



Advanced Reactor Safeguards Scenario Timeline Exploration

May 2022

Changing the World's Energy Future

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**Prepared for the
U.S. Department of Energy
Under DOE Idaho Operations Office
Contract DE-AC07-05ID14517**



ADVANCED REACTOR SAFEGUARDS

Scenario Exploration and Timeline Analysis for Microreactors

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
Curtis Smith, Director, Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Research

May 2022


Motivation on Scenario and Uncertainty Research and Development

- Advanced reactors will be able to **use risk insights** for many design aspects
 - Example risk-informed approach is found in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's SECY-19-0117
 - Probability is widespread through the guidance via a safety case
 - Probabilistic concepts are built into metrics, such as the frequency-consequence curve
- We need **bounding scenarios** for screening and scoping purposes
- We need **realistic scenarios** for input into the licensing basis safety-case
 - These scenarios must include timing and physics
- We need to **manage inherent uncertainty**
- We need to **automate** the safety-case creation as much as possible

Advanced Reactor Design Attributes have Links to Frequency-Consequence Metrics




(derived from NEI 18-04)




Attributes of the Demonstration Infrastructure




- Simulation to develop a risk-informed safety case
 - A highly transparent, traceable, scrutable framework
 - Used to inform all stakeholders (developers, regulators, operators)
- Leverage established technologies (e.g., EMRALD) for simulations
 - Risk scenario-based analyses & treatment of associated uncertainties
 - Uncertainties are captured by automating the “state space”
 - The state space represents variations in scenarios and outcomes
- Manage complex workflows to facilitate successful design evolution
 - Inform security design evolution from early design to operations
 - Also support creation of the technical basis



Modeling and Analysis in EMRALD (notional)





Timeline Analysis in EMRALD





Example: Adversary Sequence Modeling in EMRALD

This is a hypothetical facility for demonstration purposes only.



Library of Barriers and Other Model Pieces





Barriers


- Fences
- Sticky Foam
- Concrete Walls
- Security Doors
- Etc.

Properties



- Delay Time
- Equipment Requirements
- Detection Probability
- Etc.



Consequence Analysis



Sample Results & Insights



Summary: EMRALD Capabilities for Adv. Reactors

Different Attack Scenarios

- Different paths
- Adversary capabilities
 - Strategies
 - Equipment
 - Variations

Sample Space

- Timings
- Probabilities
- Outcomes

Results & Insights

- Quantitative and qualitative results
- Sensitivities
- Visualization

Portfolio of Hazards/Targets

- List of targets: target super-set
- Combination of targets
- Initiating events as starting point
- Ability to integrate with other hazard types

Different Plant Layout

- Target set
- Topology
 - Geographical entities
 - Impact on timings
 - Plant structures
- Security posture
 - Protective strategies
 - Barriers
 - Responses
 - Law enforcement
 - Recalling off-duty personnel
- Important physics of the advanced reactor

Consequences from EMRALD

- Based on what has failed during a scenario
- To achieve insights that give frequency / consequence curve
- Level 2-3 analysis in EMRALD
 - Capture impact on timings
 - Integration with thermal hydraulics codes: MELCOR / MAAP / RELAP5



<https://github.com/inl-labtrack/EMRALD>

And Thanks to the INL Team

Robby Christian
Chris Chwasz
Shawn St. Germain
Steven Prescott
Vaibhav Yadav

