



# Threats to DERs and Tools to Mitigate Them

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*Changing the World's Energy Future*

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# **Threats to DERs and Tools to Mitigate Them**


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Infrastructure Security

# Threats to DERs and Tools to Mitigate Them

## Securing Solar for the Grid (S2G)

### SEIA's Security and Reliability Forum

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# Recent Renewable Energy Cyber Attacks



- Increased renewable sector influence
- Primary U.S. adversaries
  - China
  - Russia
  - Iran
  - North Korea
- Development of more sophisticated attacks



# Key Trends

- Exploitation of disclosed vulnerability
- Limited visibility and asset inventories
- Weak / hardcoded / plaintext storage of passwords
- OT systems are not the only target
- Denial-of-view and denial-of-service are common impacts
- OT security needs consideration of embedded IT systems
- Increased access to OT networks exposes a larger attack surface





# Vulnerability Exploitation in Clean Energy


- Weak credentials
    - Weak requirements
    - Hard-coded credentials
    - Passwords derived from available information
    - Plaintext storage
    - Weak encryption or authentication
  - Web page vulnerabilities allowing arbitrary code execution
  - Cross-site scripting vulnerabilities
  - Unauthorized access to sensitive files
  - Web apps were the most targeted service type followed by remote management protocols
  - 5 OT protocols were constantly targeted (Modbus was a third of attacks, DNP3 was about 18%)
  - RATs and information stealers were the most popular malware types
- Make sure the fix is really a fix
  - Best practices for storing sensitive information (i.e. passwords)
  - Web portal security

# Cyber SHIELD

*Cyber Security through Hardware Integration, Education, and Layered Defense*



Network Diagram



## Malcolm + Asset Interaction Analysis (AIA)

- ✓ OT Asset to business processes mapping
- ✓ Log collection & analysis tool suite
- ✓ Increases cyber maturity by adding visibility of assets and threats


## CSET – Cyber Security Evaluation Tool

- ✓ Renewable Sector Focused Capability
- ✓ Tuned for renewable industry
- ✓ Identifies gaps in Cybersecurity process and procedures



# S2D-C2M2


- Secure Design and Development Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model – SD2-C2M2
  - **Guided self assessment** of a **manufacturer or developer internal processes** for design, development, manufacture, and support of Operational Technology products
  - Assess over **800 Practice Statements** for implementation as:
    - Not Implemented (**NI**), Informally Implemented (**II**), Documented (**D**), Formally Implemented (**FI**)
  - Each Practice Statement **assigned a maturity level** of:
    - MIL 1 – Basic; MIL 2 – Intermediate; MIL 3 – Advanced



# Sol-ReMM



- Solar Power Resilience Maturity Model (Sol-ReMM)
  - Tool under development to assess **resilience of solar operator's cybersecurity operational practices**
    - Utility-scale, commercial, and industrial facilities
  - Includes Cybersecurity, Operational Security, and Physical Security
  - Self-evaluating the level of maturity of key components of their resilience program and **identifying programmatic improvements** to achieve resilience goals.
    - Management tool to determine desired maturity levels based on business drivers
  - **Compare assessments over time** to measure progress in addressing gaps
  - Modeled after existing maturity model tools (C2M2 tool suite),





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