie (To Sister Unit)	Non-1E Generator
Class 3	Surry 2	4	3		1
Class 3	Susquehanna 1	5	5 (2 of the EDGs cannot support all loads)		
Class 3	Susquehanna 2	5	5 (2 of the EDGs cannot support all loads)		
Class 3	Turkey Point 3	4	2	2	
Class 3	Turkey Point 4	4	2	2	
Class 3	Vogtle 1	3	2	1	
Class 3	Vogtle 2	3	2	1	
Class 3	Watts Bar 1	4	2	2	
Class 3	Watts Bar 2	4	2	2	
Class 4	Browns Ferry 1	8	4	4	
Class 4	Browns Ferry 2	6	4	2	
Class 4	Browns Ferry 3	8	4	4	
Class 4	Dresden 2	5	2	1	2
Class 4	Dresden 3	5	2	1	2
Class 4	Fermi 2	9	4		5
Class 4	FitzPatrick	4	4		
Class 4	Limerick 1	6	4	2	
Class 4	Limerick 2	6	4	2	
Class 4	North Anna 1	5	2	2	1
Class 4	North Anna 2	5	2	2	1
Class 4	Point Beach 1	5	4		1
Class 4	Point Beach 2	5	4		1
Class 4	Prairie Island 1	4	2	2	
Class 4	Prairie Island 2	4	2	2	
Class 4	Quad Cities 1	5	1	2	2
Class 4	Quad Cities 2	5	1	2	2




Figure 9. Simplified EPS system schematic.

8. REFERENCES

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