

Analysis of Loss-of-Offsite-Power Events 1998–2012

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ABSTRACT

Loss of offsite power (LOOP) can have a major negative impact on a power plant's ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions. Risk analyses performed loss of all alternating current power contributes over 70% of the overall risk at some U.S. nuclear plants. LOOP event and subsequent restoration of offsite power are important inputs to plant probabilistic risk assessments. This report presents a statistical and engineering analysis of LOOP frequencies and durations at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. The data used in this study are based on the operating experience from fiscal year 1998 through 2012. Frequencies and durations were determined for four event categories: plant-centered, switchyard-centered, grid-related, and weather-related. The EDG failure modes considered are failure to start, failure to load and run, and failure to run more than 1 hour. The component reliability estimates and the reliability data are trended for the most recent 10-year period while yearly estimates for reliability are provided for the entire active period. A statistically significant increase in industry performance was identified for plant-centered and switchyard-centered LOOP frequencies. There is no statistically significant trend in LOOP durations.

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ACRONYMS

ECAR	East Central Area Reliability Coordination Agreement
EDG	emergency diesel generator
EPIX	Equipment Performance and Information Exchange
ERCOT	Electric Reliability Council of Texas
FRCC	Florida Reliability Coordinating Council
INL	Idaho National Laboratory
LOOP	loss of offsite power
MAAC	Mid-Atlantic Area Council
MAIN	Mid-America Interconnected Network
MAPP	Mid-Continent Area Power Pool
MCMC	Markov chain Monte-Carlo
MLE	maximum likelihood estimator
MSPI	Mitigating Systems Performance Index
PRA	probabilistic risk assessment
rcry	reactor critical year
rsy	reactor shutdown year
SERC	Southeastern Electric Reliability Council
SPP	Southwest Power Pool
WECC	Western Electricity Coordinating Council

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1. INTRODUCTION

The availability of alternating current power is essential for safe operation and accident recovery at commercial nuclear power plants. Normally, alternating current power is supplied by offsite sources via the electrical grid. Loss of offsite power (LOOP, also referred to as LOSP) can have a major negative impact on a power plant's ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions. Risk analyses performed for U.S. commercial nuclear power plants indicate that the loss of all alternating current power contributes over 70% of the overall risk at some plants. Clearly, LOOP events and subsequent restoration of offsite power are important inputs to plant probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs). These inputs must reflect current industry performance so PRAs accurately estimate the risk from LOOP initiated scenarios.

This study is a statistical and engineering analysis of LOOP frequencies and durations at U.S. commercial nuclear reactors. LOOP data for calendar years 1986–2012 were collected and analyzed. The data cover both critical (at power) and shutdown operations at these plants. Partial LOOP events, in which not all offsite power lines to the plant are lost or not all offsite power to safety buses is lost, are not included in this report. LOOP events at power, during which no plant trip was observed, are also excluded.

2. LOOP FREQUENCY

LOOP industry frequencies were determined for four LOOP event categories: plant-centered, switchyard-centered, grid-related, and weather-related. In addition, these frequencies were subdivided into results for critical and shutdown operation. Table 1 summarizes these results (plant-specific LOOP frequencies are presented in Reference 1).

Table 1. Plant-level LOOP frequencies.

Mode	LOOP Category	Plant-Level LOOP Frequency				
		Data Period	Events	Reactor Critical or Shutdown Years	Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE)	Frequency Units ^a
Critical Operation	Plant-centered	1997–2012	2	1455.1	1.37E–03	/rcry
	Switchyard-centered	1997–2012	17	1455.1	1.17E–02	/rcry
	Grid-related	1997–2012	17	1455.1	1.17E–02	/rcry
	Weather-related	1986–2012	12	2332.6	5.14E–03	/rcry
	All ^b		46	1537.9	2.99E–02	/rcry
Shutdown Operation	Plant-centered	1986–2012	23	456.6	5.04E–02	/rsy
	Switchyard-centered	1997–2012	13	177.2	7.34E–02	/rsy
	Grid-related	1986–2012	5	456.6	1.10E–02	/rsy
	Weather-related	1986–2012	17	456.6	3.72E–02	/rsy
	All ^b		53	308.1	1.72E–01	/rsy

a. The frequency units are per reactor critical year (/rcry) or per reactor shutdown year (/rsy).

b. In the “All” rows, the events and rate estimators are summed across LOOP categories. The years are calculated so that the counts divided by the years equal the rates.

For critical operation, grid-related LOOPS contribute 46% to the total critical operation LOOP frequency, while switchyard-centered LOOPS contribute 38%. The remaining two categories of LOOPS have frequency contributions of 20% (weather-related) and 4% (plant-centered). More than any other LOOP category, grid-related events have the potential to affect multiple plant units. The last three major grid events affected eight plants, two plants, and three plants. This dependency is shown graphically in Figure 1. The two grid events prior to 1996 affected a single plant unit each.

For shutdown operation, switchyard-centered LOOPS contribute 26% to the total shutdown LOOP frequency. Switchyard-centered LOOPS are dominated by maintenance and testing activities and by equipment failures. Plant-centered LOOPS contribute 22%, weather 25%, and grid 12%. These distributions are shown graphically in Figure 2.




Figure 1. Distribution LOOP categories (per plant unit) during critical operation (1997 to 2012).




Figure 2. Distribution of LOOP categories (per plant unit) while shutdown (1997 to 2012).

Trend plots for all four LOOP event categories and all LOOPS combined during critical operation are presented in Figure 3 through Figure 7. The data supporting those figures are presented in Table 10 through Table 14. These figures show trends over two periods: 1986–1996 and 1997–2012. For plant-centered and switchyard-centered LOOPS, industry performance has improved considerably since 1986–1996. The corresponding trend analyses of the entire period indicate p-values close to 0.05, which is a typical statistical measure indicating existence of a significant trend. Therefore, the baseline period for determining industry frequencies representative of current performance is 1997–2012.

As indicated in Figure 3 through Figure 7, the industry performance over this recent period is relatively constant. The 2004 analysis showed, for grid-related LOOPS, performance had worsened because of 2003 and 2004. The addition of four years data without new events has reduced the previous trend to a non-significant flat trend.

a. Statistically significant is defined in terms of the ‘p-value.’ A p-value is a probability indicating whether to accept or reject the null hypothesis that there is no trend in the data. P-values of less than or equal to 0.05 indicate that we are 95% confident that there is a trend in the data (reject the null hypothesis of no trend.) By convention, we use the "Michelin Guide" scale: p-value < 0.05 (statistically significant), p-value < 0.01 (highly statistically significant); p-value < 0.001 (extremely statistically significant).




Figure 3. Trend plot of LOOP frequency for 1986–1996 and 1997–2012. Plant-centered LOOPS: trend plot of industry performance during critical operation.





Figure 4. Trend plot of LOOP frequency for 1986–1996 and 1997–2012. Switchyard-centered LOOPS: trend plot of industry performance during critical operation.



Note: The confidence interval for 2003 does not account for the dependence of the events and is, therefore, too narrow (by an undetermined amount).

Figure 5. Trend plot of LOOP frequency for 1986–1996 and 1997–2012. Grid-related LOOPS: trend plot of industry performance during critical operation.





Figure 6. Trend plot of LOOP frequency for 1986–1996 and 1997–2012. Weather-related LOOPS: trend plot of industry performance during critical operation.



Note: The confidence interval for 2003 does not account for the dependence of the events and is therefore too narrow (by an undetermined amount).

Figure 7. Trend plot of LOOP frequency for 1986–1996 and 1997–2012. All LOOPS combined: trend plot of industry performance during critical operation.

Distributions for the industry LOOP frequencies in Table 1 are presented in Table 2. Presented are the 5%, median, mean, 95%, maximum likelihood estimator (MLE), and shape (α) and scale (β) parameters for the gamma distributions. Variation was modeled in some cases, as discussed further below.

To develop LOOP distributions for use in PRAs, the first consideration was the issue of whether critical operations data should be separated from shutdown operation data. Past data support the separation of these two modes of operation for grid and weather-related LOOPS, but current data show fewer differences. The decision was made to split the data for all modes because of the different plant operating conditions and the different demands on the emergency power system associated with the two operational modes.

Another overall consideration was the period of time to use for each estimate. For the critical operation data, data since deregulation was used for all the LOOP categories as in the previous study, except for the weather-related occurrences. Here, there was no statistical evidence to suggest splitting the overall period of data (since 1986). It is believed that weather is independent of deregulation. For the shutdown data, differences in switchyard LOOP occurrence frequencies remain apparent (p -value = 0.0016) and only the data since deregulation are used.

In this study, Bayesian methods are used to derive distributions describing industry-level occurrence rates for use in PRAs. The methods account for uncertainties coming from the random nature of the data and from between-group variation. They also support the combining of data to describe the total LOOP rate. The methods start by searching for variability in the data using several grouping schemes: plant, site, various geographical areas, electrical grid areas, year, and others. The variability is sought for each separate LOOP frequency estimate using chi-squared tests and empirical Bayes analyses. In a SAS procedure, exact chi-square tests are approximated by simulation. Where the statistical tests show

variation and empirical Bayes distributions describing that variation are identified, the variation is modeled. In cases where the empirical Bayes analyses identified more than one grouping scheme with significant variability, a judgment call was made concerning which set of results to use. (See Appendixes B and C of Reference 1 for more information.)

The process of combining of the data for the total LOOP rate begins by specifying diffuse, broad gamma prior distributions for each rate being considered (see Section 8). These distributions are tuned in a Bayesian “Markov chain Monte-Carlo” (MCMC) simulation process. Poisson event counts that might occur from particular rates, based on specified historical years of critical operation, are described in the model. The observed event counts are specified. In the “Metropolis-Hasting” step, values from a given iteration of the simulation are accepted if they improve the likelihood for the constellation of sampling and parameter distributions under consideration. After a “burn-in” period, the parameter distributions describing the gamma distributions for the occurrence rates under study become stable. The resulting posterior distributions are sampled to determine the mean and other characteristics of the occurrence rates. Industry-level rates are monitored since they are the sum of the plant-centered, switchyard-centered, grid-related, and weather-related occurrence rates.

With regard to specific modeling of additional variation, the grid data were found to differ with regard to several possible breakdowns (site, grid, year, etc.) Differences in data from the 10 “Reliability Councils” (Figure 8) were selected as representative of this variation. In the modeling described above, separate data were input for each Reliability Council. In each iteration of the simulation (for which over 900,000 iterations were performed after the burn-in period) a reliability council was selected at random, with a weighting based on each council’s proportion of critical operation time, to provide input for the grid contribution to the total LOOP. The results of the evaluation of variation by NERC reliability council for grid events are shown in Table 3.

For shutdown operation, all the historic data was used as in the previous study, except for the switchyard-related LOOPS. Here, the occurrences since deregulation were significantly fewer than the occurrence rate in the earlier period (p-value 0.0001). Additional variation was modeled for the shutdown plant-centered LOOPS (plant differences) and for the shutdown weather-related loops (grid differences).




Figure 8. NERC reliability council regions.
(Source: <http://www.nerc.com/regional/nercmapcolor.jpg>.)

Table 2. Plant-level LOOP frequency distributions.

Plant-Level LOOP Frequency Distribution ^a									
Mode	LOOP Category	5%	Median (50%)	Mean	95%	MLE	Gamma Shape Parameter (α)	Gamma Scale Parameter (β , years)	Variation Modeled
Critical operation	Plant-centered	3.94E-04	1.50E-03	1.72E-03	3.80E-03	1.37E-03	2.5	1455.1	Homogeneous
	Switchyard-centered	7.72E-03	1.18E-02	1.20E-02	1.71E-02	1.17E-02	17.5	1455.1	Homogeneous
	Grid-related	7.07E-04	8.65E-03	1.23E-02	3.61E-02	1.17E-02	1.0	85.7	Reliability council
	Weather-related	5.59E-06	1.85E-03	5.03E-03	2.08E-02	5.14E-03	0.4	80.3	Year
Shutdown operation	All	1.37E-02	2.70E-02	3.47E-02	7.36E-02	—	2.9	83.3	MCMC simulation ^b
	Plant-centered	2.91E-03	3.48E-02	4.91E-02	1.44E-01	5.04E-02	1.1	21.6	Plant
	Switchyard-centered	4.56E-02	7.43E-02	7.62E-02	1.13E-01	7.34E-02	13.5	177.2	Homogeneous
	Grid-related	5.01E-03	1.13E-02	1.20E-02	2.15E-02	1.10E-02	5.5	456.6	Homogeneous
	Weather-related	1.50E-03	2.58E-02	3.90E-02	1.21E-01	3.72E-02	0.9	23.0	Grid
	All	8.97E-02	1.61E-01	1.81E-01	3.33E-01	—	4.9	26.9	MCMC simulation ^c

a. The frequency units for 5%, median, mean, and 95% are per reactor critical year (/rcry) or per reactor shutdown year (/rsy).

b. α and β were estimated by matching the mean and 95th percentile. The MCMC median was 2.49E-02 and the 5th percentile was 1.18E-02.

c. α and β were estimated by matching the mean and 95th percentile. The MCMC median was 1.52E-01 and the 5th percentile was 8.05E-02.

Table 3. Grid-related LOOP frequencies by reliability council (1997—2012).

Reliability Council ^a	Events	Reactor Critical Years	5%	Median	Mean	95%	MLE	Gamma Shape Parameter (α)	Gamma Scale Parameter (β , years)
ECAR	2	103	3.95E-03	1.54E-02	1.62E-02	3.51E-02	1.94E-02	2.92	169.01
ERCOT	0	58	2.34E-04	4.86E-03	7.30E-03	2.33E-02	0	0.92	126.65
FRCC	0	67.3	2.07E-04	4.51E-03	6.86E-03	2.20E-02	0	0.92	136.50
MAAC	4	188.9	6.72E-03	1.43E-02	1.84E-02	3.47E-02	2.12E-02	3.92	251.25
MAIN	0	210.9	5.02E-05	2.27E-03	3.54E-03	1.23E-02	0	0.92	271.46
MAPP	0	83.7	1.67E-04	4.07E-03	6.20E-03	2.01E-02	0	0.92	151.54
NPCC	6	154.4	1.13E-02	3.48E-02	2.94E-02	5.44E-02	3.89E-02	7.92	217.85
SERC	2	436	1.46E-03	5.34E-03	5.85E-03	1.26E-02	0	2.92	486.06
SPP	0	42.9	2.90E-04	5.49E-03	8.16E-03	2.57E-02	0	0.92	112.24
WECC	3	110.1	5.95E-03	2.03E-02	2.07E-02	4.27E-02	2.72E-02	3.92	177.02
Total	17	1455.2							

a. ECAR = East Central Area Reliability Coordination Agreement
ERCOT = Electric Reliability Council of Texas
FRCC = Florida Reliability Coordinating Council
MAAC = Mid-Atlantic Area Council
MAIN = Mid-America Interconnected Network
MAPP = Mid-Continent Area Power Pool
NPCC = Northeastern Power Coordinating Council
SERC = Southeastern Electric Reliability Council
SPP = Southwest Power Pool
WECC = Western Electricity Coordinating Council.

3. LOOP DURATION AND RECOVERY

Probability of exceedance versus duration curves were generated for each of the four LOOP categories: plant-centered, switchyard-centered, grid-related, and weather-related. No significant differences exist between the critical operation and shutdown operation data within the distinct LOOP categories, so curves were generated combining both types of data. In addition, no significant differences exist within each LOOP category between the 1986–1996 and 1997–2012 data periods, so the entire 1986–2012 period is applicable.

The lognormal density and cumulative distribution functions used in this report are the following:

$$f(t) = \frac{1}{t\sqrt{2\pi}\sigma} e^{-\frac{1}{2}\left[\frac{\ln(t)-\mu}{\sigma}\right]^2} \quad (1)$$

$$F(t) = \Phi\left[\frac{\ln(t)-\mu}{\sigma}\right] \quad (2)$$

where

- t = offsite power recovery time
- μ = mean of natural logarithms of data
- σ = standard deviation of natural logarithms of data
- Φ = error function.

The values that should be used for these equations are shown in Table 4. The definitions of the lognormal μ and σ parameters in Equations (1) and (2) are those found in Microsoft® Excel and the curve fitting software described in Appendix B of Reference 1.

The corresponding curves are presented in Figure 9. Statistical analyses indicated that the critical operation and shutdown operation LOOP data were similar for each LOOP category, so the duration information in Figure 9 is applicable to both types of operation.

Table 4. Lognormal fit parameters.^a

	Plant-centered	Switchyard-centered	Grid-related	Weather-related	Combined Plant-and Switchyard-centered ^b
p-value	>0.18	>0.25	>0.25	>0.25	>0.12
Mu (μ)	-0.5431	-0.1386	0.5263	1.2849	-0.2611
Standard error of μ	0.2546	0.1676	0.2683	0.4449	0.1411
Sigma (σ)	1.4628	1.4609	1.0730	2.0869	1.4732
Standard error of σ	0.1801	0.1185	0.1897	0.3146	0.0998
Curve Fit 95% (h)	9.626	9.889	111.936	8.692	6.566
Curve Fit Mean (h)	2.530	3.010	31.899	2.280	1.752
Curve Fit Median (h)	0.871	1.693	3.614	0.770	0.665

a. The LaCrosse and two Pilgrim events were excluded from these analyses. See Appendix A, Table A-1 of Reference 1 for more information.

b. For plant risk models that combine the plant-centered and switchyard-centered LOOPS, this column should be used.





Figure 9. Probability of exceedance versus duration curves.

LOOP duration data for critical and shutdown operation over the entire period 1986–2012 were used to generate probability of exceedance versus duration curves for each of the four LOOP categories. Statistical analyses indicated that within each category, there was not a statistically significant difference between the 1986–1996 data and the 1997–2012 data. However, if all of the LOOP data are combined, a statistically significant increasing trend in durations is observed over the period 1986–1996. In contrast, the 1997–2012 duration data do not exhibit a significant trend. The results of this trending analysis are presented in Figure 10. Finally, if the entire period 1986–2012 is considered, there is no statistically significant trend in LOOP durations.



Note: The increasing trend over 1986–1996 is statistically significant (p-value for the slope is 0.004), while the slightly increasing trend over 1997–2012 is not statistically significant (p-value for the slope is 0.55).

Figure 10. Trend plot of LOOP duration for 1986–1996 and 1997–2012 for critical and shutdown operation.

4. EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR REPAIR TIMES

Section 5, of Volume 2, in Reference 1 presents the probability of exceedance for emergency diesel generators (EDGs) repair times (one of two EDGs) based on the unplanned outage times provided by the reactor oversight program. This section provides an update of that analysis using monthly-unplanned demands from July 2003 to December 2012 from the Equipment Performance and Information Exchange (EPIX) database.

For each train in the Mitigating Systems Performance Index (MSPI) Program, monthly entries of planned outage hours, unplanned outage hours, and plant critical hours are provided from July 2003 through the present. Only outages that occurred while the plant was in critical operation are included in the EPIX database. Table 5 shows the mean and median of the raw unplanned UA data (with zero entries removed) and the shape parameters of the Weibull distribution fit to this data for the single EDG case and a simulation of the easier to repair EDG (of two). The simulation models plant personnel choosing to repair the easier to repair EDG (shorter repair time) 80% of the time. The simulation uses the distribution of the single EDG for both EDGs. A Weibull distribution (best fitting distribution) is fit to the simulated results.

Table 6 shows the non-recovery probabilities calculated for selected critical times using the repair time distribution times shown in Table 5. Figure 11 shows a graphic comparison of the two sets of results.

Table 5. EDG unplanned repair time distribution parameters.

Parameter	Single EDG Values	Two EDG Values
Mean	27.06	14.37
Median	10.83	5.63
Weibull (α)	0.67	0.64
Weibull (β)	18.89	10.30

Table 6. EDG non-recovery probability for selected times.

Time (hr)	One EDG	Two EDGs
0	1	1
0.5	0.916	0.867
1	0.869	0.800
1.5	0.832	0.749
2	0.800	0.706
3	0.747	0.636
4	0.702	0.580
5	0.663	0.534
6	0.629	0.493
7	0.598	0.458
8	0.570	0.427
9	0.544	0.400
10	0.520	0.375
11	0.498	0.352
12	0.478	0.332
13	0.459	0.313
14	0.441	0.296
15	0.424	0.280
16	0.409	0.265
17	0.394	0.251
18	0.380	0.239
19	0.366	0.227
20	0.354	0.216
21	0.342	0.206
22	0.330	0.196
23	0.320	0.187
24	0.309	0.178




Figure 11. Plot of non-recovery probabilities based on the two sets of data.

5. SPECIAL TOPICS

5.1 Seasonal Effects

NUREG-1784 (Reference 2) indicated that more recent LOOPs (switchyard-centered and grid-related) occur mostly during the five summer months (defined in that document as May through September). The LOOP data used for the present study were reviewed to determine if this seasonal effect exists within the four categories of LOOPs. Higher summer frequencies (1997–2012) were found for all of the four categories for critical operation. The frequencies for shutdown operation (1997–2012) during the summer are higher for three of the four categories.

This section analyzes each LOOP category over the periods 1986–1996 and 1997–2012 in order to identify seasonal differences between the two periods. Results for critical and shutdown operation are presented in Table 7. The results indicate no major seasonal effects on the shutdown overall LOOP frequency for either period. However, the critical operation LOOPs over the more recent period, 1997–2012, indicate a large seasonal difference in the overall LOOP frequency. This seasonal difference for the more recent period for critical operation results mainly from grid-related and switchyard-centered LOOPs. All three major grid disturbance events (August 14, 2003, event contributing eight LOOPs; September 15, 2003, event contributing two LOOPs; and June 14, 2004, event contributing three LOOPs) occurred during the summer months. In addition, seven switchyard-centered LOOPs occurred during the summer months, while only one occurred during the non-summer months.

Table 7. Plant-level LOOP events by season.

Mode		LOOP Category	1997-2012										Frequency Units ^a
			Summer (May–Sept.)		Non-summer		Summer (May–Sept.)		Non-summer				
			Events	Mean Frequency	Events	Mean Frequency	Events	Mean Frequency	Events	Mean Frequency			
Critical operation	Plant-centered	4	1.18E-02	6	1.31E-02	1	2.34E-03	1	1.84E-03	/rcry			
	Switchyard-centered	11	3.01E-02	12	2.53E-02	11	1.80E-02	6	7.97E-03	/rcry			
	Grid-related	2	6.54E-03	0	1.01E-03	17	2.73E-02	0	6.13E-04	/rcry			
	Weather-related	2	6.54E-03	1	3.03E-03	3	5.47E-03	6	7.97E-03	/rcry			
	All	19	5.10E-02	19	3.94E-02	1	2.34E-03	1	1.84E-03	/rcry			
	Reactor critical years (rcry)	382.5		494.9		639.9		815.3		—			
Shutdown operation	Plant-centered	7	7.29E-02	9	5.38E-02	2	4.54E-02	5	4.50E-02	/rsy			
	Switchyard-centered	11	1.12E-01	20	1.16E-01	2	4.54E-02	11	9.42E-02	/rsy			
	Grid-related	1	1.46E-02	0	2.83E-03	3	6.35E-02	4	1.23E-02	/rsy			
	Weather-related	2	2.43E-02	7	4.25E-02	4	8.17E-02	4	3.68E-02	/rsy			
	All	21	2.09E-01	36	2.07E-01	11	2.09E-01	24	2.01E-01	/rsy			
	Reactor shutdown years (rsy)	102.8		176.5		55.1		122.1		—			
a. The frequency units are per reactor critical year (/rcry) or per reactor shutdown year (/rsy).													

5.2 Multi-Unit Site Considerations

Among the 170 LOOP plant level events considered in this study for frequency and duration analyses (after removing LOOPS with no trip, the Lacrosse LOOP [1986 atypical plant design], and two Pilgrim salt spray LOOPS removed [effective modifications made to minimize salt spray impacts]). There were 16 occurrences (33 plant-LOOP events) involving more than one plant at a site resulting from the same event (over a period of 24 hours) and 137 single-LOOP occurrences. These events are listed in chronological order in Table 8. Thirteen involved two plants, while one (Palo Verde on June 14, 2004) involved all three plants at the site and one (Browns Ferry April 27, 2011) caused the trip of two of the three units.

Table 8. LOOP events (1986–2012) that affected more than one plant at a site.

Event	Site	Date	Number of Plants at Site	Number of Plants Affected	LOOP Category	Mode
1	Calvert Cliffs	7/23/1987	2	2	Switchyard Centered	Critical Operation
2	Peach Bottom	7/29/1988	2	2	Switchyard Centered	Shutdown Operation
3	Turkey Point	8/24/1992	2	2	Weather Related	Shutdown Operation ^a
4	Sequoyah	12/31/1992	2	2	Switchyard Centered	Critical Operation
5	Brunswick	3/16– 3/17/1993	2	2	Weather Related	Shutdown Operation
6	Beaver Valley	10/12/1993	2	2	Switchyard Centered	Critical Operation/ Shutdown Operation
7	Prairie Island	6/29/1996	2	2	Weather Related	Critical Operation
8	Fitzpatrick/Nine Mile Point 1	8/14/2003	2	2	Grid Centered	Critical Operation
9	Indian Point	8/14/2003	2	2	Grid Centered	Critical Operation
10	Peach Bottom	9/15/2003	2	2	Grid Centered	Critical Operation
11	Palo Verde	6/14/2004	3	3	Grid Centered	Critical Operation
12	St. Lucie	9/25/2004	2	2	Weather Related	Shutdown Operation ^a
13	Catawba	5/20/2006	2	2	Switchyard Centered	Critical Operation
14	Surry	4/16/2011	2	2	Weather Related	Critical Operation
15	Browns Ferry	4/27/2011	3	2	Weather Related	Critical Operation ^b
16	North Anna	8/23/2011	2	2	Grid Centered	Critical Operation
Total			34	33		

a. In these cases, the plants shut down in anticipation of bad weather. The weather events subsequently resulted in LOOPS at the plants.

b. This event was treated as though all three units experienced a LOOP, although a 161kV offsite power line remained available for BRF3. The unit responded as though it, too, had experience a LOOP.

Of the single-unit LOOPS, 78 occurred at sites with more than one plant. For LOOP purposes, Fitzpatrick and Nine Mile Point 1 are considered a dual-unit site and Nine Mile Point 2 is a single-unit site. The three-unit sites (starting with the data in 1986) are Browns Ferry, Oconee, Palo Verde, San Onofre, Millstone, and Hope Creek/Salem [considered three-unit for LOOP purposes]. Currently, San Onofre and Millstone are two-unit sites. Since 1986 there have been 31 2-unit sites (30 still operating) and 34 single-unit sites (28 still operating).

Table 9 contains conditional probabilities of other plants at a multi-plant site experiencing a LOOP given a LOOP at a particular plant being analyzed. The table has two sections, one for LOOP-category

specific estimates, and one for general LOOP estimates based on plant state. Separate methods were used to develop the estimates for the two sections. In the first part of the table, events were tallied based on whether multiple LOOPS occurred. However, not all the observed single-LOOP events contribute because the “given” condition is on a specific plant. For example, for a two-unit plant, on average only half of the single-unit LOOPS would affect, say, Unit 2. For those particular demands, the fact that Unit 1 did not have a LOOP represents a success. The other single-unit demands (the single-unit demands on Unit 1) would not be relevant because they do not deal with Unit 2 and are not part of the given conditions. Making the condition “specific” thus reduces the number of successes used to estimate the failure probability. For three-unit sites, one-third of the single-LOOP events were counted as successes for the probability of the other units failing. Fractional demands appear in the table because of these considerations.

One other detail of this update is that it includes the first observed LOOP at a multi-unit site that did not fully affect all units at that site. The ‘unaffected unit’ did experience the LOOP, but one 161kV offsite power source remained in service. Until more events that cause a LOOP at some but not all units occur, the calculations will not attempt to factor in the remaining active unit. This event was treated as a LOOP at all three units to simplify the probability estimates.

For the second section of Table 9, probabilities are simulated for each of the four LOOP categories using the beta distributions in the first section of the table. Then LOOP frequencies for each LOOP category are simulated for critical operations using four gamma distributions in the top part of Table 2. A weighted average LOOP probability for critical operations is calculated, with weights based on the LOOP frequencies. More specifically, the average is the sum, over the four LOOP categories, of the simulated multiple-LOOP probability for a category multiplied by the simulated frequency for that category, divided by the sum of the frequencies. The simulation was repeated 100,000 times. The results were fitted to a beta distribution using the “Univariate” SAS procedure, which fits the distribution by seeking parameters that maximize the likelihood of getting the simulated data. The same method was used to calculate the distribution for shutdown operations, except that the weights for the probabilities were computed using samples from the gamma distributions in the bottom half of Table 2.

The conditional probabilities for the other units experiencing a LOOP at a multiple-unit site given a LOOP at a particular site range from $6.8\text{E-}02$ for plant-centered LOOPS to $6.9\text{E-}01$ for grid-related LOOPS. The probabilities are considered to apply to all multiple-unit sites. For example, if a site has three plants and one plant experiences a grid-related LOOP, then a point estimate of the probability that the other two plants also experience the same grid-related LOOP is 0.69 from the table. The estimates in the second section of the table are only to be used when the risk model does not distinguish the individual LOOP categories.

Table 9. Conditional probability of all plants at a site experiencing a LOOP given a LOOP at the specific plant being analyzed.

LOOP Category	Number of LOOP Events Affecting all Plants at a Multi-Plant Site	Number of “Specific” LOOP Events at Multi-Plant Sites	Conditional Probability of All Plants at a Multi-Plant Site Experiencing a LOOP Given a LOOP at a Particular Plant at the Site				Beta Distribution Parameters	
			5%	Median	Mean	95%	α	β
By LOOP Category ^a								
Plant centered	0	8.33	1.28E-04	4.21E-02	6.82E-02	2.67E-01	0.69	9.40
Switchyard centered	5	27.67	8.69E-02	1.86E-01	1.93E-01	3.25E-01	5.69	23.74
Grid related	5	6.50	3.84E-01	7.05E-01	6.89E-01	9.26E-01	5.69	2.57
Weather related	6	8	4.10E-01	6.99E-01	6.85E-01	9.08E-01	6.69	3.07
By Plant Mode ^b								
All categories, critical operation	12 ^c	27.33 ^c	9.36E-02	2.35E-01	2.39E-01	4.20E-01	10.67	33.99
All categories, shutdown operation	4	23.17	2.23E-01	3.81E-01	3.82E-01	5.54E-01	18.68	30.15

a. In the first four rows, the mean is the mean from a Bayesian update of the Jeffreys non-informative prior $(0.5 + \text{events}) / (1 + \text{total events})$. The total events are fractional. A single-LOOP event is considered as, on the average, a demand of 0.5 for each unit at a two-unit site and as a demand of 0.333 for each unit at a three-unit site. Since the "given" unit is one unit, the fractional demands are summed instead of the actual counts for single-unit LOOPS. The remaining LOOPS affected all the units at a site, including the specific unit. The data are generally not homogeneous. In accordance with the methodology of Reference 1 (V 1, App. C), constrained non-informative beta distributions were selected to represent the uncertainties.

b. All-category distributions were obtained by simulation, using the category-specific distributions in the first rows of this table weighted by the plant mode-specific LOOP occurrence frequencies in Table 2. The simulation results were fitted to smooth distributions using SAS Procedure Univariate.

c. The event with one plant operating and one in shutdown operations was treated as operating for this count.

6. ENGINEERING ANALYSIS OF LOOP DATA

This section reviews the LOOP events from an engineering perspective. The objective is to provide additional qualitative insights with respect to the LOOP events. Events were segregated according to specific causes. A breakdown of the equipment failures is presented in Figure 12, in which transformers dominate the results. Figure 13 presents a breakdown of human error events, in which maintenance activities contribute the largest fraction. Finally, Figure 14 shows the breakdown of weather-related LOOP events.




Figure 12. LOOP due to equipment failure by cause, 1986–2012.




Figure 13. LOOP due to human error by type, 1986–2012.




Figure 14. LOOP due to weather by cause, 1986–2012.

7. DATA TABLES

Table 10. Plot data of LOOP frequency for 1986–1996 and 1997–2012. Plant-centered LOOPS: trend plot of industry performance during critical operation, Figure 3.

FY	Plot Trend Error Bar Points			Regression Curve Data Points		
	Lower (5%)	MLE	Upper (95%)	Lower (5%)	MLE	Upper (95%)
1986	1.31E-02	4.80E-02	1.24E-01	9.88E-03	2.45E-02	6.08E-02
1987	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	4.27E-02	9.07E-03	2.07E-02	4.72E-02
1988	6.77E-04	1.32E-02	6.26E-02	8.24E-03	1.74E-02	3.70E-02
1989	6.75E-04	1.32E-02	6.24E-02	7.39E-03	1.47E-02	2.93E-02
1990	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.71E-02	6.51E-03	1.24E-02	2.37E-02
1991	9.74E-03	3.57E-02	9.24E-02	5.62E-03	1.05E-02	1.95E-02
1992	4.25E-03	2.39E-02	7.53E-02	4.74E-03	8.84E-03	1.65E-02
1993	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.61E-02	3.91E-03	7.46E-03	1.42E-02
1994	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.49E-02	3.16E-03	6.29E-03	1.25E-02
1995	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.37E-02	2.51E-03	5.31E-03	1.12E-02
1996	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.44E-02	1.96E-03	4.48E-03	1.02E-02
1997	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.75E-02	2.20E-05	7.32E-04	2.44E-02
1998	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.55E-02	3.25E-05	7.90E-04	1.92E-02
1999	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.30E-02	4.75E-05	8.53E-04	1.53E-02
2000	5.52E-04	1.08E-02	5.11E-02	6.86E-05	9.20E-04	1.23E-02
2001	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.19E-02	9.76E-05	9.93E-04	1.01E-02
2002	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.16E-02	1.36E-04	1.07E-03	8.47E-03
2003	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.23E-02	1.82E-04	1.16E-03	7.34E-03
2004	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.16E-02	2.35E-04	1.25E-03	6.64E-03
2005	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.19E-02	2.84E-04	1.35E-03	6.40E-03
2006	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.18E-02	3.19E-04	1.45E-03	6.63E-03
2007	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.12E-02	3.31E-04	1.57E-03	7.45E-03
2008	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.14E-02	3.18E-04	1.69E-03	9.01E-03
2009	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.18E-02	2.88E-04	1.83E-03	1.16E-02
2010	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.14E-02	2.49E-04	1.97E-03	1.56E-02
2011	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.23E-02	2.09E-04	2.13E-03	2.17E-02
2012	7.48E-04	1.46E-02	6.92E-02	1.71E-04	2.30E-03	3.08E-02

Table 11. Plot data of LOOP frequency for 1986–1996 and 1997–2012. Switchyard-centered LOOPS: trend plot of industry performance during critical operation, Figure 4.

FY	Plot Trend Error Bar Points			Regression Curve Data Points		
	Lower (5%)	MLE	Upper (95%)	Lower (5%)	MLE	Upper (95%)
1986	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	4.79E-02	1.99E-02	3.65E-02	6.69E-02
1987	2.81E-02	7.12E-02	1.50E-01	1.94E-02	3.40E-02	5.97E-02
1988	1.08E-02	3.96E-02	1.02E-01	1.88E-02	3.17E-02	5.34E-02
1989	1.08E-02	3.95E-02	1.02E-01	1.82E-02	2.95E-02	4.78E-02
1990	6.36E-04	1.24E-02	5.88E-02	1.76E-02	2.75E-02	4.30E-02
1991	9.74E-03	3.57E-02	9.24E-02	1.69E-02	2.56E-02	3.89E-02
1992	9.78E-03	3.59E-02	9.27E-02	1.61E-02	2.39E-02	3.53E-02
1993	1.65E-02	4.82E-02	1.10E-01	1.53E-02	2.22E-02	3.23E-02
1994	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.49E-02	1.44E-02	2.07E-02	2.97E-02
1995	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.37E-02	1.35E-02	1.93E-02	2.76E-02
1996	5.89E-04	1.15E-02	5.45E-02	1.25E-02	1.80E-02	2.58E-02
1997	4.45E-03	2.50E-02	7.88E-02	2.93E-03	8.77E-03	2.62E-02
1998	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.55E-02	3.36E-03	9.09E-03	2.46E-02
1999	5.65E-04	1.10E-02	5.23E-02	3.85E-03	9.43E-03	2.31E-02
2000	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.22E-02	4.37E-03	9.78E-03	2.19E-02
2001	5.46E-04	1.06E-02	5.05E-02	4.94E-03	1.01E-02	2.08E-02
2002	5.41E-04	1.05E-02	5.00E-02	5.53E-03	1.05E-02	2.00E-02
2003	3.84E-03	2.16E-02	6.80E-02	6.09E-03	1.09E-02	1.95E-02
2004	5.40E-04	1.05E-02	5.00E-02	6.59E-03	1.13E-02	1.94E-02
2005	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.19E-02	6.97E-03	1.17E-02	1.98E-02
2006	8.67E-03	3.18E-02	8.22E-02	7.18E-03	1.22E-02	2.06E-02
2007	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.12E-02	7.21E-03	1.26E-02	2.21E-02
2008	5.37E-04	1.05E-02	4.97E-02	7.09E-03	1.31E-02	2.42E-02
2009	5.44E-04	1.06E-02	5.03E-02	6.86E-03	1.36E-02	2.69E-02
2010	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.14E-02	6.57E-03	1.41E-02	3.02E-02
2011	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.23E-02	6.23E-03	1.46E-02	3.43E-02
2012	1.99E-02	5.84E-02	1.34E-01	5.87E-03	1.52E-02	3.91E-02

Table 12. Plot data of LOOP frequency for 1986–1996 and 1997–2012. Grid-related LOOPS: trend plot of industry performance during critical operation, Figure 5.

FY	Plot Trend Error Bar Points			Regression Curve Data Points		
	Lower (5%)	MLE	Upper (95%)	Lower (5%)	MLE	Upper (95%)
1986	1.51E-05	3.99E-03	1.54E-02	2.15E-03	4.29E-03	8.58E-03
1987	1.43E-05	3.76E-03	1.45E-02	2.25E-03	4.31E-03	8.25E-03
1988	1.37E-05	3.61E-03	1.39E-02	2.36E-03	4.33E-03	7.95E-03
1989	1.23E-03	1.08E-02	2.83E-02	2.47E-03	4.35E-03	7.66E-03
1990	1.33E-05	3.48E-03	1.34E-02	2.58E-03	4.38E-03	7.41E-03
1991	1.30E-05	3.40E-03	1.31E-02	2.69E-03	4.40E-03	7.18E-03
1992	1.17E-03	1.02E-02	2.68E-02	2.80E-03	4.42E-03	6.98E-03
1993	1.31E-05	3.43E-03	1.32E-02	2.90E-03	4.44E-03	6.80E-03
1994	1.29E-05	3.36E-03	1.29E-02	2.99E-03	4.46E-03	6.67E-03
1995	1.26E-05	3.29E-03	1.27E-02	3.06E-03	4.48E-03	6.57E-03
1996	1.28E-05	3.33E-03	1.28E-02	3.12E-03	4.51E-03	6.51E-03
1997	1.59E-05	4.12E-03	1.58E-02	1.54E-03	4.38E-03	1.25E-02
1998	1.54E-05	3.97E-03	1.53E-02	1.79E-03	4.62E-03	1.20E-02
1999	1.46E-05	3.78E-03	1.45E-02	2.07E-03	4.87E-03	1.15E-02
2000	1.44E-05	3.72E-03	1.43E-02	2.38E-03	5.14E-03	1.11E-02
2001	1.43E-05	3.69E-03	1.42E-02	2.72E-03	5.42E-03	1.08E-02
2002	1.42E-05	3.66E-03	1.41E-02	3.06E-03	5.72E-03	1.07E-02
2003	4.24E-02	7.83E-02	1.23E-01	3.38E-03	6.03E-03	1.07E-02
2004	7.83E-03	2.56E-02	5.18E-02	3.66E-03	6.36E-03	1.10E-02
2005	1.43E-05	3.69E-03	1.42E-02	3.87E-03	6.70E-03	1.16E-02
2006	1.43E-05	3.68E-03	1.41E-02	3.99E-03	7.07E-03	1.25E-02
2007	1.41E-05	3.63E-03	1.40E-02	4.02E-03	7.46E-03	1.38E-02
2008	1.42E-05	3.65E-03	1.40E-02	3.98E-03	7.86E-03	1.55E-02
2009	1.28E-03	1.10E-02	2.88E-02	3.89E-03	8.29E-03	1.77E-02
2010	1.42E-05	3.65E-03	1.40E-02	3.76E-03	8.75E-03	2.03E-02
2011	4.21E-03	1.86E-02	4.14E-02	3.61E-03	9.22E-03	2.35E-02
2012	1.57E-03	1.36E-02	3.56E-02	3.45E-03	9.73E-03	2.74E-02

Table 13. Plot data of LOOP frequency for 1986–1996 and 1997–2012. Weather-related LOOPS: trend plot of industry performance during critical operation, Figure 6.

FY	Plot Trend Error Bar Points			Regression Curve Data Points		
	Lower (5%)	MLE	Upper (95%)	Lower (5%)	MLE	Upper (95%)
1986	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	4.79E-02	2.55E-04	1.73E-03	1.17E-02
1987	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	4.27E-02	3.02E-04	1.83E-03	1.11E-02
1988	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.95E-02	3.56E-04	1.95E-03	1.06E-02
1989	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.94E-02	4.20E-04	2.07E-03	1.01E-02
1990	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.71E-02	4.95E-04	2.19E-03	9.71E-03
1991	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.57E-02	5.81E-04	2.33E-03	9.31E-03
1992	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.58E-02	6.80E-04	2.47E-03	8.96E-03
1993	6.19E-04	1.21E-02	5.72E-02	7.94E-04	2.62E-03	8.66E-03
1994	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.49E-02	9.21E-04	2.78E-03	8.40E-03
1995	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.37E-02	1.06E-03	2.95E-03	8.21E-03
1996	4.08E-03	2.30E-02	7.23E-02	1.22E-03	3.13E-03	8.08E-03
1997	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.75E-02	1.83E-04	1.44E-03	1.12E-02
1998	6.08E-04	1.18E-02	5.62E-02	2.56E-04	1.69E-03	1.11E-02
1999	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.30E-02	3.56E-04	1.98E-03	1.10E-02
2000	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.22E-02	4.94E-04	2.33E-03	1.10E-02
2001	5.46E-04	1.06E-02	5.05E-02	6.83E-04	2.74E-03	1.10E-02
2002	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.16E-02	9.36E-04	3.22E-03	1.11E-02
2003	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.23E-02	1.27E-03	3.78E-03	1.12E-02
2004	5.40E-04	1.05E-02	5.00E-02	1.71E-03	4.44E-03	1.16E-02
2005	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.19E-02	2.24E-03	5.22E-03	1.22E-02
2006	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.18E-02	2.86E-03	6.14E-03	1.32E-02
2007	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.12E-02	3.51E-03	7.21E-03	1.48E-02
2008	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.14E-02	4.12E-03	8.48E-03	1.75E-02
2009	5.44E-04	1.06E-02	5.03E-02	4.61E-03	9.96E-03	2.15E-02
2010	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.14E-02	4.97E-03	1.17E-02	2.76E-02
2011	2.13E-02	5.40E-02	1.14E-01	5.21E-03	1.38E-02	3.63E-02
2012	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	4.37E-02	5.36E-03	1.62E-02	4.88E-02

Table 14. Plot data of LOOP frequency for 1986–1996 and 1997–2012. All LOOPS combined: trend plot of industry performance during critical operation, Figure 7.

FY	Plot Trend Error Bar Points			Regression Curve Data Points		
	Lower (5%)	MLE	Upper (95%)	Lower (5%)	MLE	Upper (95%)
1986	1.41E-02	4.57E-02	9.18E-02	1.96E-02	4.29E-02	9.37E-02
1987	2.71E-02	6.52E-02	1.17E-01	1.97E-02	4.08E-02	8.48E-02
1988	1.85E-02	5.01E-02	9.42E-02	1.97E-02	3.89E-02	7.68E-02
1989	2.53E-02	6.10E-02	1.09E-01	1.96E-02	3.70E-02	6.97E-02
1990	1.85E-03	1.58E-02	4.12E-02	1.96E-02	3.52E-02	6.35E-02
1991	3.00E-02	6.63E-02	1.14E-01	1.94E-02	3.35E-02	5.80E-02
1992	3.01E-02	6.65E-02	1.14E-01	1.92E-02	3.19E-02	5.32E-02
1993	2.36E-02	5.67E-02	1.01E-01	1.88E-02	3.04E-02	4.91E-02
1994	1.97E-05	5.00E-03	1.92E-02	1.84E-02	2.90E-02	4.56E-02
1995	1.91E-05	4.86E-03	1.87E-02	1.78E-02	2.76E-02	4.27E-02
1996	1.07E-02	3.46E-02	6.95E-02	1.71E-02	2.62E-02	4.03E-02
1997	5.96E-03	2.61E-02	5.77E-02	5.13E-03	1.72E-02	5.74E-02
1998	1.75E-03	1.49E-02	3.89E-02	5.86E-03	1.75E-02	5.23E-02
1999	1.65E-03	1.41E-02	3.66E-02	6.67E-03	1.79E-02	4.79E-02
2000	1.61E-03	1.38E-02	3.59E-02	7.54E-03	1.82E-02	4.41E-02
2001	5.20E-03	2.27E-02	5.04E-02	8.44E-03	1.86E-02	4.11E-02
2002	1.58E-03	1.35E-02	3.53E-02	9.31E-03	1.90E-02	3.88E-02
2003	6.71E-02	1.15E-01	1.74E-01	1.01E-02	1.94E-02	3.73E-02
2004	2.06E-02	4.96E-02	8.87E-02	1.07E-02	1.98E-02	3.68E-02
2005	1.79E-05	4.55E-03	1.75E-02	1.10E-02	2.02E-02	3.73E-02
2006	9.81E-03	3.17E-02	6.38E-02	1.09E-02	2.06E-02	3.89E-02
2007	1.75E-05	4.46E-03	1.71E-02	1.06E-02	2.11E-02	4.17E-02
2008	1.58E-03	1.35E-02	3.51E-02	1.01E-02	2.15E-02	4.56E-02
2009	9.81E-03	3.17E-02	6.38E-02	9.48E-03	2.19E-02	5.07E-02
2010	1.76E-05	4.49E-03	1.72E-02	8.78E-03	2.24E-02	5.71E-02
2011	3.34E-02	6.91E-02	1.15E-01	8.06E-03	2.28E-02	6.48E-02
2012	3.48E-02	7.69E-02	1.32E-01	7.36E-03	2.33E-02	7.39E-02

8. METHODS

This section has been added to provide additional information about the methods used to derive a satisfactory ‘Total LOOP Frequency’. Reference 1 derived the total LOOP frequency by summing the plant-centered, grid-related, switchyard-centered, and weather-related frequencies. Since each of these essentially added 0.5 LOOP events (constrained non-informative prior distribution update), the total LOOP frequency was 2.0 LOOP events larger than actual counts. Since that report was prepared, Idaho National Laboratory (INL) staff have searched for a more appropriate method to arrive at the total LOOP frequency.

It should be noted that this discussion applies only to the total LOOP frequency and does not apply to the individual LOOP frequencies for the plant-centered, grid-related, switchyard-centered, and weather-related categories.

MCMC, Metropolis-Hasting, and “burn-in,” are generally most applicable to the use of WinBUGS or its newer incarnation, OpenBugs. While there are likely to be other tools for these calculations, INL staff have the most experience with WinBUGS and OpenBugs. WINBUGS is widely used in the statistical community.

The use of hierarchical Bayes methods are described in Section 8.3 of the *Handbook of Parameter Estimation for Probabilistic Risk Assessment* (Reference 3). This update implements a procedure nearly identical to the procedure discussed in Section 8.3.4. Figure 8.8 on page 8-16 of Reference 3 applies directly, except that we use a more diffuse prior on beta [$\text{gamma}(0.0001, 0.0001)$ instead of $\text{gamma}(0.0625, 0.0625)$]. (Note that, for both of these “flat” distributions, the mean is relatively high: 1.0, but the gamma distribution parameters are expected to be relatively high).

For the LOOP data analysis, this procedure is applied for each frequency that was fitted with an empirical Bayes distribution. Then, to get the overall LOOP rate, simulate and monitor

$$\lambda_{LOOP} = \lambda_P + \lambda_S + \lambda_{G, Reliability Council} + \lambda_W$$

for the critical operation data and

$$\lambda_{LOOP} = \lambda_{P, plant} + \lambda_S + \lambda_G + \lambda_{W, grid}$$

for the shutdown data.

In each of these estimates, the appropriate inputs apply (based on critical operation data or on shutdown data). Where estimates from specific groups apply, particular groups are sampled in each iteration of the simulation in proportion to their contribution to the total critical operation or shutdown time.

In the 2007 and 2008 LOOP updates, hierarchical Bayes methods were not used. Separate diffuse priors were tracked and tuned for each group for each of the three estimates for which variation is considered. For some of the groups such as plants with sparse data, the priors remained diffuse and the associated means remained relatively high. The resulting overall LOOP occurrences rates were higher than the rates cited in the current LOOP Update. INL staff believe that these new estimates are more appropriate than the estimates previously supplied in Reference 1 and the two previous updates.

9. REFERENCES

1. S.A. Eide et al., *Reevaluation of Station Blackout Risk at Nuclear Power Plants*, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR-6890, December 2005.
2. W. S. Raughley and G. F. Lanik, *Operating Experience Assessment—Effects of Grid Events on Nuclear Power Plant Performance*, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-1784, December 2003.
3. C.L. Atwood et al., 2003, *Handbook of Parameter Estimation for Probabilistic Risk Assessment*, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR-6823, September 2003.

