



# CyberSHIELD: Securing Renewable Energy Infrastructure Against Cyber Attacks 2024 Spring O&M Users Group Meeting

April 2024

*Changing the World's Energy Future*

Daniel Alan Ricci, Jake P Gentle



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**April 2024**

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Idaho Falls, Idaho 83415**

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# CyberSHIELD: Securing Renewable Energy Infrastructure Against Cyber Attacks

## 2024 Spring O&M Users Group Meeting

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Battelle Energy Alliance manages INL for the  
U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Nuclear Energy



Idaho National Laboratory

# Jake P. Gentle

Portfolio Manager;  
Staff Supervisor;  
Secure Renewables and Grid Integration



## About Me

- M.S., Measurement and Controls Engineering – Idaho State University
- B.S., Electrical Engineering – Idaho State University
- Professional Affiliations:
  - The International Council on Large Electric Systems (CIGRE)
  - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
    - IEEE Power & Engineering Society
    - IEEE Standards Association
    - IEEE Overhead Lines Subcommittee
  - Smart Electric Power Alliance
    - Cybersecurity Working Group Co-Chair

## What I work on:

- Lead multiple programs focused on the secure integration of clean energy technologies including:
  - Cybersecurity roadmap for wind technologies
  - Wind and solar cybersecurity threat assessments
  - Resiliency and security of distributed energy technologies in microgrid applications
  - Deployable wind and solar energy technologies for defense applications
  - Enhanced methodologies of bare overhead line ratings, and facilitating the global advancement of transmission innovation
  - Verification and validation of Grid Enhancing Technologies like dynamic line rating

# Dan Ricci

## Technical leadership and Cybersecurity

### About Me

- 21-year Navy Veteran
- M.S. Computer Science from Lewis University
  - Focus in Cybersecurity Operations
- ISA99 Member for ISA/IEC 62443
- Remote to Idaho Falls facilities
- Local to Washington, D.C. DOE Facilities




### What I work on:

- Cyber Defense Operation & Incident Response for Navy Afloat & Shore Networks
- Network Intelligence and Analysis in Support of DoD Cyber-enabled Operations
- Project Management of DoD Acquisition Category (ACAT) I & II Programs
- Commercial & DoD ICS/SCADA Cyber Risk Assessments for Building Automation, Energy Management, Medium-Power, Process Control, and Water Treatment Systems
- Design & implementation of Vulnerability Management programs for Manufacturing Execution Systems (MES)
- Building Cybersecurity & Physical Security Programs
- Founder of ICS Advisory Project to provide open-source data visualization of ICS vulnerabilities for small & medium size asset owners

### EERE projects:

- WindSHIELD
- WaterSHIELD
- SolarSHIELD (S2G)
- Long Duration Energy Storage (LDES) Tiger Team



# Recent Renewable Energy Cyber Attacks



- Increased renewable sector influence
- Primary U.S. adversaries
  - China
  - Russia
  - Iran
  - North Korea
- Development of more sophisticated attacks



# Examples of Internal Threat Actors & Known Incidents

AOO	OEM	Utility	Maintainers	Integrators & other third-parties
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Disgruntled employee</li><li>• Phishing victim</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• (March 2022) Nordex SE hit by ransomware</li><li>• (Nov. 2023) Vestas hit by ransomware</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• (May 2023) Danish utilities compromised by coordinated attack, forcing islanded operations</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• (2018) U.S. technician accidentally downloaded malware from hotel, later plugged into wind plant network and turbines stopped working.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Software as a Service (SaaS) providers</li><li>• Data collectors</li><li>• Installers</li><li>• Developers</li></ul>



# Examples of External Threat Actors & Known Incidents

## Benign external actors

- Landowners
- Land tenants
- Land staff
- General public

## Activist groups

- (2019) Anti-wind protestors in Hawaii disrupt construction
- Rise in eco-terrorist attacks in Europe

## Criminal organizations

- Ransomware groups affected 3 wind companies within 6 months
- Exploiting known vulnerabilities
- Ex: (2019) IPP sPower affected by denial-of-service on comms equipment

## Nation-state actors

- Reconnaissance activity and advanced persistent threats (APTs)
- Russian attack on SATCOM infrastructure affected 5800 turbines
- Chinese espionage targeting offshore wind in Strait of Taiwan and India

# Attack Vectors

## Physical Access

- Physical device access
  - Takes time to respond to intrusions



## Cyber Access

- VPN exploitation
- Wireless
- Temporary access points
- Pivoting from enterprise network


## Transient Access

- Authorized external devices
- Infected technician equipment



# Impacts

- Asset health and damage
- Loss of remote monitoring
- Power system stability



*Critical failures can lead to severe physical damage.*

- Ancillary services
- Power dispatch
- Reputational damage



# Cyber SHIELD Overview: Program Initiatives

Cyber Security through Hardware Integration, Education, and Layered Defense:

## Industry Impact

Cyber SHIELD is an impactful program (people/tools) for industry and support the “raise the floor” objectives, the initial focus has been deployment across renewable sectors (Wind/Water/Solar) with three initiative options for participating engagement partners.

- Cyber Program Assessment
- Architecture Basics
- Asset Interaction Analysis

Each initiative is supported leveraging DOE-INL tools + INL team members to integrate with asset owners/operators existing operations.

## Program Evolution

This, like most INL tools and resource program is a constantly improving iterative process that builds upon successes and setbacks, but dependent on industry engagements

## Measuring Success

Measuring the success of this effort is truly dictated by the ability to have an impact within industry and drive investment by renewable sector in cybersecurity as a priority.



# INL Cyber SHIELD-INL CERT

## INL Cybersecurity Evaluation and Risk Tool

### Key Challenges Targeted

Provide insight and guidance for better informed, broader, risk-based investment decisions for renewable asset owners/operators IT and OT cybersecurity programs through Cybersecurity Evaluation and Risk Tool (CERT)

### Key features:

- ✓ Renewable Sector Focused Capability
- ✓ Open-Source and tuned for renewable industry
- ✓ Identifies gaps in Cybersecurity process and procedures

### Top 3 Benefits:

- 1 Guided cybersecurity assessment and risk-based report
- 2 Map network architecture within the assessment to control areas to help identify or validate asset owner/operator cyber posture
- 3 Support cyber program and resource planning to more quickly meet asset owner/operator maturity objectives by providing document templates and process flows to integrate with existing organization configuration management, maintenance, incident response/recovery procedures

CERT  
Program Assessment

CERT  
Architecture Basics

Network Diagram

# SHIELD–Malcolm

## Asset Interaction Analysis

### Key Challenges Targeted


Provide asset owners/operations with initial baseline of assets linked to operational technology (OT) and business processes. Detect and visualize threats and vulnerability identification/analysis for renewable OT environments.

### Key features:

- ✓ Malcolm: OT Asset to business processes mapping
- ✓ Log collection & analysis tool suite
- ✓ Increases cyber maturity adding visibility of assets and threats

### Top 3 Benefits:

- 1 Know assets, view of asset risk levels based on devices, protocols, misconfigurations.
- 2 Identify potential attacks, vulnerabilities, and active exploits impacting assets/devices.
- 3 Increases network visibility to make informed decisions and improve operational reliability.



### Threat Monitoring and Analytics



## SHIELD Tools Links

- CSET Renewable as its own branch: [cset-renewables-download.inl.gov](https://cset-renewables-download.inl.gov)
- Malcolm site for industry to interact with dashboards and view functionality: <https://training.malcolm.fyi/dashboards>
- Malcolm GitHub Site for industry to download and install on local hardware or virtual machine: <https://github.com/cisagov/Malcolm>
- CyberSHIELD Industry Engagement Website: <https://resilience.inl.gov/inlcybershield/>
- Email for specific program contacts: [CYBERSHIELD@INL.GOV](mailto:CYBERSHIELD@INL.GOV)



**Thank you!**