



# Cybersecurity for System Operators

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*Changing the World's Energy Future*

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# **Cybersecurity for System Operators**

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF  
**ENERGY**

Office of  
Cybersecurity, Energy Security,  
and Emergency Response

# Cybersecurity for System Operators



2023 SERC System Operator Conference



Cybersecurity for the  
Operational Technology  
Environment

# Operational Technology (OT) Security Challenge

- Multidiscipline teams struggle to see and act on early indicators of attack
- Technology alone is insufficient to defend complex and interconnected energy sector systems – human involvement needed



## Industry-Identified Gaps

- Training
- Communication across disciplines
- Prioritizing attention to anomalies
- Too much noise from sensors and other data sources
- Incorporation of physical indicators



# Different mental models of risk



VS.



# Organizational environment?

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<https://pxhere.com/en/photo/1053142>



# Organizational environment!



<https://www.flickr.com/photos/pugetsoundenergy/37702347174>



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<https://pxhere.com/en/photo/1053142>



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<https://nara.getarchive.net/media/hoboken-nj-nov-5-2012-supervising-engineer-for-public-service-electric-and-769325>



# Make it intuitive




# CyOTE Vision

Improved **human-led**, technology-enabled analysis of the OT environment at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

CyOTE **advances capabilities** to help energy system operators better **detect anomalies** in their operational environments, **identify cyber-attacks** earlier in the attack chain, and act decisively to **prevent or limit damage**.


# Stuff happens...



- **Observable:** an occurrence that can be perceived
- **Anomaly:** an observable different from what is expected or “normal”
- **Triggering event:** an anomaly that merits investigation




# Central Concept



[https://www.nerc.com/comm/RSTC\\_Reliability\\_Guidelines/SA\\_for\\_System\\_Operators.pdf](https://www.nerc.com/comm/RSTC_Reliability_Guidelines/SA_for_System_Operators.pdf)

- Adapted from Endsley's 1995 Model of Situation Awareness
- **Perception:** individual human ability to detect an observable
- **Comprehension:** organizational human ability to understand an observable


# The CYOTE Methodology



- Understand the information you have, not get more data
- Applies concepts of perception and comprehension to a world of knowns and unknowns
- MITRE ATT&CK® Framework for ICS describes threat behaviors
- Goal is making a risk-informed decision to conduct incident response or to treat as a reliability failure

# NERC Reliability Guideline: Cyber Intrusion Guide for System Operators, v2


- Guide to assist System Operators in recognizing events that may be an indicator of a cyber attack, and what to do and expect
  - Understand your role and expectations according to your company's Cyber Security Incident Response Plan
  - Provide *examples* of anomalies that *could be* associated with malicious cyber activity
  - Help plan owners understand and consider System Operators' perspectives
- Practically applicable beyond System Operators in RC, BA, and TOP roles





# Could this be a sign of an attack?

- Sophisticated attacks targeting control systems often first appear as malfunctions, misoperations, or maintenance problems
  - On computer workstations
  - On protection and controls equipment
  - Other unusual occurrences
- Use a questioning attitude
- “See something, say something”



# Initial actions and internal notifications

- Follow your company's plan and your supervisor's guidance!
- Continue to operate the system safely and reliably
- Escalations and notifications
  - OT or EMS, IT support and Cybersecurity
  - Field personnel
- Be ready to provide details on observed and potential effects



# Response actions and external communications

- Follow your company's plan and your supervisor's guidance!
- *Possible* actions you may be asked to take:
  - Notify other operators
  - Guidance on release of information
  - Support isolation of devices or systems
- Be prepared to take operational actions in support of the investigation





# For more information

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Visit [cyote.inl.gov](https://cyote.inl.gov)

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NERC's Reliability Guidelines, Security  
Guidelines, Technical Reference  
Documents, and White Papers

[https://www.nerc.com/comm/Pages/  
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