



Addressing Consequence within Operational Risk (O.T. Gagnon III) 9-18-2024

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Changing the World's Energy Future

Ollie Gagnon



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Addressing Consequence within Operational Risk

Why threats and security are just not that important

2024 Aviation Cybersecurity Conference

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Transportation-Aviation-Airport Dependency Profile

(What is the most important airport infrastructure?)



FUNCTIONAL DEPENDENCY EXAMPLE: AIRPORTS

Internal Dependencies for Airport Operations

Airside Operations Passenger Ticketing Gate Operations Air Operations Center Ramp Operations & Cargo Runways Taxiways Apron Areas Deicing Aircraft Parking/Pushing	Landside Operations (cont.) Security Screening Area Inspection Areas Passenger Drop Off/Pick Up Rental Car Areas Baggage Handling
Communications Radio Equipment Cable TV Satellite Systems IT Servers	Safety & Security Security Ops Ctr Law Enforcement Fire EMS Emergency Mgmt EOC Contracted Security
Landside Operations Terminal Facility Aircraft Hangars Cargo Terminals Maintenance Tunnels/Facilities Fueling Areas Mechanical/Equipment Pedestrian Access Tunnels Aircraft Fueling Equipment Deicing Equip & Facilities Food Services Area Fuel Storage Area	Transportation Parking Garages Parking Lots EV Charging Areas Terminal Buses & Trams People Movers/Tram Helicopter Pad Roads/Highways
	Workforce Airside Ops Personnel Landside Ops Personnel



Dependencies are relationships of reliance within and among infrastructure assets and systems that must be maintained for those systems to operate and provide services*

- Types of Dependencies**
- Physical
 - Cyber
 - Logical
 - Geographic

External Dependencies for Airport Operations



Airlines Aircraft Air Traffic Control Control Facility Control Towers	Transportation Rideshare Rental Cars Public Transit Roads/Highways
Communications Fiber Optic Wireless Comms. Towers Cable TV Satellite Systems	Utilities Water Wastewater Electricity Garbage Recycling Petroleum Gas
Retail Food Shops Services	Workforce Air Marshals TSA Agents FAA ATC Personnel Customs Personnel USDA Inspections Personnel Air Crews (Pilots & FA) Airline Personnel Airport Personnel Retail Personnel
Safety & Security TSA Federal Air Security Customs & Immigration Local Law Enforcement Local Fire/EMS	

*Source: <https://www.cisa.gov/what-are-dependencies>

Image source: INL.gov

Elements of Risk

- **Threat:** A natural or manmade occurrence, individual, entity, or action that has or indicates the potential to harm.
- **Vulnerability:** A physical feature or operational attribute that renders an entity open to exploitation or susceptible.
- **Consequence:** The effect of an event, incident, or occurrence.



Assets, systems, and networks include one or more of the following elements:

Physical – tangible property;

Cyber – electronic information and communications systems, and the information contained therein, and

Human – critical knowledge or functions of people uniquely susceptible to attack.

How well do you know your operational risks?

Can your team list the top three critical systems, including their priorities, cyber and physical dependencies (internal/external), degree of IT/OT convergence, key stakeholders (internal/external), and the incident response and recovery plans?



Operational Risk

- Captures “the **uncertainties and hazards** a company faces when it attempts to do its day-to-day activities.”
- Results from “**breakdowns in internal procedures, people, and systems**,” and focuses on “how things are accomplished within an organization.”
- Determined by analyzing the **consequences**, vulnerabilities, and threats within its procedures, workforce, and systems.



Before an organization can consider vulnerabilities within and threats to its operations, it must first have a solid understanding of the consequences existing inside it's infrastructure environment.

Operational Risk (cont.)

Considerations:

- Infrastructure vs. Critical Infrastructure
- Security vs. Resilience
- Dependency vs. Interdependency



Operational Risk (cont.)

Reality

Most entities know all the components to be binned, their connections, their complexities, and their potential **consequences**.



Challenge

Knowledge is fractured into **operational silos** within the entity and/or all the **right people** needed to contribute to understanding the infrastructure environment are not part of the process.

- **Facility Engineer/Maintenance** and **Security Manager** have as much to contribute to understanding the cyber and physical infrastructure environment as the **Operations Manager/Director** and **Chief Information Officer**.
- **People (internal/external)** involved in directing, operating, maintaining, and supporting the cyber and physical infrastructure environment are essential to understanding and ultimately enhancing security and resilience.

The Realities of Cyberspace


INL's technical doctrine is based on the following assumptions:

- **Existing security efforts are insufficient** to protect control systems and the infrastructure they support against catastrophic technical attacks.
- **A determined, well-resourced and patient adversary WILL succeed** in penetrating and exploiting a critical infrastructure network.

*Given time and resources, cyber attackers
WILL have success*



Disrupting Cyber-enabled Sabotage on Critical Functions



The APPROACH (**Critical Function Assurance (CFA)**)

The WHAT to think about (**Cyber-informed Engineering (CIE)**)

A PROCESS to achieve it (**Consequence-driven Cyber-informed Engineering (CCE)**)



Understanding CFA, CIE and CCE (cont.)

- **Critical Function Assurance (CFA)** is a **foundational approach** to identifying, prioritizing, and mitigating the risk that is inherent in the delivery of critical functions that depend on digital technology. **(WHY)**
- **Cyber-informed Engineering (CIE)** is a **series of principles** focused on integrating cybersecurity considerations into the conception, design, development, and operation of any physical system that has digital connectivity, monitoring or control related to the delivery of a critical function. **(WHAT)**
- **Consequence-driven Cyber-informed Engineering (CCE)** can be thought of as a **repeatable process** to apply elements of CFA and CIE to achieve assurance of critical functions. **(HOW)**

Pillars of the National CIE Strategy



Awareness

Promulgate a universal and shared understanding of CIE



Education

Embed CIE into formal education, training, and credentialing



Development

Build the body of knowledge by which CIE is applied to specific implementations




Current Infrastructure

Apply CIE principles to existing systemically important critical infrastructure



Future Infrastructure

Conduct R&D and develop an industrial base to build CIE into new infrastructure systems and emerging technology



<https://www.energy.gov/>

CIE Principles (What to think about)


PRINCIPLE	KEY QUESTION
→ Consequence-Focused Design	How do I understand what critical functions my system must <u>ensure</u> and the undesired consequences it must <u>prevent</u> ?
Engineered Controls	How do I implement controls to reduce avenues for attack or the damage which could result?
Secure Information Architecture	How do I prevent undesired manipulation of important data?
Design Simplification	How do I determine what features of my system are not absolutely necessary?
→ Layered Defenses	How do I create the best compilation of system defenses?
Active Defense	How do I proactively prepare to defend my system from any threat?
Interdependency Evaluation	How do I understand where my system can impact others or be impacted by others?
Digital Asset Awareness	How do I understand where digital assets are used, what functions they are capable of, and our assumptions about how they work?
Cyber-Secure Supply Chain Controls	How do I ensure my providers deliver the security we need?
→ Planned Resilience	How do I turn “what ifs” into “even ifs”?
Engineering Information Control	How do I manage knowledge about my system? How do I keep it out of the wrong hands?
Cybersecurity Culture	How do I ensure that everyone performs their role aligned with our security goals?

SECURITY

Consequence-driven, Cyber-informed Engineering (CCE) (How to achieve it)

Structured Evaluation to Achieve Functional Assurance

CCE is a structured process to apply CIE principles to understand how cyber-enabled sabotage could result in events that threaten national security and business viability, then identify the engineering changes or operational controls that eliminate or significantly reduce the risk of those events.



2019 R&D 100 Award winner for cyber protection of critical infrastructure

<https://inl.gov/national-security/cce/>

DOE CIE and DHS CISA SBD Relationship

“While CISA’s Secure by Design campaign by itself has great implications for society at writ large and especially the ICS community, I do want to take a moment to also acknowledge how **this effort critically intersects with and supports the Department of Energy’s Cyber-Informed Engineering work which supports the resilience of our infrastructure** by ensuring that we’re engineering cyber-attacks out of the system.”



“Look, partnership is fundamental, innovation is critical. **Balancing and strongly moving forward on both fronts will be essential to ensuring the security of the nation's critical infrastructure.**”

*Jen Easterly, Director
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency*



*Hack the Capitol
May 30, 2024*



<https://cisa.gov>

**Addressing Consequence within Operational Risk:
Why threats (plus vulnerabilities) and security are
just not as important...**

as...

**Consequence (First Risk Consideration) and
Resilience (Desired Outcome)**

Thank You!